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Children are particularly vulnerable to the excess of small arms and light weapons in Libya.  
Photo courtesy of Paul Jeffrey.
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The mine-action community has always set standards for global hu-
manitarian intervention by tapping into our strengths—we get directly 
involved in the success of communities, and we use these experiences to 
tailor future interventions.
Working with explosive-ordnance-disposal expert Colin King and 
JMU faculty, and with support from the Office of Weapons Removal 
and Abatement in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs (PM/WRA), in 2010 CISR completed a two-year study 
on the effects of aging on landmines. Since its publication on the CISR 
website (http://cisr.jmu.edu/research/aging/aging_intro.html), dozens 
of practitioners have commented on the Landmine Aging Study's wide 
application in real-world settings. With this in mind, we ask demining 
practitioners to help us move forward as a community and continue this 
important research.
The premise is simple: Collect information on the condition of the mu-
nitions and explosives you encounter in the field. By following standard 
clearance procedures, organizations can provide valuable information 
without dismantling landmines. External conditions give a good indica-
tion of internal conditions. Even with in situ demolition, trained experts 
can assess and record the conditions of landmines as they render posi-
tive visual identification.
Basic information on the condition of landmines plays a critical role in 
understanding munitions life cycles. The Landmine Aging Study team 
recommended engaging with field projects to collect additional data. 
Involving the largest possible number of operational organizations 
working within normal procedures and practices will have a significant 
impact on this research and our community. To facilitate this process, 
we have created a form for practitioners to track the conditions of muni-
tions found. You can download the form from the Aging Study website: 
http://bit.ly/JVNIBJ. Please send completed forms to cisr@jmu.edu, and 
we will maintain a database of the information collected in order to in-
form future aging research. 
As we have seen with the first iteration of the Landmine Aging Study, 
collecting and analyzing information readily available to practitioners 
can improve clearance operations, prioritization and mine-risk educa-
tion. Once again, we can come together as a community and set a stan-





Photo courtesy of Missouri State University Photo Services.
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S Unplanned Explosions at Munitions  
   Sites: Concerns and Consequences
Over the past 25 years there have been reports of more than 400 unplanned explosions at munitions 
sites in almost half the world’s countries. The UEMS rate is quickly increasing. Whereas the Small 
Arms Survey’s UEMS Database shows 70 such incidents for the 10-year period between 1987 and 
1996, more than this number was registered in the past two years alone. These events occur in large 
part because states store their munitions improperly. This article reviews the direct and indirect con-
sequences of these explosions on peace and security. It also notes steps states are taking—or should 
take—to improve practice in stockpile management.
by Eric G. Berman and Pilar Reina [ Small Arms Survey ]
The Small Arms Survey defines unplanned explosions at munitions sites as accidents resulting in the explosions of abandoned, damaged, improperly stored or prop-
erly stored stockpiles of munitions and explosives. Munitions 
sites comprise storage areas such as those temporarily main-
tained during demilitarization or explosive-ordnance dispos-
al. Processing sites, whether temporary or permanent, are also 
considered munitions sites. Ammunition-manufacturing fa-
cilities (ordnance factories) are not included in this definition, 
but accidents during ammunition-processing operations with-
in munitions sites were included where known.1
The SAS has recorded unplanned explosions in 94 coun-
tries since 1987 (see Figure 1 on page 6). Explosions have re-
portedly occurred on every continent except Antarctica and 
Australia. The UEMS Database reveals more than a twofold 
increase in the number of incidents from 1997–2006 com-
pared to the previous 10-year period. Furthermore, the aver-
age number of incidents from 2007–2011 is almost 50 percent 
greater than that of the preceding five years. An average of sev-
en incidents were recorded per year during 1987–1996. Yet in 
2011, more than seven incidents occurred every two months.
Several factors contribute to the explanation of the in-
crease. Multilateral political and legal processes at the global 
and regional levels may have compelled governments to sub-
mit more comprehensive reports on UEMS. Perhaps states 
have become more willing to acknowledge the occurrence 
of such explosions to garner financial resources and techni-
cal expertise that previously was unavailable. (Since 2000, 
for example, the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency has 
funded projects to destroy surplus ordnance and improve 
physical security and stockpile management practices.)2 
Another reason may be that increased public access to infor-
mation via social media could simply make it more difficult 
to keep UEMS secret.3
In assisting countries with their PSSM needs, ammuni-
tion-storage specialists focus on technical causes for UEMS. 
Such experts note that the propellants, fuzes, primers and 
explosive components comprising ammunition become un-
stable over time. Poor storage conditions, inadequate surveil-
lance and insufficient testing can exacerbate an inherently 
hazardous situation. Although the causes for many reported 
UEMS remain unknown and official explanations may be er-
roneous or misleading, a dearth of local expertise on ammu-
nition and explosives safety is clearly a contributing factor.
The direct effects of unplanned explosions are numerous. A 
single incident can result in significant casualties. In January 
2002, one particularly deadly explosion in Lagos, Nigeria re-
portedly claimed the lives of more than 1,000 people and in-
jured 5,000 more.4 Another direct consequence of UEMS is the 
dispersion of fragmented ordnance. Unexploded ordnance can 
be propelled over long distances, thus representing immedi-
ate and long-term dangers to neighboring civilians as well as 
military personnel assigned to clean up the affected area. For 
example, in June 2011, in the Udmurtian village of Pugachevo 
in the Russian Federation, a fire expanded across 18 storage fa-
cilities, triggering a blast that was felt across a 10-kilometer ra-
dius (6.2 miles) and that spread explosive fragments over the 
surrounding 16 hectares (39.5 acres).5
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A single event can also result in the displacement of thou-
sands of people. In Uzbekistan, 60,000 Kagan residents were 
displaced in 2008 after more than 150 million rounds of am-
munition exploded.6 Later that year an explosion in eastern 
Ukraine’s Karhkiv Oblast resulted in a 14,000-person evacu-
ation from the city of Lozovaya because of the ensuing fire 
and blast effects.7 In 2011, a Venezuelan army depot exploded 
in Maracay, forcing the evacuation of 10,000 people.8 Later in 
the same year, after an explosion in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 
some 4,000 people fled their homes near the army base for 
shelter in a stadium.9
In addition to such widespread and long-lasting effects, 
UEMS can cause extensive damage to infrastructure. In mid-
2011, an explosion in Cyprus crippled the island’s primary 
power plant. Daily power cuts across the island ensued, ad-
versely affecting the economy and exacerbating an escalating 
political crisis.10 Accounts of unplanned explosions tend to 
focus on the value of the material destroyed and the costs of 
the subsequent clean-up, especially when an external donor is 
engaged. More attention should focus on the longer-term eco-
nomic impacts and consequences for affected communities.11
Another indirect effect of poorly managed stockpiles is the 
diversion of state-owned weapons and ammunition to unin-
tended recipients. The absence of accurate record-keeping in-
hibits accountability and facilitates corruption, e.g., security 
forces renting or selling their weapons and ammunition. Poor 
storage practices can enable such misconduct, making it dif-
ficult to keep track of inventories, as is the case when recov-
ered items—such as weapons, ammunition or explosives used 
in training or confiscated from the public—are haphazardly 
tossed onto piles or into open or loose crates.
Preventing UEMS sometimes calls for expensive strate-
gies to implement and may require external assistance. The 
international community is addressing this challenge. Some 
sites may need to be closed and have their ordnance moved 
to other locations at significant cost. New sites, incorporating 
A government depot in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Photo courtesy of Gwenn Dubourthoumieu/MAG.
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Figure 1. Unplanned explosion locations as recorded by SAS.
Graphic courtesy of CISR
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quantity-distance12 principles and se-
curity features, may need construction 
from scratch. These concerns are ad-
dressed by groups such as the Regional 
Approach to Stockpile Reduction 
Initiative, an ad hoc coalition of nine 
countries from Southeast Europe that 
agreed to share information on their 
surplus stockpiles and demilitarization 
capacities to achieve economies of scale 
and to generate international support.13 
Many measures, however, can be 
undertaken unilaterally and with 
modest investment. As depicted in 
the RASR PSSM Best Practice cards,14 
states can achieve positive results with-
out major infrastructure projects. They 
can do so by installing proper doors 
and locks, using adequate fences and 
barriers, posting signs to warn and in-
form, and organizing the stockpile into 
stacks and aisles free of obstruction. 
Given the high human and economic 
costs of unplanned explosions, policy-
makers should appreciate the value of 
such modest investments.
Numerous challenges remain. The 
U.N. and several regional organizations 
have developed PSSM best practice and 
technical guidelines. However, such guid-
ance does not necessarily cover all obsta-
cles encountered in practice.15 Solutions 
themselves can generate new challenges. 
For example, a number of explosions at 
demilitarization plants raise questions 
about the efficacy of existing national 
controls, oversight and coordination with 
commercial contractors.16 The upcoming 
Second Review Conference of the U.N. 
Programme of Action on Small Arms 
(August/September 2012) will provide 
the international community with an im-
portant opportunity to track progress 
and consider improvements to practices 
in the field.17 
See endnotes page 81
Figure 2. The Physical Security and Stockpile Management Best Practice Cards, produced by the Small Arms Survey for the 
Regional Approach to Stockpile Reduction Initiative, provide guidance on best practice for stockpile management.
MAP FOOTNOTES:
 
ALBANIA: In 1997 more than a dozen explo-
sions at ammunition depots were reported dur-
ing social unrest in several towns throughout 
Albania.
ARMENIA: The explosion in Armenia occurred 
in a depot owned by Russia's 7th Army. 
AZERBAIJAN: One of the explosions occurred 
in Azerbaijan in 1991 (no date reported) when 
the country was probably still a republic of the 
Soviet Union.   Azerbaijan regained its indepen-
dence de facto in 25 December 1991, when 
the dissolution of the Union Soviet occurred.
CHINA: This includes 10 incidents recorded in 
Taiwan, a province of China.  
CZECH REPUBLIC: The two reported inci-
dents took place before 31 December 1992, 
when Czechoslovakia ceased to exist as a sin-
gle state, but in the region that  became the 
Czech Republic.
ISRAEL: The two incidents took place in the 
Palestinian Territories.  
SOUTH SUDAN: The two incidents were re-
corded in Juba (2005 and 2007) after Sudan 
signed  the Comprehensive Peace Agree-
ment (9 January 2005) and before South 
Sudan became independent (14 July 2011) 
from Sudan.  
LUXEMBOURG: The depot where the incident 
took place has been the Belgian Army's main 
munitions store since 1993.    
 
RUSSIA: Three explosions in the Russian Fed-
eration happened while it was still the USSR. 
    
Sources:  Wilkinson (2011); Zahacewsky 2011); 
Small Arms Survey (forthcoming).   
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How DTRA/SCC-WMD is Minimizing 
   the Risk of Catastrophic Accidents  
   Across the Globe
The U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating 
Weapons of Mass Destruction are taking measures to reduce the number of accidents caused by 
conventional weapons. More accidents are occurring with the proliferation of small arms and light 
weapons; DTRA wants to significantly reduce those accidents and the risks of their occurrence. In 
doing so, DTRA’s SA/LW Program organizes and conducts seminars on the practices for physical 
security and stockpile management throughout the world. Its goal is to educate countries through 
seminars on proper management of stockpiles and to ultimately assuage the risk of those weapons 
becoming available to insurgents.
by Anne Marek [ DTRA/SCC-WMD ]
On 6 April 1994, two man-portable air-defense mis-siles, or MANPADS, struck an aircraft in mid-air carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, 
causing the plane to erupt into flames and crash into the gar-
dens of the Rwandan presidential palace. The crash killed both 
presidents and propelled one of the bloodiest conflicts of the 
late 20th century, including a Rwandan genocide that killed 
more than 800,000 people.1 Responsibility for the attack re-
mains disputed, but the method—MANPADS, commonly 
referred to as shoulder-fired anti-
aircraft missiles—demonstrates the 
tragic and destabilizing consequenc-
es that can occur when convention-
al weapons and munitions fall into 
dangerous hands.
During the Cold War (1945–
1991), millions of small arms and 
light weapons—pistols, machine 
guns, shoulder-launched anti-air-
craft missiles and rocket-propelled 
grenades—were manufactured and shipped around the 
world. Since then, many of these weapons have fueled local 
and international armed conflicts and supplied low-level ter-
rorists and non-state actors with the ability to cause wide-
spread casualties and economic disaster.
The United Nations estimates that conventional firearms 
kill more than 500,000 people worldwide every year,2 with the 
bulk of these deaths occurring in conflict zones of developing 
regions. MANPADS have hit at least 40 civilian aircraft since 
the 1970s, and these weapons continue to pose a threat to com-
mercial aviation.
DTRA’s SA/LW Program
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s SA/LW Program 
plays a critical role in reducing SA/LW across the globe. The 
branch assists foreign governments with improving security, 
safety and management of state-controlled stockpiles of SA/LW, 
MANPADS and conventional ammu-
nition. SA/LW experts provide for-
eign governments with assessments, 
technical advice and orientation 
seminars on the best international 
practices for physical security and 
stockpile management. By securing 
and managing these stockpiles, the 
DTRA’s SA/LW Program limits the 
availability of weapons and ammu-
nition to terrorists and insurgents. 
DTRA helps reduce regional exposure to destabilizing cross-
border weapons transfers and minimizes the risk around the 
world of catastrophic accidents caused by improperly stor-
ing weapons.
“The whole world is affected by the proliferation of small 
arms and light weapons. If it’s not a concern for tracking and 
tracing, it’s a concern for import and export control, or it’s 
a concern for illegal trafficking,” says SA/LW Branch Chief 
“Nobody has been killed by a nuclear 
weapon or dirty bomb in 50 years, but 
people get killed by small arms and 
light weapons on a daily basis. These 
weapons are much easier to acquire, 
conceal and transport. They are the 
everyday tool of a terrorist.” 
~ Brett Wise, SA/LW Internal Relations 
Specialist and SOUTHCOM/PACOM Desk Office
10
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Larry Schultz. “The channels used to smuggle drugs and oth-
er illegal substances are the same channels used to smuggle 
weapons and ammunition.”3
DTRA’s on-site Inspection Directorate first became in-
volved in PSSM, following a deadly ammunition explosion 
in Guyana in 2000. Prior to this accident, the agency’s focus 
centered primarily on arms-control treaties and activities in 
the former Soviet Union. However, after the Guyana event, 
DTRA, with its experience in conducting military missions 
in sensitive environments, was asked to provide technical 
expertise to the U.S. Department of State to help foreign na-
tions safely secure and store stockpiles of arms, ammuni-
tions and explosives. 
Over the next few years, DTRA developed and conducted 
orientation seminars to assist nations with securing national 
SA/LW and ammunition stores. In 2006, DTRA was designat-
ed the executive agent for supporting SA/LW destruction ini-
tiatives, providing assistance to countries wishing to improve 
the security of their stockpiles of small arms and ammuni-
tion. Since then, the agency’s SA/LW expertise has continued 
to grow significantly as the types and number of missions have 
developed and evolved. 
DTRA’s SA/LW Outreach
Currently, program requests come from a number of 
sources: U.S. Embassies, U.S. regional combatant com-
mands (European Command, Central Command, Northern 
Command, Africa Command, Southern Command and 
Pacific Command), the U.S. Department of State, host na-
tions and multilateral organizations. For each request, DTRA 
conducts a thorough, routine coordination process that seeks 
concurrence from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Joint Staff, appropriate staff offices and the partner coun-
try’s U.S. Embassy. Through additional coordination with 
the United Nations, NATO, the Multinational Small Arms 
and Ammunition Group, the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe and other nations’ arms-control and 
Steps in a Small Arms and Light Weapons Request
1. SA/LW experts meet with host government.
2. Host government requests assistance.
3. SA/LW team performs assessment of host government’s munitions, weapons, storage and safety.
4. Assessment results are reported to the local U.S. Embassy.
5. The local U.S. Embassy reports assessment findings to the host government.
6. SA/LW team reports results to U.S. Department of State for funding consideration.
7. SA/LW team shares best practices with host government to correct problems.
8. Host government may implement best practices with or without funding or U.S. assistance.
Senior Technical Officer, Bill Johnson, assesses an 
ammunition storage area in Southeast Asia, Fall 2010.
All graphics courtesy of Defense Threat Reduction Agency/
USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass  
Destruction [DTRA/SCC-WMD].
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verification agencies, the program has 
mediated many U.S. bilateral and mul-
tilateral commitments.
In less than a decade, DTRA has 
conducted PSSM assessment missions 
and seminars in 60 countries world-
wide. DTRA-recommended solutions, 
ranging from the destruction of con-
ventional weapons to the building of 
more secure SA/LW storage facilities, 
may receive funding from the Office of 
Weapons Removal and Abatement in 
the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of 
Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA).
 “We’ve done assessments everywhere 
you can imagine,” says SA/LW Internal 
Relations Specialist and Southern 
Command/Pacif ic Command Desk 
Off icer Brett Wise. “Sometimes we 
have to remind people that just because 
a place is nice to visit doesn’t mean it 
doesn’t have problems.”4 For instance, 
in 2010, fisherman in the Galapagos 
Islands retrieved nine severely corroded 
World War II-era bombs left over from 
an abandoned military airbase in 1947. 
A Navy-led investigation revealed that 
local fishermen have occasionally pulled 
up and released aircraft bombs from 
territorial waters, and a large number of 
these bombs remain on the seafloor. In 
addition, a small quantity of aging am-
munition was found near the abandoned 
U.S. military base. Concerned about the 
potential threat to its tourist industry, 
the Ecuadorian Government requested 
U.S. assistance to address the problem. 
DTRA conducted a subsequent threat 
assessment, identified all the risks 
and made recommendations on how 
Ecuador could best consolidate and de-
stroy the aging munitions.
“That base was built at a time when 
those islands were considered by 
some, to be a worthless wasteland,” 
says SA/LW Program Manager Billy 
Johnson. “It wasn’t until years later, 
when Ecuador realized the ecological 
importance of the area, that they be-
gan protecting it. Those islands are now 
a major source of tourism for Ecuador. 
So an accident there could have seriously 
affected their income stream.”5 
The SA/LW Program may seem 
like an unusual fit for an agency fo-
cused on countering weapons of mass 
destruction—chemical, radiological, 
biological, nuclear and high-yield 
explosives—but its mission is shared. 
High-yield explosives, technically classi-
fied as SA/LW, are one of the most eas-
ily acquired forms of CBRNE materials 
and, depending on the amount and loca-
tion of the explosives, can prove as dead-
ly as their chemical, biological or nuclear 
counterparts. 
Additionally, the cooperative rela-
tionships that DTRA built through the 
SA/LW Program demonstrate that the 
agency can help partner countries con-
trol and reduce weapons within their 
own borders while providing assis-
tance and training as it relates to weap-
ons of mass destruction.
Table 1. Destruction activities funded and administered by the U.S. Department of State.
SA/LW Technical Advisor Ben Cacioppo assesses an ammunition storage site in 
Central America, summer 2010.
SA/LW by the Numbers
Total Assessed (Since 2001) Total Destroyed (Since 2001)
Total MANPADS 26,607 32,000
Total SA/LW 1,657,500 1,500,000
Total Ammunition (Tons) 2,686,296 90,000
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In November 2010, DTRA U.S. Strategic Command 
Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Director 
Kenneth Myers joined U.S. Senator Richard (Dick) Lugar 
(R-Indiana), Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, 
Chemical and Biological Defense Programs Andrew C. Weber, 
and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Global Strategic 
Affairs Ken Handelman, in leading a mission to Burundi 
where experts from the Departments of State and Defense are 
working closely with the Burundi Government to destroy 
weapons and ammunition stockpiles through the Lugar-
Obama SA/LW Destruction Program. The program is a by-
product of the Nunn-Lugar 
Global Cooperative Threat 
Reduction effort that has suc-
ceeded in securing, storing 
and eliminating weapons of 
mass destruction for more 
than two decades. “Whether 
we’re dealing with conven-
tional weapons or dirty 
bombs, physical security and stockpile management is a large 
part of what this agency does,” says SA/LW Deputy Branch 
Chief and European Command/Central Command Desk 
Officer John Schmitt. “Stockpile management of explosives 
can help prevent catastrophic events 
like Khobar Towers and the Oklahoma 
City bombing…”6,7
The program’s success is not with-
out its challenges. Three of the pro-
gram’s desk officers break down the 
six geographic combatant commands. 
Together, with a staff of 11, they must 
brief every defense attaché and every se-
curity officer that enters host countries. 
Program desk officers must prepare 
personnel for what to expect when they 
arrive and educate them on how the 
SA/LW Program can assist their coun-
try with physical security and stockpile 
management. They must gain the trust 
and respect of the host country to allow 
them to enter the country and assess the 
host’s weapons and munitions. 
“We can’t just come in and say, ‘We 
want to look at all your stockpiles and 
possibly destroy some of them,’ because 
they don’t always understand why,” says 
Wise.4 “So we go into their country in a cooperative manner 
and tell them that we know they are the true experts of what 
they need for their own defense purposes. We explain that we 
just want to make sure that whatever they have is being se-
cured properly, but that’s not always easy to do.” 
In 2008, DTRA approached Tanzania through the U.S. 
Embassy to offer an assessment of the facility in the Mbagala 
district of Tanzania, which had long been identified as a con-
cern. However, Tanzania did not take advantage of the op-
portunity. The following year, an ammunition explosion at 
the facility killed 26 people, injured hundreds more and de-
stroyed more than 7,000 homes. 
DTRA offered to help the coun-
try secure its facilities, but 
Tanzania again declined. Two 
years later, an army munitions 
bunker housing aging ammuni-
tion exploded in Mbagala near 
the international airport. The 
explosion killed at least 20 peo-
ple and wounded more than 100.8
“Unfortunately, this happens,” says SA/LW Africa Command 
Desk Officer Chanda Brown. “We offer our assistance to coun-
tries, and they don’t take it. They have so many other factors 
African weapons storage facility, summer 2010.
“The [U.S.] State Department was given the 
mandate to finance destruction of these weap-
ons for the U.S., but they did not have the nec-
essary technical expertise to do it. DTRA 
became the technical set of eyes to help the 
State Department carry out that mission.”
~ Larry Schultz, SA/LW Branch Chief
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for instability—coups, changes in leadership and natural di-
sasters—that they don’t always see us as a priority. But when 
they do agree to schedule a meeting with us, and they don’t can-
cel… when they listen to what we can do for them and seem to 
want to make a difference… when they actually work to make 
tangible improvements themselves or follow up with the State 
Department for assistance… that’s what I view as a success.”9
In March 2011, a SA/LW team deployed to the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo was preparing to conduct a seminar at 
a base attached to the DRC presidential palace when 60 armed 
SA/LW Technical Advisor Ben Cacioppo escorts U.S. Senator Richard Lugar and U.S. officials at a storage facility in Burundi,  
Fall 2010.
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rebels stormed the compound in a vi-
olent attempt to assassinate President 
Joseph Kabila of the DRC. In a hail of 
gunfire, numerous soldiers and rebels 
were killed; the compound was closed 
for investigation, and the SA/LW team 
was forced to relocate the seminar. “We 
were teaching our seminar to the par-
ticipants from the base that was at-
tacked,” says SA/LW Africa Command 
Technical Advisor Ben Cacioppo. “With 
everything that had just happened, it 
was difficult to get their mindset back 
onto some of the things we were talking 
about … but we talked about the tragedy 
and what could have prevented it to re-
focus them on why we were there.”10
Although the global effort to secure 
SA/LW has increased, the threat posed 
by these weapons persists. Large am-
munition stockpiles accumulated dur-
ing the Cold War continue deteriorating 
around the world, and many countries, 
especially those without strong diplo-
matic ties to the United States, do not 
request assistance until an accident oc-
curs. “One of the most difficult things 
about this program is that we can’t do 
an assessment until they invite us in,” 
says Brown. “When they do invite us in, 
we prefer to do our assessments first, but 
when that is not possible, we can use our 
seminars as a lead into the assessments. 
That way, we are informing countries 
that aren’t familiar with us, and don’t 
know why we’re there or what we’re re-
ally after, before we do the assessment. 
Basically, we’re trying to earn their trust 
and build relationships where we can.”9
In coordination with multilateral or-
ganizations and the arms control and ver-
ification agencies of like-minded nations, 
the SA/LW Program assists nations with 
stockpile management and building last-
ing relations with the countries where it 
conduct missions. “It’s an education pro-
cess worldwide,” says Schmitt. “It is free 
for these countries for us to come in 
(and that’s what we try to sell them on), 
listen to what we have to say and if 
there’s a problem, we tell them how to fix 
it. For the most part, the solutions we of-
fer don’t break the bank, but if you think 
about how much human suffering and 
economic turmoil that an accident in one 
of these places may create, our program is 
a real value.”6 
See endnotes page 81
~ Reprinted with permission from 
The Shield, Volume 1, Issue 3, Fall 2011
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“We help prevent humanitarian disasters, and we do it on a rela-
tively small budget. We would prefer to spend a couple thousand 
taxpayer dollars upfront over millions of dollars worth of humani-
tarian aid following a disaster.”
~ Ben Cacioppo, SA/LW Technical Advisor
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Small Arms/Light Weapons and  
   Physical Security in Misrata, Libya
During November 2011 DanChurchAid performed a small arms/light weapons field assessment in 
Misrata, Libya. In this article, DCA outlines this assessment and explains why SA/LW risk education 
is a valuable and appropriate response to this situation.
by Adam Forbes [ DanChurchAid ]
The proliferation of small arms and light weapons is a common civil-war legacy, often thought to exacer-bate post-conf lict insecurity and instability within 
a country and beyond its borders.1 SA/LW proliferation is 
a potentially sensitive and dynamic issue for international 
nongovernmental organizations to address; this issue be-
comes more difficult in the immediate aftermath of war and 
major uprisings. 
The 2011 uprising in Libya and the accompanying influx of 
SA/LW into civilian communities prompted DanChurchAid 
to evaluate the SA/LW situation in Libya.2  A recent field 
assessment undertaken by DCA in Misrata determined 
that, within the areas visited and at the time of the assess-
ment, SA/LW were not contributing to insecurity in the po-
litical or criminal sense. However, DCA found that SA/LW 
did represent an immediate threat to personal security and 
should be the legitimate focus of humanitarian efforts to re-
duce the risks to civilians. 
SA/LW in Misrata
Misrata saw some of the heaviest fighting in the 2011 
Libyan uprising. Under the Moammar Gadhafi regime, few 
people were authorized to own small arms apart from some 
hunters and farmers. However, the events of 2011 caused the 
civilian population to acquire a large and unknown number 
of SA/LW via combat, stockpile seizure or the black market. 
At a macro-level, Misrata was secured in late 2011. 
Interviews with authorities and community leaders suggest 
that crime rates are negligible, and the inevitable maneu-
vering of local political factions is peaceful and nonviolent. 
DCA found that a considerable amount of social control ex-
ists to regulate individual behavior around SA/LW and miti-
gate some of the potential negatives of weapons ownership. A 
number of sources pointed to heavy regulation. The brigades, 
known as khatiba, reportedly have a large number of SA/LW. 
One hundred eighty-six brigades of approximately 50 mem-
bers each are registered with the Misrata Military Council. 
During the uprising, prospective weapons owners were re-
quired to enroll with a brigade and register their firearm. This 
data for most, if not all, SA/LW would greatly benefit any fu-
ture attempt to collect and control these weapons. Brigades 
exert some control as they only allow their members to carry 
their weapons “on duty” (e.g., staffing a checkpoint) and they 
plan to centralize members’ SA/LW into stockpiles. 
Religious leaders are another source of control. Speaking 
on radio broadcasts and during Friday prayer, the Imams con-
demned the practice of celebratory gunfire. It is largely due to 
their influence that the practice has become less common; this 
influence was evident by the virtually gunshot-free, public 
Children are at risk from small arms and light weapons. 
They are naturally curious and do not know they should 
not touch weapons.
All photos of courtesy of Paul Jeffrey.
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celebrations following the death of Mutassim Gadhafi (son 
of Moammar Gadhafi) in October 2011. Lastly, communities 
self-regulate, and if someone fires a weapon in or around a 
home, vocal and forceful criticism ensues, which carries great 
weight in a tight-knit society. 
SA/LW Risk Education
During the assessment DCA found that SA/LW-related in-
cidents threaten physical security in Libya. The results led the 
DCA team to conclude that SA/LW risk education is the most 
appropriate and effective method for organizations to assist 
the transitional authorities and civil society. Future interven-
tions involving physical security and stockpile management in 
Libya need assessment as the context evolves.
SA/LW risk education is based on observing risk-taking be-
havior and forming the appropriate messages to encourage be-
havioral change. These messages are then turned into materials 
(e.g., training curricula, posters or plays, and programs deliv-
ered via radio) and transmitted through a relevant medium (e.g., 
peer-to-peer education, radio broadcast or community leaders). 
Through interviews with civil society, transitional authori-
ties and international NGOs (notably Handicap International), 
DCA found the following examples of risk-taking behavior. 
Statistics are not available, however, because no one, foreign 
or domestic, systematically collects data on SA/LW-related in-
juries in Misrata.
Risk-taking Behavior
Celebratory gunfire. Numerous reports cite people be-
ing wounded and killed during bouts of celebratory gunfire. 
Growing recognition of this danger and the strong advocacy of 
Imams and transitional authorities against the practice signifi-
cantly decreased its frequency.
Mishandling ammunition. In addition to hearing numer-
ous reports, DCA witnessed children playing with ammuni-
tion, fuzes and grenades. Teachers report that children bring 
ammunition to school and try to remove the gunpowder. 
Ammunition is often thrown into fires for its explosive effect. 
Only a few days prior to this assessment, a young girl was se-
riously injured because her brother was playing in this way.
People are holding onto SA/LW for multiple reasons: for protection, as trophies and to mitigate uncertainty over the future.
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Alcohol-induced misuse. Judiciary authorities stated that 
of 10 incidents of post-conflict shootings currently under le-
gal investigation, seven involve alcohol. On 25 October 2011, 
a drunk man killed a khatiba member at a checkpoint in the 
Kasar Ahmed district. In another case, neighbors entered into 
a violent dispute with a hero of the uprising who repeatedly 
shot into the air when intoxicated. Neighbors killed the man 
because he was dangerous.
Children playing with small arms. Firearms, unless se-
curely stored, represent a particular threat to curious children. 
Grenades and other explosive devices pose a threat to the en-
tire household regardless of how they are stored. While many 
men insisted they knew of and practiced safe-storage tech-
niques, the majority of women interviewed believed their hus-
bands and older sons were still unfamiliar with firearms and 
said the men frequently left weapons unattended and load-
ed. Notably, some households lack appropriate storage con-
tainers. Reports of accidents are rare but occur nonetheless. 
Although parents undoubtedly tell their children not to touch 
SA/LW, a discrepancy exists between safety messages and a 
wider culture in which weapons are celebrated as a means of 
defense and of defeating the regime. This is evidenced in tele-
vision, public events and public discourse in general.
Local Outreach
As described previously, individuals, civil society and 
transitional authorities in Libya are already active in con-
trolling SA/LW misuse. DCA will continue to assist local au-
thorities, governments and NGOs as they work to mitigate 
risk-taking behavior among civilians through a variety of ca-
pacities, including:
Imams. Imams in Misrata are organized through the 
Council of Mosques (Al awkaf ). The current leader, Sheikh 
Ahmed Dowa, met with DCA and has the authority to 
guide the content of the sermon at Friday prayers across all 
Mosques in the city. Thousands of male adults and children 
hear these prayers. Based on the successful work of imams 
to discourage celebratory shooting, the Council of Mosques 
is keen to work with DCA to deliver a wider range of risk-
education messages.
Teachers. State schoolteachers and Koranic schoolteachers 
are excellent influencers of children’s behavior and subsequent-
ly, their parents’ behavior. DCA is working with schoolteach-
ers to help provide psychosocial support to conflict-affected 
children and will build upon this initiative and network.
Radio stations. Radio broadcasts are highly influential 
and respected. Regular programs and drama sketches address 
the problem of celebratory shooting. The main station, Radio 
Misrata, operated throughout the conflict, and Gadhafi forces 
regularly attacked it due to its credibility with the local popu-
lation. Interviews with women suggested that radio is perhaps 
the best medium for reaching mothers and wives who spend 
much of their time at home and are considered to be respon-
sible for the home. Therefore, women have a key role to play in 
ensuring that weapons are stored safely. 
Khatiba members. Misrata society honors as heroes the 
predominantly young, volunteer fighters from the uprising. 
They have a profound effect on teen and child behavior and 
are very aware of this fact. One member told DCA that “if chil-
dren see us smoking, then they will smoke too.” Many khati-
ba members have a negative view of SA/LW after seeing many 
friends killed or injured, which differs to some extent from 
older men who may have acquired a firearm for protection 
but did not witness such fighting. DCA will seek to mobilize a 
number of khatiba members to deliver SA/LW risk-education 
messages in schools, at parent-teacher evenings and elsewhere. 
Khatiba members display a strong sense of responsibility for 
the new Libya and expressed interest in this activity.
Children are particularly vulnerable to the excess of SA/LW 
in Libya.
18
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol16/iss2/1
16.2 | summer 2012 | the journal of ERW and mine action | focus         19
Military Council and Security 
Council. At the time of the assess-
ment, the Military Council and 
Security Council were the most tan-
gible forms of authority followed by the 
National Transitional Council. DCA 
met with leaders of both councils who 
DCA found to be ready and willing to 
speak on radio programs and through 
other media to deliver SA/LW risk-edu-
cation messages.
Local NGOs. Prior to the conflict, 
only two NGOs existed in Misrata: the 
Boy Scouts and the Red Crescent. They 
are now joined by a burgeoning number 
of NGOs and associations with vary-
ing levels of capacity, activity and orga-
nization. The Boy Scouts organization 
is active in mine-risk education and 
will soon begin work with Handicap 
International on SA/LW risk educa-
tion. The Red Crescent works with the 
International Committee of the Red 
Cross on, inter alia, MRE. The newer 
NGOs often respond to the effects of 
the conflict on vulnerable people, par-
ticularly children. Local NGOs are a 
good source for delivering messages to 
Group Level of risk awareness Category Sample messages
1 Unaware Children Similar to Mine Risk Education – don’t touch etc
2 Aware of risk, unaware 








• Never point a weapon at anyone
• Always assume that a weapon is loaded and 
dangerous
• Never touch the trigger unless you have thought 
exactly about what you are shooting and why you are 
doing it
• Make sure your weapon is locked away and 
inaccessible to children
• Separate ammunition from weapon
3 Aware of risk and safe 





• There is no point keeping a weapon in your house to 
protect your family if that weapon only makes them 
more afraid
• People fought and died to build a new Libya. 
Wouldn’t you rather protect yourself from weapons in 
order to enjoy this new future?
Table 1. At-risk groups for excess SA/LW and samples of mine-risk education messages.
women as well. By training local NGOs 
in SA/LW risk-education methods, 
DCA will complement existing com-
munity outreach programs to empower 
women with safety advice.
Conclusion
Contrary to the experience of many 
post-conflict settings, SA/LW did not 
present a threat to security in terms of 
crime or political stability in Misrata, 
Libya at the time of this assessment. 
However, SA/LW constituted a consid-
erable threat to personal security, which 
Libyan civil society, authorities and me-
dia have recognized. While the scope of 
this assessment did not include other 
areas of the country, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the situation is similar in 
Benghazi and, to a lesser extent, Tripoli. 
The immediate role of DCA and other 
international actors is to help Libya and 
its elected authorities mitigate the risk of 
SA/LW in this transitional period and 
beyond, whether SA/LW are subject to 
disarmament, regulated ownership or a 
combination of both. This is a humanitar-
ian endeavor in every sense and follows 
Adam Forbes has worked in conflict-
affected countries for eight years on 
issues including mine action, civilian dis-
armament, security-sector reform and 
community security. He managed  
DanChurchAid’s mine-action pro-
gram in Burundi and designed DCA’s 
global policy on Armed Violence 
Reduction. He works for the U.K. 
Department for International De-
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the mine-action mission to remove the 
explosive remnants of war, so that survi-
vors may enjoy peace. As one Libyan 
journalist noted, “What good is freedom 
if one is not safe to enjoy it?” 
See endnotes page 81
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Afghan Experience Calls for 
   Innovative Approach to DDR
Criminal activities, illegal arms trading and violence against civilians continue threatening 
Afghanistan’s stability and security, and hinder the work of humanitarian nongovernmental organi-
zations. As a result, potential investors are discouraged from making heavy capital investments, and 
NGOs cannot implement projects that could dramatically improve the socioeconomic condition of 
civilians. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration appear to be crucial steps for the success 
of post-conflict recovery in Afghanistan. Conducting DDR in the complex and turbulent Afghan envi-
ronment has proven difficult, and this article explores past attempts at DDR in Afghanistan to draw 
lessons for future efforts.
The Bonn Agreement was a power-sharing arrangement between Northern Alliance fac-
tions and militias that assisted in U.S.-
backed efforts against the Taliban.1 
Over time, these groups have become 
largely self-sufficient. Many of these 
groups were founded in direct oppo-
sition to the central government in 
Kabul, some along ideological lines. 
According to a 2009 report on disar-
mament, demobilization and reintegra-
tion in Afghanistan published by the 
Small Arms Survey, Afghanistan’s 
various interest groups include “mul-
tiple Mujahedeen parties, tribal militias, 
warlords, paramilitary organizations, a 
trained state officer corps, armed intel-
ligence services, and both mono-eth-
nic and multi-ethnic armed groups and 
alliances.”1 Established under the Bonn 
Agreement, the government was com-
prised of many autonomous groups 
whose allegiance to the state and one 
another was questionable.2 
The disarmament process reflected 
these divisions, and as a tentative agree-
ment between volatile allies, the process 
was slow. Strict disarmament efforts were 
viewed as a risk to the new state’s author-
ity and solidarity, as many of the leaders 
who drafted the Bonn Agreement were 
involved with armed groups. The Bonn 
Agreement called for the Mujahedeen 
militias of the Northern Alliance and 
the other armed groups outside the 
government to be dissolved, reorga-
nized as the Afghan Military Forces 
and brought under the auspices of the 
Afghan Ministry of Defense. However, 
the agreement did little to determine the 
actual disarmament process.1
In 2002, the government established 
the Afghan National Army and dis-
mantled the Afghan Military Forces.3 
With limited effort in January 2003, the 
government established the National 
Disarmament Commission, an over-
sight body tasked with implementing 
the internationally led disarmament 
effort—the Afghan New Beginnings 
Programme. President Hamid Karzai 
and his administration moved quickly 
to bolster the National Disarmament 
Commission, expanding its initial man-
date to include the collection, stockpil-
ing and eventual transfer of one million 
weapons to the Afghan Ministry of 
Defense depot in Kabul. Viewed by 
many as an effort to preempt any inter-
national disarmament effort, the pro-
gram displayed a lack of transparency, 
and a host of questionable dealings led 
many observers to doubt its legitimacy. 
The government has yet to release the 
program’s final figures.1
International pressure mounted 
against the expansion of the National 
Disarmament Commission. In March 
2003, the international community 
pushed the Afghan government to 
establish the Afghan New Beginnings 
Programme, led by the United Nations 
Development Programme. The National 
Tribal and religious leaders gather 
following a shura held by Afghan 
President Hamid Karzai in Kandahar, 
Afghanistan. 
Photo courtesy of U.S. Navy Petty Officer 
1st Class Mark O’Donald.
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Disarmament Commission and its tasks were integrated into 
the new program, which then began its own DDR program. 
Initially, the organization’s goal was collecting weapons from 
100,000 Afghan Military Forces combatants, but the number 
was not calculated on the basis of a thorough needs assess-
ment. Spontaneous demobilization and fluctuating member-
ship is characteristic of Afghan militias, and after one year of 
operation, estimates were lowered to 60,000 participants.4 In 
fact, the Small Arms Survey notes that virtually no standard 
preparatory and investigatory measures were taken to deter-
mine needs, capacities or best practices before the launch of 
the Afghan New Beginnings Programme.1 
AMF groups submitted a list of fighters to the Ministry of 
Defense in Kabul. Ministry of Defense staff verified these lists, 
and trusted community leaders received them for approval. If 
the fighters met eligibility criteria—essentially, if they had at 
least eight months of prior service and the ability to submit 
a serviceable weapon upon disarmament—then they surren-
dered their weapons and started the process of reintegration. 
The reintegration process began with a meeting between a 
combatant and a case worker, in which the case worker rec-
ommended possible avenues of reintegration—i.e., future edu-
cation, vocational training, etc. Afterward, militiamen were 
discharged under the condition that they swear off violence. 
In the program’s first phases, militiamen were given cash pay-
ments, but this ended after authorities discovered that former 
commanders seized these funds.1 
Though the program began successfully, issues of fraud 
and pilfering surrounded it. In some cases, command-
ers were suspected of providing their least loyal and most 
poorly trained fighters for disarmament, which happened 
in previous National Disarmament Commission programs.4 
Moreover, cash incentives led many to register under falsified 
identification. Old lines of patronage and loyalty still existed, 
threatening government legitimacy, authority and the rule of 
law. To address these problems, the Afghan New Beginnings 
Programme began the Commander Incentive Programme 
in 2004 and offered a generous package to commanders 
willing to comply with DDR efforts. A new law prohibiting 
political ties to militia groups, which effectively banned polit-
ically ambitious commanders from upcoming elections, and 
according to Small Arms Survey, a shift in U.S. policy toward 
promoting DDR efforts created a climate for success.1 By mid-
2006, 460 commanders of the 550 identified had participated 
in the program.1 
In 2006, the DDR mandates expired, and the final par-
ticipants gave up their weapons in a ceremony with Afghan 
President Hamid Karzai.5  The removal of Afghan Military 
Members of a combined Afghan and coalition security force 
collected a cache of weapons after clearing a known Haqqani 
network foreign fighter encampment site in Paktitka prov-
ince, Afghanistan. The insurgents had stockpiled weapons, 
including rocket-propelled grenade launchers, heavy machine 
guns and AK-47 assault rifles.
Photo courtesy of International Security Assistance Force.
Forces from the Ministry of Defense budget, the disband-
ment of militia checkpoints and the restriction of com-
mander privileges positively affected Afghan civilians, 
former combatants and security forces within Afghanistan. 
By significantly reducing militia arsenals and optimistically 
reintegrating former soldiers, the program has fostered a 
more stable environment in the country. However, the situ-
ation remains tenuous, and observers worry that, if tensions 
escalate, the decommissioned units could quickly remobi-
lize.1 Furthermore, Afghan New Beginnings Programme's 
efforts only addressed AMF personnel and did not disband 
armed groups outside of the Northern Alliance. 
Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups
During the formal DDR of Afghan Military Forces mem-
bers, President Karzai issued a decree making all non-AMF 
militias in Afghanistan illegal. In 2005, the Canadian govern-
ment offered a grant to establish the Disbandment of Illegal 
Armed Groups program, charged with fostering, promot-
ing and conducting disarmament and disbandment of armed 
groups outside of the government. At first, officials estimated 
that more than 1,800 illegal militias with over 100,000 mem-
bers existed in Afghanistan. Not only do these militias pose a 
threat to the government’s authority and legitimacy, but they 
engage in the illegal arms and drug trade, further promoting 
black-market activities and supporting violent criminal fac-
tions within Afghanistan.1,6 According to the Programme of 
Action Implementation Support System, the United Nations’ 
informational resource for countering the illegal sale of small 
arms and light weapons, the new Disbandment of Illegal 
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security situation is too volatile for many organizations to 
extend their efforts outside of the capital in Kabul. For fear of 
attacks by insurgent groups, NGOs are often forced to settle 
for less ambitious projects and half-measures.10
Though small-arms proliferation escalates the violence, 
hindering NGO work, the disarmament of Afghan militias 
and civilians proved immensely difficult under a weapons-
centric approach, as it addresses only the symptoms of under-
lying problems—i.e., the deep-rooted patronage culture and 
the appeal of illegal-commodity markets for poor civilians 
without viable alternatives.1,9,11 One solution may be to focus 
on incentivizing disarmament with development assistance, 
an approach that was previously pursued in limited ways. By 
providing development assistance to distressed communities, 
international and domestic actors can provide alternatives to 
the violent cycle of crime and insurgency.1,11 
On the other hand, coupling DDR with development 
assistance can lead insurgent groups to improperly connect 
humanitarian NGOs that deliver development assistance 
without political or military ties with Coalition forces, and 
this puts the NGOs in peril. One of the primary avenues for 
development assistance and local capacity-building is the 
NGO community, and various Afghan NGOs often deliver 
the development assistance. Yet, the more these NGOs asso-
ciate with the Afghan Government, foreign security forces 
and their disarmament mission, the more insurgents view 
them as foreign occupiers and targets for insurgent violence. 
U.S. and Coalition forces further distorted this association 
between NGOs and foreign military forces when they estab-
lished Provincial Reconstruction Teams. These Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams operate like humanitarian NGOs 
At a forward operating base in Kandahar, Afghanistan, explo-
sive ordnance disposal personnel prepare charges to blow 
up stockpiled bombs left behind by fleeing al-Qaeda troops.
Photo courtesy of U.S. Navy, Chief Photographer’s Mate Johnny 
Bivera.
Armed Groups program focused on two main initiatives:1,7 
1. To improve security through the disarmament and dis-
bandment of illegal armed groups
2. To provide basic development support to communities 
freed from the threats of illegal armed groups
These two interrelated initiatives were intended to provide 
an impetus for communities to disarm and reduce the need for 
illegal activities as a means of socioeconomic empowerment. 
However, benefits encouraging disarmament were provided at 
the community level, not at the individual level. Unlike the ini-
tial DDR programs, which were based largely on these indi-
vidual incentives to promote disarmament, the Disbandment 
of Illegal Armed Groups program activities primarily took a 
law-enforcement perspective.1 Problems similar to those faced 
in earlier DDR efforts encircled the project: Commanders sub-
mitted their least serviceable weapons and would often “dis-
arm” militias that had already been through the DDR process.1 
Thus, Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups’ efforts did not 
adequately reduce the militia arsenals, failed to provide sup-
port to ex-combatants seeking reintegration and could not 
create a viable security situation for disarmed communities. 
Because of these shortcomings, many regions deemed in com-
pliance to the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups pro-
gram’s demands slipped back into violence. In 2010 alone, six 
compliant districts relapsed into insurgency, while only 12 
were brought into compliance.8 However, in spite of its logis-
tical issues and brief mandate, the Disbandment of Illegal 
Armed Groups program curbed the influence of illegal armed 
groups and militia leaders on the government.1
Current Situation and Future Obstacles
Afghanistan remains a country in conflict, and insurgent 
activities fuel the robust industry of its illegal black market. 
Militia leaders derive their authority from the pervasion of 
weapons and traditional patronage networks, which keeps 
Afghanistan in tumult and prevents many international 
actors from investing in capital-intensive projects. Security 
is an overwhelming concern for civilians and government 
and hinders the progress of development projects, economic 
enterprises and the rule of law.1,6,9,10 Arms and conflict prolif-
eration also prevents NGOs in the country from effectively 
providing assistance. 
As of 2006, Afghanistan was considered the “most dan-
gerous country in the world for aid agencies.”10 NGOs in 
Afghanistan became targets for insurgent groups that view 
internationally coordinated aid agencies and government-
supported Afghan NGOs as forms of external interference, 
even though staff are predominantly Afghan nationals. The 
22
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol16/iss2/1
16.2 | summer 2012 | the journal of ERW and mine action | focus         23
In March 2012, the United Nations Mine Action Service appointed Agnès Marcaillou as Director.1 Marcaillou 
replaced  Justin Brady, who served as Acting Director 
from 11 April 2011 to 19 March 2012. Brady became 
Head of Office for the Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs for Somalia. 
Previously Chief of the Regional Disarmament 
Branch in the United Nations Office for Disarmament 
Affairs, Marcaillou worked for Kofi Annan, Secretary-
General of the United Nations, as the U.N. Deputy 
Spokesperson. She also worked for the American 
Division of the Department of Political Affairs as a 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General Akashi 
and at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament 
Research.2 Notably, Marcaillou served as Chief of Staff 
for the first Executive Secretary of the Organization for 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in the Hague.2 Photo courtesy  
of UNMAS.
A long-time women’s-rights advocate, Marcaillou is a 
former President of the Group on Equal Rights for Women 
at the United Nations.2 Similarly, she pioneered the first 
Gender Action Plan of the U.N. Secretariat.1 Marcaillou 
is a laureate of the NATO and U.N. Programme of 
Fellowship on Disarmament and a Fellow of the French 
Institut de Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale (Institute 
of Higher National Defense Studies).2
UNMAS is responsible for U.N. mine clearance 
around the world. As Director, Marcaillou will bring her 
extensive experience in political affairs, conflict preven-
tion and post-conflict interventions, disarmament and 
non-proliferation.2 
~ Blake Williamson, CISR staff
see endnotes page 81
Agnès Marcaillou Appointed UNMAS Director
but are extensions of the foreign mili-
tary forces and thus have strategic and 
political ends.10 
Conclusion
The struggle to disband armed 
groups is one of Afghanistan’s most 
prevalent problems, threatening civil-
ians, NGOs, commercial actors and the 
government. Despite numerous efforts, 
developing effective programs for con-
fronting illegal armed groups and the 
black market activities supporting them 
have yet to occur. However, some impor-
tant lessons from the past can guide and 
focus future efforts:
1. Reintegration and economic 
development are essential compo-
nents to discourage illegal armed 
groups, and demobilized militia 
members must be provided with 
alternative opportunities.
2. Weapons collection cannot serve 
as the focal point for Afghanistan’s 
DDR. It neither addresses the 
underlying causes for armed 
insurgency nor weakens the arse-
nals of these militias, and com-
manders generally hand over 
their weakest weapons and least 
trained fighters. 
3. Disarmament practitioners must 
provide illegal armed groups with 
disbandment incentives but must 
be careful to maintain the distinc-
tion between humanitarian NGOs 
and foreign military actors. Also, 
development assistance designed 
to encourage DDR must be pub-
licly distinguished from nonpar-
tisan, unaffiliated humanitarian 
work that other NGOs provide.
These three lessons are not easily 
applied, but if properly implemented, they 
could lead to a more stable and secure 
Afghanistan. By using development and 
not weapons collection as the driving force 
behind DDR in Afghanistan, practitioners 
can provide alternatives to illegal activi-
ties. Furthermore, practitioners can pro-
vide an impetus to disarm without 
alienating Afghan civilians who may see 
gun ownership as a necessity in a volatile 
security situation. By rejecting the weap-
ons-centric mentality, actors involved 
with DDR can focus on more tangible 
measures of success, such as the extent to 
which DDR activities reduce Afghanistan’s 
overall level of violence and illegal activity. 
Work focused primarily on removing the 
motivation to participate in illegal armed 
groups more easily accommodates the 
complex Afghan cultural identity and 
adapts to the long history of violent con-
flict in the country. 
~ Jeremiah Smith, CISR staff
See endnotes page 81
Contact Information:
Center for International Stabilization  
   and Recovery
James Madison University
Harrisonburg, Virginia / USA
Email: cisr@jmu.edu 
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El Centro Integral de Rehabilitación de Colombia (CIREC) is a nonprofit organization based in Bogotá, Colombia that focuses on the rehabilitation of disabled individu-
als by strengthening physical and social capacities in order to 
improve independence and quality of life. It was established in 
September 1976 by Dr. Jeannette Perry de Saravia and Father 
Joaquin Castro in hopes of addressing the needs of the disabled 
in Colombia.1 Many of these disabled individuals are victims of 
anti-personnel mines; they face physical, economic and social 
obstacles as a result of their disabilities and are in need of re-
habilitative treatment, prosthetics, orthotics or mobility aids. 
As the majority of AP mine survivors cannot pay for these ser-
vices, CIREC is dependent on the support of partners and do-
nations to fund their activities. Their primary funders include 
Colnodo (the Colombian Association of Nongovernmental 
Organizations for Communication), Fundación Panamericana 
de Desarrollo (the Pan American Development Foundation), 
El Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (the Colombian 
Family Welfare Institute), La Organización de Los Estados 
Americanos (the Organization of American States), the 
Norwegian Government, the Star of Hope Mission, the United 
States Agency for International Development, and the Office of 
Weapon’s Removal and Abatement in the U.S. Department of 
State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA).
Since its inception, CIREC has become a respected orga-
nization in Colombia and is especially well-regarded for its 
work in prosthetics and its psychosocial rehabilitation pro-
grams involving sports, culture, art, leisure, education and 
other activities.2 In addition to assisting persons with dis-
abilities, CIREC focuses on other underrepresented groups 
in Colombia including women and those living in poverty. 
CIREC also strives peaceably for economic development, hu-
man rights and social justice in areas of the country where 
violence is common. In addition, in February 2012 CIREC re-
ceived the Quality Management Certification ISO 9001:2008.3
Seeds of Hope
The Semillas de Esperanza (Seeds of Hope) program is 
one of CIREC’s most influential projects. Operating in re-
gions affected by intense violence, Seeds of Hope sends med-
ical brigades to remote rural districts to provide therapy to 
PWDs. The Seeds of Hope program also helps conduct com-
munity message campaigns and develop small businesses, so 
that PWDs are able to gain economic and psychological in-
dependence. As a result, PWDs are reintegrated as self-suffi-
cient, productive members within their families, workplaces 
and communities. The program also supports the rights of 
PWDs through community leadership, social awareness and 
inclusion activities. Finally, Seeds of Hope is the vehicle for 
CIREC’s mine-risk education program. In the same com-
munities where the Seeds of Hope program is being carried 
out, MRE tools are distributed to community leaders—many 
of whom are landmine survivors themselves—for use in ed-
ucating others on the appearance, location and dangers of 
landmines and unexploded ordnance. Seeds of Hope is ac-
tive in 50 townships in 10 departments (Antioquia, Bolívar, 
Cauca Cundinamarca, Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander, 
Santander, Sucre and Tolima) and boasts a support network of 
more than 3,577 members.4
Other CIREC projects include: 
• Trabajando con Calidad (Working with Quality), an 
18-month project funded by La Fundación Panamericana 
para el Desarrollo for CIREC to design and implement a 
comprehensive program aimed at improving the quality 
of CIREC management practices and operations.
• Un Regreso a la Capacidad Creativa (A Return to 
Creative Capacity), a 12-month project funded by the 
U.S. Department of State in which CIREC will run four 
rehabilitation brigades serving 199 PWDs and work to-
ward minimizing the risk of landmine accidents in the 
municipality of San Francisco, Antioquia.
Comprehensive 
   Rehabilitation 
   Center of Colombia
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• Entrando en la onda TIC (Entering the ITC Wave), a 
12-month project in which CIREC will train PWDs to 
use computers and Internet tools. This project is fund-
ed by El Ministerio de Tecnologías de la Información 
y las Comunicaciones (the Ministry of Information 
Technology and Communication), and Colnodo, an or-
ganization based in Bogotá and focused on development 
through electronic communications.
• A four-month cooperation agreement with El Instituto 
Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (the Colombian 
Family Welfare Institute) that promotes familial well-
being and the rights of disabled children and adoles-
cents through workshops and family-strengthening 
intervention strategies.
• Mejorando la calidad de vida de sobrevivientes de 
mina antipersonal y munición sin explotar (Improving 
the Quality of Life of Anti-personnel Mine and UXO 
Survivors), a 12-month project funded by the Norwegian 
Government involving specialized care, training and 
support for young survivors of landmines and unex-
ploded ordnance in Valencia, Cordoba.
• Puentes para Paz y Pan (Bridges for Peace and Bread), 
a 12-month project funded by Premio Estrella de 
Esperanza (Star of Hope Award). In this project, CIREC 
focuses on empowering the community of Mirandita, 
Antioquia to self-sustainability by providing education-
al materials and constructing an organic garden for the 
school of Mirandita to improve the diet and nutrition of 
the children and community.
Since 1993, CIREC has presented the Star of Hope Award 
to disabled individuals who have returned to productive 
roles in their families and communities. Aimee Mullins, 
an American athlete and model who had her legs amputat-
ed below the knees at age one, was invited to tell her story 
at CIREC’s 2011 Star of Hope Award Ceremony.5 More than 
400 people attended the ceremony, which was held at Club El 
Nogal on 19 September 2011 and covered by a number of ma-
jor Colombian news stations.
In addition to presenting awards, CIREC has also re-
ceived numerous awards for its service to the people of 
Colombia. Most recently, CIREC was recognized when the 
U.S. Department of State honored Dr. Jeanette Perry de 
Saravia for 35 years of dedicated service to victims of land-
mines and PWDs. 
~ Dan Baker, CISR Staff
See endnotes page 81
Contact Information
El Centro Integral de Rehabilitación de Colombia (CIREC)
Carrera 54 # 65 - 25, Barrio Modelo Norte
Bogotá / Colombia
Tel/Fax: + 57 (1) 3114808
Email: contactenos@cirec.org
Website: www.cirec.org
Center for International Stabilization and Recovery
James Madison University
Harrisonburg, Virginia / USA
Email: cisr@jmu.edu
A display of prosthetics at a CIREC clinic.
Photo couresty of Survivor Corps/CISR.
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The Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at James Madison University in Harrisonburg, Virginia helps communities affected by violence and 
trauma through education, programs and transformative 
services. CISR offers on-the-ground management and mine-
awareness training and victim-assistance programs and ser-
vices; facilitates innovative post-conflict recovery workshops 
and conferences; researches a variety of post-conflict issues; 
and offers resource materials through its information-exchange 
services including online and print media and content-rich web-
sites, all focusing on post-conflict topics related to mine action 
and victim assistance. 
CISR collaborates with many international partner or-
ganizations, including the U.S. Departments of State and 
Defense, the United Nations and the Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian Demining, among others. In 2011, 
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recognized CISR as 
a leader in post-conflict issues, and in 2008 the U.S. Senate 
Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations recog-
nized JMU as one of 10 U.S. universities uniquely qualified 
to support State Department and United States Agency for 
International Development tasks.  
Information Exchange
CISR functions as an information clearinghouse, gath-
ering, managing and distributing information about glob-
al mine action through an interactive website, publications 
and related research. CISR’s website includes the CISR 
Sphere Blog, mine-action forums, an international job an-
nouncement board, publications and the Global Mine Action 
Registry—connecting people and organizations with re-
sources throughout the world. CISR’s staff regularly updates 
the website with new developments in the field and is avail-
able to assist in researching questions related to clearance and 
recovery efforts. 
Published three times a year, the CISR publication, The 
Journal of ERW and Mine Action, is sponsored by the Office 
of Weapon’s Removal and Abatement in the U.S. Department 
of State’s Bureau of Political Military Affairs (PM/WRA). The 
Journal was first published in 1997 and is the longest contin-
uous source of explosive-remnants-of-war and mine-action 
information in the world. It reaches more than 1,800 read-
ers in print and 170,000 online readers in 180 countries. Each 
themed issue contains editorials; articles on current clear-
ance and recovery projects; reports on topics such as victim 
assistance, mine-risk education and field studies; book reviews; 
organization and/or country profiles; mine-related news; and 
the latest in research and development in the industry. The 
R&D section, supported by the U.S. Department of Defense’s 
Humanitarian Demining Research and Development Program, 
contains peer-reviewed articles describing new technology for 
clearance efforts and study results of equipment and technol-
ogy tests.
CISR also publishes To Walk the Earth in Safety, the U.S. 
Department of State’s annual report on its global work in 
landmine removal and conventional weapons destruction. 
In addition, CISR publishes other useful resources, includ-
ing, for example, the Landmine Action Smart Book, detail-
ing background information and the key components of the 
mine-action pillars; the Adaptive Technology Catalog, provid-
ing in-depth listings of practical products to meet the needs 
of resource-limited persons with disabilities; and Landmine 
Casualty Data: Best Practice Guidelines, a reference for docu-
menting and using mine/ERW victim information. 
CISR conducts mine-action and victim-assistance re-
search and publishes reports about the findings. In May 
2011, CISR concluded a two-year study of the effects of aging 
on landmines for the U.S. Department of State. The results 
and findings of the study are available on CISR’s website. In 
CISR Director, Ken Rutherford (right), greets a participant 
of the Pathways to Resilience Workshop in Lebanon. The 
workshop was held in May 2011. 
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partnership with GICHD, CISR is currently conducting a 
four-country analysis and study of the use of landmine vic-
tim-assistance information as part of comprehensive mine-
action national programing. 
International Training
CISR continues to serve as the global leader for senior 
management training programs. Since 2004, CISR annually 
conducts a five-week ERW and Mine Action Senior Managers’ 
Course, providing high-level management training for of-
ficials and experts conducting clearance, demilitarization 
and conventional weapons destruction efforts throughout 
the world. Sponsored by the United Nations Development 
Programme from 2005 through 2009 and by PM/WRA since 
2010, the course combines the expertise of CISR staff mem-
bers and JMU College of Business faculty with that of demin-
ing and post-conflict recovery experts. The courses are hosted 
by CISR at JMU, and the most recent course was held 16 May–
13 June 2012 for 17 participants from 14 countries.
From 2009 to 2011, CISR and the JMU College of Business 
faculty facilitated a sister course to the SMC in Amman, 
Jordan, working with Jordan’s National Committee for 
Demining and Rehabilitation to deliver the ERW Senior 
Managers Training Course. 
Between the SMC courses at JMU and the ERWTC in 
Jordan, more than 200 managers from 47 countries have been 
trained to date.
Recognizing the need to address the emotional as well as 
the physical trauma faced by landmine and other conflict 
survivors, CISR held its first Pathways to Resilience seminar 
in Hammana, Lebanon in May 2011. The program provided 
psychosocial assistance to 29 landmine/ERW survivors from 
Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Yemen through resilience activi-
ties empowering participants to manage emotions, gain self-
confidence and find social support. Participants were also 
trained to establish and manage peer-to-peer support pro-
grams, in which a trained survivor provides encouragement 
and assistance for other survivors. This pilot program is a 
model that CISR will deliver globally.
In 2010, the international nonprofit Survivor Corps dis-
solved, and with the support of the Survivor Corps board, 
CISR absorbed its wealth of information and files, and hired 
its peer-to-peer support specialist, Cameron Macauley. Since 
then, CISR has provided train-the-trainer projects, enabling 
survivors to help other survivors of war-related trauma in 
communities in Burundi, Colombia, Lebanon and Rwanda. 
In January 2012, in cooperation with the African Centre for 
Treatment and Rehabilitation of Torture Victims, CISR held a 
four-day workshop on peer support for survivors of torture for 
21 mental health professionals in Entebbe, Uganda. In March 
2012, CISR worked with its local implementing partner the 
Association for the Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities 
to develop and lead a three-day peer-support training pro-
gram for 35 persons with disabilities in Dong Hoi, Vietnam.
Other Services
Supported by PM/WRA and working with Jordan’s NCDR, 
CISR and a Jordanian NGO, Life Line Consultancy and 
Rehabilitation, jointly developed the “We Love Life” play, a 
psycho-educational drama and creative arts performance. This 
play, in Arabic, provides MRE to children and young adults, 
teaching mine-warning signs, safe behaviors and social sensi-
tivity to survivors. The play was performed by disabled actors 
for more than 25,000 people in Jordan in 2008 and 2009. It has 
also been performed in Lebanon, and the team plans to use this 
MRE program in other neighboring countries.
Additionally, CISR administers the annual Frasure-
Kruzel-Drew Humanitarian Mine Action Fellowship with 
PM/WRA, funding one JMU graduate to work at PM/WRA 
in Washington, D.C. for a year. The fellowship is named after 
three former U.S. officials who lost their lives in an automobile 
accident in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, while working to 
help end the concurrent conflict.
Each April CISR hosts a Post-Conflict Recovery Week at 
JMU that includes a range of humanitarian UXO and mine-
clearance activities. Past activities include demonstrations 
using mock minefields, lectures with keynote speakers, in-
cluding landmine survivors and international clearance ex-
perts, movies and a variety of other activities that highlight 
the continuing global humanitarian impact of landmines and 
ERW. Post-Conflict Recovery Week 2012 was held 2-5 April at 
James Madison University. 
“As a landmine survivor myself, I understand how chal-
lenging recovery is,” says CISR Director Dr. Ken Rutherford. 
“Whether it’s through our victim-assistance workshops, 
training programs for trauma counselors in low-resource en-
vironments, or our studies and publications, CISR is commit-
ted to standing with communities until peace is achieved.”
~ Rachael Weber and 
Eric Wuestewald, CISR Staff
Contact Information
Center for International Stabilization  
   and Recovery
James Madison University
Harrisonburg, Virginia / USA
Email: cisr@jmu.edu
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D anish Demining Group was founded in 1997 and is the Humanitarian Mine Action Unit in the Danish Refugee Council. Based in Copenhagen, Denmark, 
DDG works in 10 countries. DDG’s mission is to foster a safe 
environment and enable economic and social development in 
areas that have suffered trauma and conflict due to landmines, 
unexploded ordnance, and small arms and light weapons. 
DDG works diligently to “make a positive difference in 
people’s lives” and strives to fulfill its strategic objectives:1
• Enhance human security by clearing landmines, UXO 
and other remnants of war; reducing risks from SA/LW; 
and providing SA/LW and mine-risk education
• Provide efficient, effective and innovative solutions with 
partners and stakeholders in conflict-affected areas
• Enable social and economic development by supporting 
“local structures and institutions in finding sustainable 
solutions to residual problems.”1
DDG’s main donors are the governments of Denmark, 
Germany, Holland, Japan, Sweden and the United States, 
the United Nations Development Programme, the United 
Nations Refugee Agency and the United Nations Mine Action 
Service. DDG is  a member of the International Committee 
to Ban Landmines and the Cluster Munition Coalition, the 
Survey Action Center, the IMAS Review Board as well as the 
Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining 
Advisory Board. In addition, DDG is part of the Expert 
Reference Group to the International Small Arms Control 
Standards and is a certified partner of the Humanitarian 
Accountability Partnership.1
Mine Action
DDG works in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Liberia, 
Libya, Somalia (including Somaliland), South Sudan, Sri 
Lanka, Uganda and Yemen. DDG’s mine-action opera-
tions are based on the five pillars of mine action as set out 
in the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, 
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on 
Their Destruction (also known at the Anti-personnel Mine 
Ban Convention, or APMBC): 





In addition, DDG educates the public and advises officials 
on issues related to SA/LW security and destruction. 
Mine/UXO clearance: Although DDG has expanded 
its mission to include risk education and reducing SA/LW 
threats, the organization still supports and conducts sig-
nificant mine- and UXO-clearance activities in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Somaliland, Puntland and South/Central Somalia, South 
Sudan and Sri Lanka. In Afghanistan, one of the world’s most 
mine-affected countries, DDG’s mine-action program has 
conducted survey, clearance and MRE since 1998. These op-
erations cleared 1.3 million UXO items and 33,800 landmines, 
releasing 5,133,000 square meters (1,268 acres) of contaminat-
ed land and 21,445,000 sq m (5,299 acres) of battle area. DDG 
has also covered 3,500 towns in village-by-village explosive-
ordnance clearance, an emerging method for safer, more ef-
ficient mine clearance based on needs identified by local com-
munity leaders.
MRE: DDG conducts MRE programs aiming to educate 
the population on the exact location of mined areas, address-
ing how to best avoid them and explaining the consequences 
of handling mines and UXO. Uganda, where educational 
training programs are conducted daily, provides an example 
of DDG’s MRE work. These training sessions often target 
children, as they are at risk of encountering UXO and land-
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mines when collecting water and fire-
wood. The program stresses community 
involvement and gives children T-shirts 
that read “report to your parents,” en-
couraging them to inform their teach-
ers and other community members if 
they come into contact with UXO.2
Armed Violence Reduction
In November 2010, DDG partnered 
with UNDP to cohost a conference on 
armed-violence reduction and develop-
ment in Nairobi, Kenya. Attendees were 
civil-society members and representa-
tives from various governments and 
U.N. agencies. The conference focused 
on armed violence as an obstacle to hu-
man development and discussed how to 
better address the developmental needs 
of communities suffering as a conse-
quence. DDG recognizes armed violence 
as a major obstacle for human develop-
ment and feels that community-based 
solutions aimed at targeting the source 
of conflict are the best means for en-
hancing safety.3 
DDG emphasizes local community 
involvement, implementing commu-
nity-based impact programs, such as 
the Community Safety program in 
Somaliland and the Community Safety 
and Livelihoods programs in Uganda. 
The Community Safety programs edu-
cate community members in conflict 
management, provide firearm-safety 
education, and conduct ERW-disposal 
operations and MRE. The programs 
also foster cooperation between local 
police and communities to improve 
safety. Both programs strive for cultural 
sensitivity when uniting communities, 
and enhancing safety and security in 
violence-threatened regions.4
The Armed Violence Reduction and 
Community Safety initiatives specifi-
cally address SA/LW and ERW prob-
lems while also fostering a sense of 
communal responsibility: emphasizing 
the role of local communities in iden-
tifying and addressing their own safety 
needs.1 These DDG strategies also help 
reduce the risk of violence to its employ-
ees and the local population, as DDG 
often works in potentially dangerous 
locations in conflict-affected countries.
Future
DDG continues to expand the scope 
and efficiency of its work in efforts to 
promote safety, security and prosperity 
for people in conflict-affected regions. 
Its dual focus on human security and 
local capacity-building allows for im-
mediate but sustainable relief for people 
in war-torn regions, while its emphasis 
on efficiency and innovation ensures 
that all available resources are put to the 
best possible use.
In the future, DDG hopes to expand 
its operations in Colombia. DDG first 
came to Colombia in late 2010 when 
the country approved Law 1421, which 
allowed international nongovernmen-
tal organizations to participate in hu-
manitarian mine-action activities 
within the country.5 In April 2011 
DDG became registered as a humani-
tarian mine-action organization in 
Colombia. Though the legal framework 
remains in discussion, DDG hopes to 
extend operations to all areas of mine 
action in Colombia in 2012. 
~ Ivy Hensley, CISR Staff
See endnotes page 81
Contact Information
Danish Demining Group
Borgergade 10, 3rd Floor
1300 Copenhagen / Denmark
Tel: +45 3373 5000
Email: ddg@drc.dk
Website: http://danishdemininggroup.dk
Center for International  
   Stabilization and Recovery
James Madison University
Harrisonburg, Virginia / USA
Email: cisr@jmu.edu
The Danish Demining Group working in Afghanistan.
Photo courtesy of Charlotte Øostervang/DDG.
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Golden West Humanitarian Foundation is a public charity established in 1997 to address operation-al limitations in mine and unexploded-ordnance-
clearance efforts, and to protect the lives and livelihoods of 
individuals affected by landmines and UXO.1 Since 1997, 
Golden West has grown and built upon its work, starting new 
programs with governments, the United Nations and nongov-
ernmental organizations, while expanding operations to Belize, 
Cambodia, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Moldova, Nicaragua, the Solomon Islands and 
Vietnam.2 
Based in California (U.S.), with offices in Cambodia, 
Hawaii (U.S.), South Africa and Vietnam, Golden West con-
sists of nine full-time American employees and 13 local staff 
in Cambodia and Vietnam, as well as a number of part-time 
employees who are engaged as needed. Combining experience 
with explosive-ordnance disposal, engineering, chemistry 
and more, Golden West works to create innovative technol-
ogy for the mine-action community making operations safer, 
faster and/or cheaper.3
Activities
As part of its mission to help those affected by landmines 
and other explosive remnants of war, Golden West undertakes 
numerous activities, including:
• Consultancy: Golden West offers specialized methods and/
or technologies to groups that dispose of mines or ERW 
In the past, Golden West has consulted on developing na-
tional mine-action standards, mine/UXO/ERW-detection 
technology, cluster-bomb/small-arms stockpile destruction, 
white phosphorus munitions destruction, battle-area clear-
ance and related subjects.4
• Munitions-risk education: Golden West operates several 
programs aimed at providing MRE. One of these programs, 
the Mine Indicator Program, offers participants country-
specific materials with visual indicators that signal the 
presence of landmines or UXO. The program encourages 
individuals to mark the location of a perceived threat and 
submit a report to authorities.  
• Children’s education division: Golden West offers educa-
tional materials designed for and distributed to children to 
teach them how to respond to mines and UXO. One teach-
ing tool is a graphic novel demonstrating landmine threats 
exclusively through illustrations to ensure accessibility. 
Other efforts include an educational video game offering 
visual cues of contamination that mirror reality for the One 
Laptop Per Child program and an illustrated storybook ex-
plaining how to alert authorities in the event of a discov-
ered threat. 
• Detection technology: Golden West conducts extensive 
research and designs improvements for land and shallow-
water UXO detection instruments; increasing their ca-
pacities into multifunctional turnkey systems with digital 
global positioning systems interface for digital recording 
and accurate mapping.   
• Cluster-munitions stockpile destruction: Golden West 
has developed safe and effective techniques for the disposal 
of low-density cluster-munitions stockpiles and uses that 
expertise to advise and assist other countries and orga-
nizations in disposal activities. Golden West has already 
provided disposal education in Cambodia, Moldova and 
Vietnam, and will offer these services to other countries as 
the need arises.
• Harvesting explosives: Golden West’s Explosive Harvesting 
System safely extracts the explosives from excess ammuni-
tion, bombs and anti-tank mines; it then converts these 
explosives into small, highly effective disposal charges to 
assist with landmine and UXO clearance. This process al-
lows countries and mine-action programs with small bud-
gets to save money instead of spending it on commercial 
explosives and shipping costs. 
• Small-arms/munitions destruction: Golden West has 
also developed sustainable and cost-effective small-arms 
burners for the destruction of small arms, light weapons 
and certain ammunition types. In Cambodia and Central 
America, these burners were fabricated using readily avail-
able local materials by fully qualified welders. In Central 
America alone; a single munitions/small arms burner unit 
processed more than 100 metric tons (220,462 pounds) of 
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small-arms ammunition in a five-
month period, fully destroying the 
propellant but containing all metal-
lic/lead components.  
• Munitions cutting: Expanding on the 
techniques used with the Explosive 
Harvesting System, Golden West has 
manufactured mobile and stationary 
units intended to safely cut explosive 
ordnance up to 2,000 pounds (909 
kilograms). The mobile system allows 
EOD technicians to safely remove the 
initiating system from larger ord-
nance items that would otherwise 
need in situ destruction and transport 
it to a safe storage/disposal area. The 
stationary units allow remote cut-
ting of safe-to-move/hard-to-destroy 
explosive-loaded items, reducing the 
time, effort and expense of normal 
disposal by detonation methods.   
• Training aids: Additionally, Golden 
West provides inerted ordnance and 
fuzing systems to other nonprofit 
groups—often for little-to-no cost, 
thus providing an essential resource 
for organizations to teach EOD, dem-
ining and UXO disposal.
Employee Scholarship Program
Finally, Golden West provides edu-
cation support to developing nations 
through GWHF’s Employee Scholarship 
Program. The ESP affords local staff—
and often their families—with the mon-
ey needed to continue their education 
while employed with Golden West. 
Since the program’s origination in 2008, 
90 percent of the local staff acquired a 
secondary education, with the program 
covering the costs. 
Funding
Golden West’s funding comes from a 
combination of grants, contracts, corpo-
rate donors and private donors. A large 
majority of government funding comes 
from the United States Department 
of Defense’s Humanitarian Demining 
Research and Development program, 
Night Vision and Electronic Sensors 
Directorate, and the Office of Weapons 
Removal and Abatement in the U.S. 
Department of State’s Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs (PM/WRA). In addi-
tion, Golden West has contracts with 
the Organization of American States for 
SA/LW destruction, stockpile reduction, 
training and UXO-clearance work.
Future
In the future, Golden West plans to 
increase involvement in SA/LW and 
stockpile-reduction efforts in Latin 
America through the Organization of 
American States. It also intends to con-
tinue expanding shallow-water detec-
tion technology to assist UXO clearance 
in Southeast Asia’s ponds, rivers and 
canals, improving the capacities in the 
South Pacific as well as increasing part-
nerships in Vietnam and Laos to ex-
pand technology and training. The 
Children’s Education Division is creat-
ing a new graphic novel—a scrap metal/
munitions-risk story—that relies heav-
ily on a visual component to increase 
communication. 
~ Eric Wuestewald, CISR Staff
See endnotes page 81
Contact Infomation
Golden West Humanitarian Foundation
6355 Topanga Canyon Blvd., Suite 517
Woodland Hills, CA 91367-2102 / USA
Tel: +1 818 703 0024 
Fax: +1 818 703 1949 
Email: info@goldenwesthf.org
Website: www.goldenwesthf.org
Center for International Stabilization  
   and Recovery
James Madison University
Harrisonburg, Virginia / USA
Email: cisr@jmu.edu
Photo collage courtesy of Golden West Humanitarian Foundation.
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MAG 
   (Mines Advisory Group)
MAG (Mines Advisory Group) is a nonprofit glob-al humanitarian organization that helps create peace and prosperity by removing deadly rem-
nants of war.  For more than two decades, MAG has directly 
reduced the devastating effects of armed violence and conflict, 
and paved the way for reconstruction, peace and security in 
some of the world’s poorest communities, thereby saving lives 
and enabling safer futures. 
MAG works in areas of the world that have been affected 
by conflict, assisting local populations with recovery and de-
velopment.. MAG teams consult with local community mem-
bers, working to lessen the threat of death and injury, while 
releasing land that is safe and other vital resources back to the 
population to help communities rebuild and develop their so-
cial and economic potential. In 1997, MAG received the Nobel 
Peace Prize for its work with the International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines.
With 60 staff in the United Kingdom and more than 2,500 
staff worldwide, MAG has worked in roughly 40 countries 
since 1989 and has operations in Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Laos, 
Lebanon, Libya, Republic of Congo, Sri Lanka, Somalia, South 
Sudan, Sudan and Vietnam. It is funded through grants from 
14 different governments, United Nations contracting agen-
cies, the European Union, trusts and foundations, and the 
general public.
MAG’s Objectives
Throughout the world, where conflict results in human 
death or injury from remnants of war such as landmines, un-
exploded ordnance, weapons and ordnance stockpiles, and 
other residual contamination that have a highly damaging ef-
fect on populations, MAG aims to relieve instability, suffering 
and distress by:
• Providing training and assistance in clearance and 
reconstruction
• Undertaking preventive measures that improve human 
security including safely managing, storing, destroying 
or reducing the availability of stockpiles of weapons and 
ammunition 
• Providing risk education
• Finding solutions to problems faced by those whose lives 
are affected by conflict 
How MAG Works
Mine action. Identifying landmines and other UXO as le-
thal barriers to development and physical safety, MAG has 
long pioneered land release and clearance best practices. 
Weapons disposal and security. Finding and destroy-
ing unsecured and often unstable weapons and ammuni-
tion stockpiles is an integral part of many MAG programs 
worldwide. Working with national authorities MAG is mak-
ing substantial progress destroying surplus weaponry that 
threatens, not only surrounding communities, but also re-
gional security.
MAG employs many female deminers. These women are 
working in Xieng Khouang Province, Laos.
All photos courtesy of Sean Sutton/MAG.
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MAG 
   (Mines Advisory Group)
Teaching safety. In addition to man-
aging and destroying landmines, UXO, 
and small arms and light weapons, 
MAG proactively educates communi-
ties at risk with tailored safety messages 
about the dangers of UXO and weapons 
proliferation.
Managing stockpiles and developing 
capacity. MAG works with security forc-
es in Burundi, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Iraq, Somaliland and the 
state of Puntland in Somalia, and pro-
vides weapons management and storage 
training. In Burundi, MAG conducted a 
nationwide survey of all police armor-
ies and performed physical-security up-
grades in many locations. MAG trains 
police and army officers to safely store 
and keep records of firearms, significant-
ly reducing the risk they pose to civilians.
MAG and the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals. The world’s 10 poorest 
countries are either in or emerging from 
conflicts.1 MAG’s work helps release 
land, increase safe access to vital re-
sources—such as water, education, trade 
and health services—and promotes gen-
der equality in many of these countries. 
As a result, MAG’s work actively con-
tributes to the United Nations’ Millen-
nium Development Goals, which strive 
to “free people from extreme poverty 
and multiple deprivations.”2 Moreover, 
MAG continues to work to minimize 
the devastating effects of armed vio-
lence and remnants of war/conflict. 
~ MAG staff; Katy Lovin, CISR 
staff, assisted with this article.
See endnotes page 81
Contact Information
MAG (Mines Advisory Group)
68 Sackville Street
Manchester M1 3NJ / UK
Tel: +44 161 236 4311
Fax: + 44 161 236 6244
Email: info@maginternational.org
Website: 
   http://www.maginternational.org
MAG teams working in Laos to clear unexploded ordnance in partnership with 
UNESCO. This project was funded by the New Zealand Government and intended 
to secure World Heritage status for the site. Here Boua Van is marking the spot 
where her detector signaled a metal item. It could be a piece of fragmentation, a 
nail or a cluster bomblet. 
MAG community liaison session. The team discusses the priorities for clearance 
determined by the community. Among other things, this involved drawing a com-
munity map, explaining MAG's methodologies, and conducting UXO awareness 
discussions.
Center for International Stabilization  
   and Recovery
James Madison University
Harrisonburg, Virginia / USA
Email: cisr@jmu.edu
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This article's aim is to present several land-release principles for use in the battle-area clearance 
of Libya’s built-up areas, also called Urban Land Release. Based on the practical, empirical 
experience of DanChurchAid, it is not intended as a one-size-fits-all solution to BAC task 
planning, but it may be helpful in other locations when compared with local knowledge of 
the situation on the ground. It does not apply to landmine clearance. BAC is the traditional 
means of clearing unexploded ordnance in open areas. Libya is now contaminated with UXO 
and explosive remnants of war as a result of the uprising that occurred in 2011. This article also 
examines the effectiveness of BAC as reconstruction occurs, particularly in Misrata, based on 
the experience of DanChurchAid deminers.
by Robert Keeley [ RK Consulting, Ltd. ]
Urban Land Release in Libya: BAC and  
   Land Release in Built-up Areas 
Humanitarian mine action produces two main outputs with a socioeconomic impact. The first is land release for subsequent safe use by the local 
population. This is the main output of landmine clear-
ance and UXO clearance in areas contaminated by clus-
ter munitions where the local population is unwilling to 
use the contaminated areas.
The second main impact is that HMA reduces the risk 
of death or explosive remnants of war injury. HMA activ-
ities, such as mobile explosive ordnance disposal teams 
and mine-risk education, do not clear land for safe use 
but reduce the risk of death and ERW injury by removing 
hazards and modifying the behavior of the local popula-
tion, thereby reducing the probability of the incidence. 
Notably, the local population is rarely dissuaded from us-
ing areas by the threat of ERW. Hence, any HMA activi-
ties that are based on the land’s wholesale clearance are 
not likely to impact the livelihoods of the local popula-
tion, as people would have used the land anyway.
Amount of area cleared in hectares or square meters, 
while a useful measure of efficiency, is not a very useful 
measure of impact (see definitions in Table 1). Therefore, 
HMA teams operating in built-up areas should focus on 
activities optimized for ERW’s safe removal. Initially, this 
may appear the same as BAC, but it is important to un-
derstand that BAC is an area-clearance tool, and area-
clearance tools are used for hazard reduction. Although 
eventually effective—teams will find ERW—it is not al-
ways efficient, especially in situations where the density of 
ERW contamination is comparatively low.
Development Evaluation Criteria
A key concept referred to in this article is the develop-
ment-evaluation criteria created by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development. Table 1 details 
these criteria and respective definitions.1 The most rele-
vant terms in this document are impact, effectiveness and 
efficiency.
Land Release and Non-technical Survey
The humanitarian mine-action sector still strug-
gles with defining the term land release. The Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining has 
released three new International Mine Action Standards 
Examining UXO found during a BAC task. The item was 
hard to spot and is likely to have been missed by a previ-
ous search.
All photos courtesy of the author.
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on the subject. Although a direct reference to “land re-
lease” is constrained to a single footnote in only one 
IMAS, a recent meeting of the IMAS Review Board de-
termined that considering a review of the relevant stan-
dards, IMAS 08.20–08.22, was still too soon.2 However, 
the mine-action sector’s general consensus is that infor-
mation-gathering and analysis techniques, such as Non-
technical Survey, should be used to prioritize the use of 
technical resources in landmine-contaminated areas and 
these actions should have some sort of socioeconomic im-
pact. Definitions of the three IMAS mentioned above are 
as follows:
• IMAS 08.20 defines Land Release:
“Land Release is the process of applying all reason-
able effort to identify or better define Confirmed 
Hazardous Area and remove all suspicion of mines/
ERW through non-technical survey, technical sur-
vey and clearance using an evidence based and doc-
umented approach.” 3
• IMAS 08.21 defines Non-technical Survey:
“The term ‘Non-technical Survey’ describes a... sur-
vey activity which involves collecting and analyzing 
new and/or existing information about a hazard-
ous area. Its purpose is to confirm whether there is 
evidence of a hazard or not, to identify the type and 
extent of hazards within any hazardous area and to 
define, as far as is possible, the perimeter of the actu-
al hazardous areas without physical intervention.” 4
• IMAS 04.10 defines Battle Area Clearance:
“The systematic and controlled clearance of hazard-
ous areas where the hazards are known not to in-
clude mines.” 5
Weapon Use in the Libyan Conflict
The fighting in Libya involved land-service ammu-
nition with some air-delivered weapons and small arms 
and light weapons. Air strikes on existing Libyan Army 
ammunition-storage areas have scattered abandoned ex-
plosive ordnance and SA/LW ammunition, and caused 
significant contamination in the surrounding areas. The 
majority of the fighting was concentrated along nodal 
points, coast roads and around sites of particular inter-
est, such as government buildings within town centers. 
Therefore, significant damage occurred in some areas, 
whereas other areas escaped unharmed.6
BAC in Libya
In Libya, much of the early humanitarian clearance 
work was conducted as the fighting continued and re-
volved around the BAC of urban areas, particularly in 
Misrata. Early work by international nongovernmental 
organizations showed that although a number of unex-
ploded ordnance was identified, the amount was far less 
than what might be expected given the intense fighting. 
By talking to locals, it was learned that the local forces 
engaged in some informal UXO removal. 
Although BAC can be conducted faster than demin-
ing, especially when it involves surface-visual clearance 
on hard surfaces, it remains slow and expensive. Clearing 
a city takes considerable time; the Joint Mine Action 
Coordination Team was originally tasked with clearing 
Misrata. The operation’s relative costs and benefits were 
brought into particular focus given that a smaller-than-
expected quantity of UXO was found. Therefore, it should 
be considered whether the principles of the emerging 
Criterion De nition
Relevance  e extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies of 
the target group, recipient and donor
Impact  e positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, 
directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.  is involves the main impacts 
and e ects resulting from the activity on the local social, economic, environ-
mental and other development indicators.
E ectiveness A measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives.
E  ciency E  ciency measures the outputs—qualitative and quantitative—in relation to 
the inputs. It is an economic term which signi es that the aid uses the least 
costly resources possible to achieve the desired results.  is generally requires 
comparing alternative approaches to achieving the same outputs, to see if the 
most e  cient process has been adopted.
Sustainability Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the bene ts of an activity 
are likely to continue a er donor funding has been withdrawn.
Table 1. OECD Development Evaluation Criteria.
All tables courtesy of the author.
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land-release concepts can be employed when focus-
ing BAC efforts into areas containing UXO contamina-
tion and where its removal will have some socioeconomic 
impact.
Risk and Hazard. The discussions below depend on 
a mutual understanding of the formal definitions of risk 
and hazard, as follows:
• IMAS 04.10 defines risk as the “combination of the 
probability of occurrence of harm and the severity 
of that harm.”7
• IMAS 04.10 also defines a hazard as a “potential 
source of harm.”8
This is usually described mathematically as: r=PixSo 
where r = risk, Pi  equals the probability of the incidence 
and So  is the severity of the outcome. In mine-action terms, 
risk can also be seen as a product of hazard x activity.
This means that removing the hazard can reduce the 
risk, or reducing the probability of an incident by modi-
fying people’s behavior (i.e., with mine-risk education). 
However, the converse must also be true: Risk is not actu-
ally reduced when work is done to search areas that are sub-
sequently found never to have had ERW contamination.
ERW and Casualties
One problem facing the HMA sector involves how to 
measure the impact of EOD teams, given that they do 
not clear land. The more UXO that is safely removed, the 
safer the population. However, measuring the produc-
tive value of cleared land is not so simple. Estimating the 
impact of EOD teams and UXO removal is possible, and 
an established mathematical relationship now links the 
number of UXO and the number of casualties.9 A mathe-
matical function involves the percentage of ammunition 
that becomes UXO (commonly understood to be 10 per-
cent), the percentage of UXO considered unsafe to move 
(and hence most likely to cause casualties) and the av-
erage number of UXO casualties per incident. In other 
words, the more ammunition used in a particular area, 
the more UXO that will remain in the area. As a result, 
more casualties will occur.
Any land-release technique forcing the HMA teams 
to concentrate on maximum-impact areas will improve 
efficiency and will have more of an impact on donor 
funds. This has already occurred in Libya. Although 
Misrata was one of the most heavily contaminated areas 
in Libya, some areas did not see combat, and identifying 
Misrata’s contamination was the first step in this iden-
tification process. By using local knowledge and infor-
mation about the conduct of the fighting (see Figure 1), 
teams can improve this process. Other procedures can 
further focus the teams’ attention on the areas where the 
fighting was heaviest.
Figure 2. Distribution of battle damage around the focus of the fighting. The red line is a representation of how the 
density of damage is distributed across the battle area.
Illustration courtesy of the author/CISR.
Ser Datum Uncontrolled
1 Days worked 17
2 Area Cleared (Ha) 66.64
3 Items found 81
4 Area cleared per day (Ha) 3.92
5 UXO per day 4.76
6 UXO per Ha 1.22
Table 2. DCA BAC Data for August 2011.
An example of low amounts of battle damage. No 
items of UXO were found around this building.
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UXO Scrap, Damage and Fragmentation
A simple proxy indicator of the probable density of 
ERW contamination will be the density of UXO scrap, 
which can be moved and is likely to decrease over time, 
and weapon damage to buildings, which includes frag-
mentation marks. This is a simple statement of pro-
portion: The amount of fighting is proportional to the 
amount of building damage. Since the amount of ERW 
and the amount of fragmentation damage are both pro-
portional to the severity of the fighting, using fragmen-
tation as an indicator of ERW presence is statistically 
reasonable. As a general principle, one exploding weap-
on causes spalling/cratering over approximately one 
square meter (one square yard) and significant amounts 
of smaller fragmentation damage over an area of 100 sq 
m (120 sq yd).10
Experience From Misrata
Practical experience from Misrata supports a number 
of observations:
• Fragmentation and battle damage is distributed 
around the foci of conflict. It is possible to see a 
distribution of contamination around areas of 
most severe fighting which is similar to a statisti-
cal distribution. This appears to be a result of the 
nature of the fighting in Misrata. When walking a 
few meters away from severely damaged areas, no 
damage is observable in parts of the town. This dis-
tribution is represented graphically in Figure 2. 
• Items of UXO are strongly correlated with frag-
mentation and battle damage. In general, the 
presence of UXO is very strongly correlated with 
the degree of observed battle damage. No items 
of UXO were found in areas without battle dam-
age. The correlation with other ERW items, espe-
cially caches of abandoned ordnance, might be less 
strong, as ammunition stockpiles may be found 
away from conflict areas.
• Far fewer ERW are being found than the amount 
of battle damage might suggest. This lack of ERW 
is one key observation from the ground in Misrata. 
Looking at a building with 20-plus projectile 
strikes, one or two UXO items may be found in or 
around the building, but what was actually found 
on the ground was far fewer. Indeed the UXO-
contamination level around the foci of fighting 
is estimated to be only about 10 percent of what 
might be found (i.e., one UXO for every five to 10 
buildings searched). This is not because the am-
munition used was particularly reliable; rather, in-
formation given to DCA suggests that local teams 
within the Libyan Transitional National Council 
collected ERW items before DCA (and indeed the 
other international NGO team working in Libya) 
could deploy. Seemingly, DCA teams are finding 
items missed by these original searchers. In con-
ditions of such low contamination, making EOD/
BAC interventions more efficient is even more im-
portant. Table 2 sets out performance data for DCA 
teams in Misrata for August 2011. This was effec-
tively the first month of operations, and some days 
at the end of the month included a stand-down in 
preparation for the Eid al-Fitr holiday. These data 
give benchmarks by which any subsequent change 
in procedures can be measured.
The amount of UXO scrap found by a team of three search-
ers in one hour. UXO was subsequently found on the roof 
of a building in this same area by the team later that day.
An area showing more moderate damage. Much of the 
damage to this building is from fires rather than from 
the blast or fragmentation effects of UXO. A small num-
ber of UXO items were found in the buildings pictured.
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Severe Signi cant or total collapse reulting from 
repeated strikes. Signi cant amount of frag-
mentation or SA/LW strike damage
Can be harder to search than build-
ings with moderate damage
Moderate Some strikes on buildings resulting in notice-
able damage, but no general collapse. Frag-
mentations or SA/LW strike damage present.
Light Some fragmentation marks on buildings. No 
signi cant damage.
Nil No visible battle damage




Nil Reactive call-out only to spot tasks such as 
abandoned explosive ordnance or caches of 
SA/LW ammunition. Do not carry out pro-
phylactic BAC.
Light As per Nil. In the event that some UXO re-
ported then ‘clear to fade.’
Moderate ‘Clear to fade’ if UXO reported or ‘clear to 
boundary’ (of project) if area required in 
support of a funded development project. 
Clear as prophylactic BAC task when no 
severe areas le .
Severe Carry out BAC tasks on severe areas as prior-
ity when no EOD spot tasks reported. Clear 
to fade.
Consider mechanical assistance for 
searching rubble.
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Iron and steel factories
Figure 1. Wikipedia map of the battle of Misrata.
Map courtesy of Wikipedia/CISR.
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Priority De nition Contamination Impact Remarks
Priority 
One




BAC in support of funded devel-
opment project
X Strong in terms of potential 
impact. Moderate and severe 
areas only except where clear-
ance is speci cally funded.
Priority 
 ree
BAC in ‘Severe’ areas X Most likely to be contaminat-




BAC in other areas Consider relocating some 
teams to other regions if too 
many P4 tasks being under-
taken.
Table 5. Prioritization in Urban HMA.
Categorizing Explosive Fragmentation 
Battle Damage
If the above principles are operationalized for prac-
tical use in urban land release, identifying different cat-
egories of battle damage will be useful; this information 
could then be used to prioritize efforts and identify dif-
ferent technical interventions. This should assist in im-
proving the allocation of resources to the problem and 
improve efficiency.
In Misrata, four categories of battle damage were 
identified. These are explained in Table 3.
Limitations
One apparent limitation of using battle-damage evidence 
to cancel areas for BAC is that the outliers, i.e., the one-off 
item of UXO that was the only explosive-ordnance item 
to fall in an area of light or nil battle damage will not be 
found. Nor will this method find ERW caches in areas 
where no immediate fighting occurred.
The technique described is purely a method for cat-
egorizing buildings and surrounding areas based on the 
degree of battle damage. While this method is consid-
ered a useful means of categorizing areas, other data-
gathering methods exist. For example, local knowledge 
may also highlight one-off ERW items (since abandoned 
ordnance is less likely to be as closely correlated with bat-
tle damage as is UXO) or identify buildings that were oc-
cupied by fighters but were less damaged. Table 4 shows 
how other factors can be incorporated as part of a re-
source-allocation process in urban land release.
On the other hand, BAC will not find all ERW in 
built-up areas. It will not work in abandoned or locked 
buildings, and even the best BAC searchers will not be 
likely to spot UXO in unusual locations. We know that 
from World War I and World War II small numbers of 
UXO plague Europe long after the wars. Therefore, as-
suming BAC activities in built-up areas have a risk-re-
duction output rather than area clearance is important. 
ERW reports can be used to modify the default-option 
response, which the damage category suggests.
Prioritization
The principles set out previously can prioritize HMA 
assets between EOD spot tasks and wide-ranging BAC 
tasks in built-up areas. Table 5 provides prioritization 
guidelines; these compare the type of task with likely at-
tributes of contamination and impact. This can help de-
termine whether multi-purpose HMA teams deploy as 
small, mobile EOD teams or should combine for area-
clearance tasks.
Other Techniques
Marking. Not all abandoned buildings are freely ac-
cessible, which may mean that not all severely damaged 
buildings can be cleared during urban BAC activity, and 
some contamination may not be found during prophy-
lactic BAC searches. Improving BAC effectiveness in 
terms of contamination and impact is possible by the 
use (in Libya) of simple add-on stickers in Arabic and 
English, including a message similar to that in Figure 3.11 
These stickers should help improve the impact of HMA 
activity and will help the local population when they en-
counter ERW.
Human information. As implied in Table 4, collect-
ing human information will be important. Using com-
munity-liaison teams to seek out human input on ERW 
is critical. MRE can help facilitate this but only when 
it includes information about how suspect ERW can be 
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reported. MRE is more useful when a feedback loop is 
incorporated. Like the stickers on abandoned buildings, 
human input will help improve the impact of HMA ac-
tivity as it will help the local population confront ERW.
Clearing to Fade. Clearing to fade is a concept where-
by BAC teams search outward from ERW-contamination 
areas until they find no more contamination. Based on 
DCA’s experience in Misrata, the approximate mean 
distance between UXO (in contaminated areas) is 25 
m (27 yd). Therefore, the clearing-to-fade distance rec-
ommended here is 50 m (55 yd), or twice the average 
distance between UXO pieces in contaminated areas. 
Teams stop at least 50 m (55 yd) beyond the most recent-
ly found piece of UXO. The distance can be increased 
when practical, e.g., to extend the search by a few me-
ters to allow a wall or road junction to act as a boundary. 
Independent Confirmation
Produced by the French NGO Agency for Technical 
Cooperation and Development (ACTED), a map served 
as independent confirmation of this hypothesis (see aer-
ial photo, next page). In order to plan possible aid in-
terventions, this map showed battle-damage areas after 
an ACTED survey. Based on DCA’s work conducted in 
August, the UXO data was superimposed on this map 
to show a high degree of correlation between UXO finds 
and battle damage. The few outliers are marked; they 
were explained previously.
Resource Allocation Through  
Response-time Analysis
The information contained in Figure 5 is based on an 
approach called response-time analysis used by a num-
ber of countries, including Australia and the United 
Kingdom. Under such an approach, an average response 
time is set as a standard by the appropriating authority. 
This would be the expected time between an item of UXO 
Figure 3. Message to occupiers of a building in Misrata that could not be searched.
being reported to the implementing agency and its mo-
bile EOD team arriving to deal with the suspect item.
Given the time necessary to deal with an average find 
after the team arrives on site, and typical travel times 
between two separate locations, one could expect each 
team to deal with two separate UXO tasks each working 
day. This process allows analysis using the principles set 
out in Figure 5 (previous page).
This analysis can be carried out at a program level 
to determine whether there are sufficient EOD teams 
in the country, and repeated at a project level to estab-
lish whether the capacity is allocated efficiently between 
provinces or regions.
A DCA searcher checks severe damage to a building. 
The building includes a great deal of blast damage and 
collapse in some areas. An item of UXO was found on 
the roof of this building.
To the occupier:
A search of the area around this building has been carried out for dangerous explosive items, 
but access to this property was not possible. If subsequently you find any items that you suspect 
might be an explosive item, contact us at [telephone number] and we will check it for you as soon 
as possible.
Please DO NOT touch the item yourself and please also make sure that no one else touches it 
in the meantime. Do not become a casualty.
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Can you spot the UXO? This neighborhood has no readily identifiable fragmentation or battle damage, yet apparently 
has UXO, as reported to DCA by a neighbor. It is unlikely to have been spotted by BAC.
The pink shaded area on the map was produced by Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development to 
show battle-damaged areas in Misrata. The red marks show where UXO was found by DCA in August 2011.
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Top left. DCA teams working around "Severe" damaged buildings. Top right. An MRE poster provided by Handicap International. Center and 
bottom. This cluster munition was reported to DCA by a resident who could see it on the garage of his neighbor’s house. It would have been 
missed by BAC teams who would not have been granted access to the house, and it would not have been spotted by the householder as 
there is no view over the garage from the house.
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• If EOD teams are each carrying out an average of two tasks per day and there is no backlog of tasks, then 
the number of teams available can be considered sufficient and their management efficient.
• If EOD teams are carrying out an average of two tasks per day and there is a backlog of tasks, then the 
number of teams available may be insufficient, even if they are being managed efficiently.
• If EOD teams are carrying out less than two tasks per day and there is no backlog of tasks, then there may 
be too many teams available (or a problem in the task reporting process).
• If EOD teams are carrying out less than two tasks per day and there is a backlog of tasks, then it is likely 
that the teams are being managed inefficiently.
Figure 5. Principles for EOD response-time analysis.
Conclusion
BAC is traditionally used in open areas and is conven-
tionally considered a means to release land for subse-
quent safe use. DCA’s experience in Libya in 2011, 
specifically in Misrata, suggests that BAC may not always 
be an efficient way of achieving a socioeconomic impact 
due to a number of confounding factors. These include 
the underestimated amount of UXO found and the large 
number of buildings not accessible to searchers. However, 
findings from initial DCA operations show a strong cor-
relation between the degree of battle damage and the 
amount of UXO found. Therefore, using the degree of 
battle damage—supported by reports from the local pop-
ulation—should allow searchers to focus on reported 
ERW and on areas where ERW are most likely found 
within an urban land-release concept. Urban land release 
will not find all ERW, especially items of abandoned ord-
nance not found in the close proximity of battle areas. 
However, the comparatively small number of ERW found 
using conventional BAC reveals the importance of focus-
ing activities in areas where ERW are most likely found. 
Support from enhanced MRE and community-liaison ef-
forts will further improve the efficiency and impact of 
humanitarian mine-action activities in built-up areas. 
Acknowledgements: This paper could not have been 
developed without input from all of DanChurchAid’s 
Humanitarian Mine Action teams working in Misrata.
See endnotes page 81
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The GICHD Tool for Management of  
   Mechanical Demining Operations
In response to a need for an operational management tool for the mechanical demining community, 
the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining developed a system called the Man-
agement Tool for Mechanical Demining Operations. This system increases the efficiency of mine-
clearance operations by using a database that organizes and creates data reports. GICHD is working 
to improve the system including the addition of a GPS tool in 2012.
by Pehr Lodhammar [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ] and Erik de Brun [ Ripple Design ]
M echanical demining systems can greatly increase the effectiveness and efficiency of mine-clearance operations. In the past, only some commercial 
companies and very few noncommercial organizations used 
machines regularly, but today most make use of them in at 
least some capacity. Also, in recent years, the number of ma-
chine manufacturers has steadily grown, and many different 
types of machines and systems exist. 
The Geneva International Center for Humanitarian 
Demining has researched and studied machine-deployment 
practices and the cost-effectiveness of various mechanical de-
mining systems. GICHD found that the success of operation-
al mechanical demining programs depends on several key 
elements: 
• Appropriate machine-type selection
• Effective operational management
• Administration of mechanical demining operations 
• Planning of mechanical demining operations
• Proper understanding of how various machines are 
best utilized (i.e., as stand-alone systems or jointly 
with other assets) 
The research also revealed some unmet needs in mechani-
cal demining:
• Operators require increased flexibility and versatil-
ity during field operations. As a result, machines are 
increasingly developed to support multiple working 
tools, such as tillers and flails. Despite the improved 
design of machines and their increased use, much 
room for improvement remains regarding how ma-
chines are deployed and how performance data is cap-
tured and processed.
• In general, mechanical demining systems in the field of-
ten are underused, which is also known as downtime. If 
the role of the machines in technical survey (when used 
alone or when combined with other methods) was more 
appropriately defined, overall operational efficiency 
would increase. Far too often, machines are not used ef-
fectively, suggesting untapped potential. This can be due 
to poor management and planning, a lack of logistics, 
or external factors such as the weather or poor securi-
ty. Given the increase in mechanical demining among 
operators and national mine-action programs, the de-
mand/need for assistance is likely to remain high and 
may increase in the coming years. 
• The increased use of machines requires central coordi-
nation and support to ensure that information or ex-
perience with promising conceptual/technical innova-
tions, as well as general global empirical experience, are 
shared with the community at large.
Using funds provided by the Governments of Switzerland 
and Sweden, GICHD worked to address these needs by devel-
oping a software tool designed to aid in the operational man-
agement of mechanical demining in 2011. The Management 
Tool for Mechanical Demining Operations helps minimize 
vehicle downtime and maximize output during mechanical 
demining operations. This process is done by enabling the 
collection and review of machine-specific operational and 
nonoperational data. 
The GICHD Web page and GICHD training interven-
tions made the tool accessible to the mine-action commu-
nity. Based on positive operator feedback and requests from 
the users of the mechanical demining systems, the initial, 
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mechanical, demining-centric tool was expanded to support the 
management of animal detection and manual-demining oper-
ations and is known as the Management Tool for Demining 
Operations.
Description
The Management Tool for Demining Operations is a sim-
ple, macro-enabled, Microsoft Excel© database. This tool 
tracks the performance and downtime of mechanical, man-
ual and animal detection demining assets. It was developed 
primarily for field/site management and is intended to:
• Be user-friendly 
• Require only a short daily or weekly time commitment
• Augment, rather than replace, existing reporting/track-
ing processes 
The database collects operational data (i.e., performance) 
and nonoperational data (i.e., downtime) for each working as-
set every work day. The data is then compiled into a series of 
summary reports, which can be viewed, printed or saved as 
PDF documents. 
Figure1. Demining Management Tool: Main Menu.
Figure 2. Demining Management Tool: 
Admin Data Entry.
Figure 3. Demining Management Tool: Mechanical 
Asset Entry.
The user interface is designed to be intuitive for operators; 
it has a simple format that contains clearly-labeled data-entry 
fields. The main menu provides a starting point, and the tool 
is divided into three main sections: 
• Setup 
• Daily data entry 
• Reporting 
Using the Tool
When the tool is first used as part of a new task, the user 
must enter organizational and asset-specific information 
in the setup areas. The user only needs to enter the infor-
mation once, and it can be saved and used as a baseline for 
Figure 4. Demining Management Tool: Mechanical 
Daily Data Entry.
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Figure 5. Demining Management Tool: Example Report, 
Mechanical Page 1.
Figure 6. Demining Management Tool: Example Report, 
Mechanical Page 2.
Figure 7. Demining Management Tool: Example Report,  
Page 3.
subsequent tasks. Task and organizational information is 
entered first, followed by asset information. For machines, 
users need to input:
• Machine-identifying information 
• Tool specifications 
• A capacity estimate (area processed per unit of time)
For manual-demining teams, users enter the team name, 
supervisor and a team-capacity estimate. For each animal 
asset, the animal name, handler ID and a capacity estimate 
are required. Assets can be added, modified or deleted at 
any time.
Once assets are entered into the database, the daily data 
entry form (Figure 4, previous page) can be used to record op-
erational and nonoperational information for each asset ev-
ery working day. To begin, data about the site’s environmental 
conditions, e.g., weather, terrain, soil information, is record-
ed. Under each asset type, individual assets can be selected 
and specific related information for that working day entered. 
The following information for each asset is also recorded: 
• Operational data, such as hours worked, area processed 
or asset-specific environmental data
• Nonoperational data, such as downtime and causes
• Hazard-specific data
Once data entry is complete, operators can access the re-
porting forms. The demining management tool processes 
all recorded data and produces a set of reports for each asset 
group and individual reports for each specific asset. For each 
asset group, a two-page summary report is generated, which 
shows tabular and graphical data for all the active individu-
al assets. For any specific asset, a two- to three-page report is 
prepared, which shows nonoperational details and operation-
al/performance details, alongside environmental conditions 
(see Figures 5, 6 and 7 for an example of a mechanical asset 
report). Reports can be viewed within the tool, printed or ex-
ported as PDF documents.
In 2012, the tool will be improved to include a GPS track-
ing and visualization function, as well as other features to 
allow operators to view the mechanical demining unit pro-
duction graphically. A small GPS tracking device will be fitted 
to the demining machine, and after each working session, the 
data collected during clearance will transfer to the manage-
ment tool. To review the GPS data, the operator needs only to 
select appropriate dates, and the software will display a map 
of the area with all path data displayed as an overlay. The GPS 
tracking report will be viewable and printable.
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Based on needs identified during 
studies of mechanical demining oper-
ations in the field, GICHD developed 
the Management Tool for Mechanical 
Demining Operations, software en-
abling mechanical demining operators 
to collect performance and downtime 
data and generate useful reports. The 
initial tool, released in mid-2011, is al-
ready used in more than 40 field proj-
ects. Based on feedback from operators, 
the tool was expanded to include manu-
al demining and animal detection, and 
will continue to help enhance the pro-
ductivity and cost-effectiveness of de-
mining operations. 
The tools and companion user man-
uals can be downloaded from the 
GICHD Web page and are regularly dis-
tributed to operators during GICHD 
training outreach activities.1 GICHD 
welcomes feedback from users, which 
should be sent to Pehr.Lodhammar@
gichd.org.  
See endnotes page 82
An online gathering place for 

































Check out what’s happening in
the CISR sphere.
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The Role of Croatian Media 
   in Mine-risk Education
In its work, the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) has found that various forms of media, 
from new Internet applications to newspapers and the radio, are uniquely situated to raise aware-
ness among at-risk populations about the realities of landmines. To examine the media’s effective-
ness in mine-risk education, in 2008, CROMAC completed a study evaluating the Croatian media’s 
coverage of landmine incidents and related news. With cooperation, CROMAC hopes better report-
ing about MRE programs will prevent mine accidents and create a more informed population. 
by Josip Ĉerina [ Croatian Mine Action Centre ]
L andmine contamination in Croatia is a result of mass landmine use during World War II (1941–1945) and the Homeland War (1991–1995). Between 1991 and 
2011, 1,329 mine incidents occurred in Croatia resulting in 
approximately 1,912 casualties. Since the establishment of the 
Croatian Mine Action Centre in 1998, the number of incidents 
has steadily decreased over the years to fewer than 10 incidents 
per year. From 2008 to 2010, six mine incidents each year 
occurred (a total of nine killed and 12 injured), and in 2011, 
five incidents occurred (zero killed/four injured). From 2005 
to 2007, a total of 37 mine incidents resulted in eight deaths 
and 24 injuries, and from 2002 to 2004, 47 incidents resulted 
in 21 deaths and 30 injuries.1 (See Table 1 for details.)
Various activities such as massive clearance efforts fund-
ed by the Croatian Government and by some foreign gov-
ernments and private donors contributed to the reduction of 
mines in Croatia, including conducting mine-risk education 
and marking mine-suspected areas with hazard signs. The 
media has also contributed greatly to this reduction. During 
a study published in Medijska istraživanja in 2009, CROMAC 
found that the ''media is a very important CROMAC partner 
in the implementation of different programs as well as distrib-
uting educative and preventive messages.''2 
Bearing in mind that mine action’s purpose is not only de-
mining but also reduction of mine danger, this article elabo-
rates on the role that the media plays in the process of solving 
the mine problem. Taking into account recent Croatian me-
dia practices, CROMAC investigated how extensively the me-
dia covers mine action-related topics and analyzed the effects 
of incomplete reporting that fails to educate or teach preven-
tive behavior. This research allowed CROMAC to begin to un-
derstand more efficient solutions for MRE delivery and other 
mine-related information.
Mine incidents involving civilians following the Home-
land War show the need for systematic communication re-
garding risks. Endangered communities require safe-behavior 
training and warning about the risks that mines and explosive 
remnants of war impose. This is especially important in the 
Croatia’s rural areas, where inhabitants live and engage in ag-
riculture and farming near mine-suspected areas. According 
to the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demin-
ing’s A Guide to Mine Action, four categories of persons suffer 
from mine incidents:
1. Unaware: The person is not aware of mine danger.
2.  Uninformed: The person is informed about mines but 
is not aware of safe forms of behavior.
3.  Inconsiderate: The person knows about and ignores 
the safe forms of behavior. 
4.  Deliberate: The person, generally without many op-
tions available, deliberately accepts unsafe behavior.3 
Due to Croatia’s persistent landmine and ERW contamina-
tion, continuing mine-awareness activities and promoting be-
havior change is necessary.4 Croatia uses radio, television and 
newspapers, along with signposts marking hazardous areas, to 
spread warnings and raise public awareness about risks and 
safe behaviors.
In addition, recent technological developments enable 
communication over the Internet. CROMAC website’s MIS-
portal, launched in February 2009, allows users to obtain 
comprehensive information about mine-suspected areas in 
Croatia by selecting a desired location.5 MISportal also de-
tails the method of marking contaminated areas.
Although media coverage helps prevent landmine inci-
dents, until mined areas are finally cleared, the most important 
form of prevention from mine incidents is the mine-warning 
sign. Each year, CROMAC regularly checks the conditions of 
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all mine-warning signs, placing special emphasis on checking 
in the spring (after winter weather has damaged or destroyed 
some signs) and when rural activities intensify. Currently, 
Croatia has 16,000 mine-warning signs. CROMAC makes 
and updates mine-situation maps for all endangered commu-
nities, also updating its online MISportal.6 In addition, repre-
sentatives of local communities and individuals can freely ask 
CROMAC to update and verify the marking status of mine-
suspected areas. This form of two-way communication is im-
portant for maintaining a high level of marking accuracy.
Keeping the population informed also includes providing 
the location and scope of contaminated areas and mine-ac-
tion activities undertaken so far. This information is neces-
sary for citizens to take an active part in adopting priority 
plans. Municipalities and towns file requests for drafting 
county-priority lists. The priority list serves as the basis for 
the annual demining plan.7 Cooperation with the local com-
munity often contributes to faster socioeconomic develop-
ment, especially regarding agriculture and farming, upon 
completion of demining operations.
Research Methodology
While CROMAC’s MISportal helps combat 
sporadic media coverage of landmines, and 
serves as a platform for information exchange 
about the extent of mine dangers, additional 
and ongoing media coverage could also effec-
tively raise mine awareness among individu-
als and local communities. If journalists act 
responsibly, newspapers could be an efficient 
medium, because they provide opportunities 
for more detailed coverage of a particular top-
ic or event.
To further examine the local media’s ef-
fectiveness, in 2008, CROMAC researched 
and analyzed the Croatian press’ contribu-
tion to providing information and teach-
ing MRE. Using the quantitative method, the 
study examined mine-related articles in nine 
Croatian daily newspapers: Vjesnik, Večernji 
list, Jutarnji list, 24 sata, Slobodna Dalmaci-
ja, Glas Slavonije, Novi list, Zadarski list and 
Karlovački list.
This media review covered 242 randomly 
selected newspaper articles published in the 
period 2005–2007. It investigated mine-related 
topics and content in order to analyze what 
areas should be addressed more frequently—all with the pur-
pose of achieving socially-responsible reporting about the ex-
isting mine danger, including special emphasis on informative 
and educational stories about the danger.
Results and Analysis
The analysis of mine action-related topics in the newspaper 
articles showed that most coverage focused on six main fields:
1. Informing the population about mine dangers 
2.  Providing MRE
3. Announcing mine-victim assistance
4.  Advocating non-use of landmines
5.  Reporting on the rights of demining staff 
6. Discussing the socioeconomic impact of the mine 
problem
The remaining articles focused on other mine-related 
topics: reporting about different visits, signing cooperative 
agreements, demining companies’ business operations, ac-
tivities of nongovernmental organizations, etc. Table 2 pres-
ents the results obtained.
Of the topics studied in the selected articles, the most fre-
quent topic, advocating non-use of landmines, was addressed 







1991 190 43 48 162 253
1992 235 48 67 196 311
1993 183 42 67 162 271
1994 110 36 37 102 175
1995 205 27 93 214 334
1996 100 23 35 75 133
1997 75 20 43 63 126
1998 62 21 36 35 92
1999 34 9 21 27 57
2000 17 5 10 8 23
2001 21 7 8 14 29
2002 24 9 6 11 26
2003 10 4 1 4 9
2004 13 0 14 2 16
2005 10 0 4 9 13
2006 10 6 1 4 11
2007 7 1 3 4 8
2008 6 1 2 4 7
2009 6 1 4 2 7
2010 6 3 3 1 7
2011 5 2 0 2 4
1998-2011 231 69 113 127 309
Total 1,329 308 503 1,101 1,912
1603
309
Table 1. Number of mine incidents and casualties in Croatia.
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29.97 percent of the time. In the framework of this topic, the 
frequency of the following subtopics was analyzed:
• International Mine Action Standards 
• Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention
• Humanitarian action
• Donations for the purpose of technically surveying sus-
pected areas and clearing known hazardous areas 
The topic “informing the population about mine dangers” 
was recorded in 24.74 percent of the total number of topics an-
alyzed. On the other hand, MRE appeared quite rarely, in 6.62 
percent of the articles—an obvious lack of educational content 
aiming to increase the safety of citizens.
The socioeconomic impact as a result of the mine prob-
lem was represented in 20.21 percent of the articles. In the 
framework of this topic, the newspapers reported about 
different consequences of the mine problem: limitations in 
war-damaged family houses and the return of displaced per-
sons, impact on construction of infrastructure and economic 
facilities, effects on agriculture and farming, etc. Articles of this 
nature discuss how mine-contaminated areas are an obstacle to 
the return of displaced citizens and increased economic activity.
Mine survivor assistance garnered only 2.44 percent of the 
attention, indicating that very few articles were dedicated to 
this topic. Also, contrary to what was expected, very few arti-
cles were dedicated to health care and psychological and social 
assistance for the mine survivors. In addition, very few articles 
were about projects of national institutions and NGOs intend-
ed for mine survivor-assistance purposes.
The topic entitled “reporting on the rights of demining 
staff” was covered in only 20 cases—in 6.96 percent of the to-
tal number of articles analyzed. In 1996, Croatia passed the 
Law on Humanitarian Demining and other laws that regu-
late demining-staff rights in a transparent manner. In addi-
tion, Croatia enacted a law specifically to cover the rights of 
demining staff in the event of an injury, and it is a States Par-
ty to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (ratified in 2007) and follows all of the rights 
of this convention.1,8 Therefore, after a review of the articles, 
CROMAC concluded that reporting the rights of demining 
staff was no longer needed.
Informing the Public
CROMAC then wanted to further analyze the articles fo-
cused on informing the population about mine dangers and 
providing MRE. In order to discover the informative value of 
newspaper articles, the presence of the following indicators 
were analyzed: 
• Information for the public about mine-suspected areas
• Information regarding marking of hazardous areas
• General information on the current mine situation of 
endangered communities
• Information for the public about the commencement of 
demining operations
• Announcements about demining courses 
• Reports about the handover of cleared areas
Table 3 presents the analysis of these results, revealing that 
the most frequent topic addressed—in 42.26 percent of the ar-
ticles—was “general information on the current mine situa-
tion.” Other categories were represented almost equally. 
Very few articles were about specific terrain clearance, i.e., 
demining of particular areas. The fact that CROMAC did not 
find any articles about the handover of cleared areas confirmed 
this. However, the researchers believe that mass media must 
inform the local community about completed clearance proj-
ects, so locals know when it is safe to access demined areas. 
To establish the educational value of the newspaper arti-
cles, the study analyzed the articles based on the presence of 
the following indicators: 
• Information on organized forms of MRE
• Information about professional gatherings, sympo-
siums and workshops
• Information on ERW types
Framework of the topic Frequency %
Informing of population about mine danger 71 24.74
Mine-risk education 19 6.62
Mine-victim assistance 7 2.44
Advocating non-use of landmines 86 29.97
Rights of demining sta 20 6.96
Socioeconomic impact of mine problem 58 20.21
Other 26 9.06
Total 287 100
Table 2. Overview of the topic framework analysis.
Framework of the topic Frequency %
Marking of mine-suspected areas 9 12.68
Noti cation for public about the beginning 
of demining
10 14.08
Information for public about de nition of mine-
suspected areas
10 14.08
Information for public about the course 
of demining
12 16.9
General information about mine situation of 
endangered communities
30 42.26
Handover of cleared areas 0 0
Table 3. Overview of the analysis of the topic, informing 
about mine danger.
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• Information on clearance methods
• Information on procedures when 
encountering mines and ERW
The most represented indicators were 
information on mine and ERW types, 
with 31.58 percent of the articles men-
tioning this, and information on clear-
ance methods, garnering 26.32 percent 
of the published articles (see Table 4).
Other categories were less frequent-
ly represented. The category “Informa-
tion on procedures when encountering 
ERW” was never mentioned. Accord-
ing to these results, mine danger is 
poorly represented in newspapers ex-
cept in the case of mine accidents, when 
such events become worthy of media 
attention. This analysis showed how 
newspapers use the space they have 
available. It also pointed out to the re-
searchers that this space could be bet-
ter used to invite the population to 
adhere to all possible measures of pre-
caution and responsible behavior in 
mine-affected environments.
Conclusion
Even though the press contributes to 
informing and educating citizens about 
mine dangers, a need remains for more 
frequent reporting about safe behav-
ior. Publicizing the status of demining 
in particular areas and the handover of 
cleared areas is also important. Report-
ing about humanitarian actions and 
donations is not enough, neither is em-
phasizing the mine problem as an ob-
stacle to socioeconomic development. 
Disseminating information more effi-
ciently is necessary, as well as making 
MRE more available until all contami-
nated areas are thoroughly cleared and 
handed over to the final beneficiaries for 
safe use.
For this purpose, more information 
regarding demining activities and the 
demining process should be sent to me-
dia outlets. It would also be helpful if 
Framework of the topic Frequency %
Organized forms of mine-risk education 4 21.05
Professional gatherings, symposiums and workshops 4 21.05
Information on ERW types 6 31.58
Information on clearance methods 5 26.32
Information on the procedure when running into ERW 0 0
Table 4. Overview of the analysis of the topic, mine-risk 
education.
the media was invited to attend various 
demining activities, so that it could re-
lay first-hand accounts of current dan-
gers to the public and to periodically 
organize symposiums in which experts, 
journalists, activists and representa-
tives of local communities participate in 
workshops designed to educate citizens 
about the mine threat. 
The media’s social responsibility 
should be based on joint liability of all 
social subjects, because its interactive 
relationship with the public requires 
ethical behaviors in protection of civil 
interests and needs. CROMAC informs 
the population about mine-action activ-
ities and the mine situation in particular 
communities, but the communication 
with media takes place directly between 
CROMAC and the media, even though 
the assistance of a professional public-
relations agency would probably make 
communications more efficient. Good 
cooperation through PR services that 
provide reliable and timely information 
may contribute to quality reporting 
about mine problems. 
See endnotes page 82
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Peer-support Training for     
   Nonliterate and Semiliterate  
   Female Ex-combatants in Burundi
by Cameron Macauley [ CISR ], Monica Onyango [ Boston University School of Public Health ]  
and Eric Niragira [ CEDAC ]
In September 2011, 25 female veterans of Burundi’s civil war were trained to become peer-support 
workers. The five-day training, funded under a grant from the Stavros Niarchos Foundation and con-
ducted by James Madison University’s Center for International Stabilization and Recovery, was the 
first of its kind to offer peer-counseling skills to nonliterate and semiliterate women.1 
B etween 1961—when Burundi declared its indepen-dence from Belgium—and early 2005, violence in Burundi killed an estimated 500,000 people and 
left the country in a chronic state of political instability. 
Following the assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye in 
1993, ethnic conflict between Hutus and Tutsis, and attempts 
to overthrow the government, resulted in brutal military re-
prisals that forced many Burundians to take up arms in self-
defense. Paramilitary organizations conscripted men, women 
and children at gunpoint to provide slave labor and fight on 
the front lines.2
By 2005, war had left Burundi without infrastructure 
or industry, and had reduced already low indices of health 
and education. At the height of Burundi’s civil conflict, lit-
eracy among women ages 15 and above fell from 52.2 per-
cent in 2000 to 44 percent in 2002. Although literacy among 
women had increased to 60.9 percent by 2009 (with an en-
couraging leap to 76 percent among girls ages 15 to 24), the 
United Nations Development Programme’s 2009 Human 
Development Report ranked Burundi 174 out of 177 nations.3 
As in much of traditional Africa, Burundian women are al-
ready on an unequal footing with men, enrolling less fre-
quently in school and receiving fewer years of education.
Although French is an official language in Burundi, few 
Burundians are proficient in French, and the literacy statistics 
above refer mainly to literacy in Kirundi, a language in which 
few publications are available. In addition, literacy among 
women is significantly higher in urban communities, where-
as the percentage of literate women is close to zero in some 
rural communities. Furthermore, opportunities for adult 
women in Burundi to learn how to read and write are sparse, 
and motivation to seek educational opportunities is low for 
women who devote long days to farming, working and raising 
children. Alternatively, male literacy in Burundi is typically 
about 10 to 15 percent higher than that of women.10
Female Veterans in Burundi
For 13 years, during the darkest period of the war, un-
scrupulous warlords on both sides forced adolescents and 
children into military service in order to swell their fighting 
forces with obedient and resilient youths.11 In addition, many 
thousands of teens willingly joined paramilitary units devot-
ed to defending Tutsi communities from wholesale genocidal 
slaughter.12 Many teachers fled, and 29 percent of Burundi’s 
schools were destroyed, leaving education in Burundi severe-
ly affected for nearly a decade.13
Burundian women involved in military service were often 
little more than slaves.14 Conditions were abysmal for those 
assigned to cook, wash clothes and act as “bush wives” for 
male soldiers. Life was only marginally better for women who 
received combat training and went into battle. Women suf-
fered from hunger and sexual abuse at the whim of their male 








Table 1. Female literacy rate in Burundi.4
All graphics courtesy of CISR/Cameron Macauley.
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comrades, and even those who had distinguished themselves 
in battle garnered little respect and few privileges.15
Demobilization created a dilemma for the Burundian 
Government, as the status of female veterans remained doubt-
ful.16 Many observers questioned whether women were ever 
combatants, and female claims for the same rights as male ex-
combatants were routinely denied by the Programme National 
de Démobilisation, Réinsertion et Réintégration (National 
Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Program).17 
Initially, women were only eligible for assistance if they were 
married to male soldiers, and only then if their husbands had 
fought on the government’s side.18 Opportunities for land, 
housing, vocational training and health care slowly opened 
up to women when the numbers of female ex-combatants be-
came apparent. Regardless, assistance was difficult to obtain 
for these female veterans’ children.19 Consequently, as many 
as 85 percent of women “self-demobilized,”15 meaning they 
did not bother trying to register as ex-combatants. Of the es-
timated 55,000 ex-combatants believed to live in Burundi, 
30,916 were officially demobilized as of April 2010, and of 
these, only 795 were female.20
Many female ex-combatants tried to return to their com-
munities after demobilization, only to confront a variety of 
obstacles. Whereas male counterparts received praise and re-
spect, female veterans were frequently stigmatized as “kill-
ers,” and single mothers with children were accused of 
promiscuity.17 When wanting to remarry, these women found 
that men believed they would be difficult to control.21 
In some cases, there was a grain of truth to this: As a re-
sult of years of abuse, Burundian women in military service 
had acquired survival skills to avoid exploitation. Some had 
advanced in rank by challenging stereotypes and excelling in 
traditionally male-oriented activities, such as handling weap-
ons, leading troops into battle, nighttime reconnaissance 
and interrogating prisoners.22 These women were outspoken, 
fearless and protective of their more vulnerable colleagues.22 
However, they contradicted traditional norms of the subservi-
ent and docile wife that Burundian men find attractive.
War-related Trauma
Research suggests that women exposed to combat are 
more likely to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder than 
men.23,24 For women, the social transformation into soldiers 
is more profound and potentially more disturbing. Men feel 
more comfortable in the role of warrior and defender in which 
they are required to kill or maim an enemy. For women, the 
traditional role of protector and caregiver is brutally violated 
during military service.25 For female ex-combatants who were 
raped, the trust and self-confidence necessary to interact nor-
mally with men in their community is particularly difficult 
to regain.
A participant gives a presentation on what it means to be a 
veteran and a mother.
Participants learn about trust in an exercise in which blind-
folded participants are guided by partners.
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Because of their similar experience, 
female ex-combatants wanted to stay 
together after demobilization. Having 
spent years surviving in the bush and 
witnessing the same violent atrocities, 
these women found that their military 
friends were often closer to them than 
family. No one can understand the an-
guish and hardship of such a life better 
than those who have also experienced 
it.26 Rejected by their parents, husbands 
and communities, many of these wom-
en established communal families in 
order to survive.
The Center for the Training and 
Development of Former  
Combatants
Eric Niragira, an ex-combat-
ant forced into combat at the age 
of 15, founded CEDAC (Le Centre 
d’Encadrement et de Développement 
des Anciens Combattants, or The Center 
for Management and Development 
of Veterans) in 2005 as an organiza-
tion dedicated to helping demobilized 
veterans reintegrate into Burundian 
society.27 Following CEDAC’s estab-
lishment, many female ex-combatants 
banded together to form similar groups 
for advocacy and income generation, 
and now some 60 such associations ex-
ist in Burundi with more than 1,200 
members.28,29 Niragira realized that re-
integration was especially difficult for 
women, and he obtained funding to 
establish a commune in which female 
ex-combatants could live, raise their 
children together and participate as a 
group in income-generating activities. 
However, many of the women contin-
ued to suffer from post-traumatic stress 
disorder, for which Burundi has limit-
ed treatment. CEDAC’s work attracted 
the attention of Survivor Corps, which 
offered training on how to provide peer 
support.27 In rural areas where coun-
seling and psychotherapy are virtual-
ly nonexistent, the training proved to 
be highly successful, since it encour-
aged the women to help each other rath-
er than rely on outsiders. Symptoms of 
PTSD diminished quickly among the 
commune population, and some of the 
recovered women chose to return to 
their home communities.
One difficulty Survivor Corps en-
countered was the very low literacy 
Day 1
• Personal introductions
• Exercises on helping survivors achieve emotional control
Day 2





• How to listen to it
• Questions to ask
• Exercises and discussions on helping a survivor develop goals and objectives
• Role plays
Day 4
• Exercises and discussions on building trust 
• Exercises and discussions on building self-esteem
• Role plays
Day 5
• Exercises and discussions on protecting privacy and confi dentiality
• Role plays 
• Closing ceremony
Table 2. Workshop curriculum.
level among women living in the com-
munes; this was a problem since all 
of Survivor Corps’ training materials 
were developed for literate peer-sup-
port workers. In 2011, CISR proposed 
another training event for CEDAC, 
specifically designed for nonliterate or 
semiliterate women.
The 2011 Peer-support 
Training Workshop
CEDAC selected 25 female partici-
pants from eight CEDAC communes in 
Burundi to take part in the workshop. 
The women, ranging in age from 28 to 
54, served in the military or paramili-
tary forces during the Burundian civil 
conflict, and showed interest and skill 
in counseling other women. Most of the 
participants were abducted into service, 
and approximately half of the partici-
pants experienced combat for the first 
time during the war. The majority of the 
women suffered gunshot wounds or had 
been injured by landmines. Most were 
sexual-abuse victims. Fifteen of the par-
ticipants were semiliterate, in that they 
could read and write some Kirundi. The 
remaining women were functionally 
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illiterate,1 although most could write 
their own names. None of the partici-
pants could speak French or English.
Workshop Content and Methodology
The workshop focused on the hu-
man response to traumatic experiences, 
and how active listening, empathy and 
understanding can facilitate the natu-
ral recovery processes resulting from 
traumatic events. Teaching methodolo-
gy was based on a series of interactive 
exercises, some of which were developed 
by Dr. Lennis Echterling and Dr. Anne 
Stewart of James Madison University.
Question-and-answer exchanges 
with the facilitator elicited responses 
indicating that most participants had a 
clear understanding of trauma’s effects 
on survivors of war-related violence. 
The participants were willing—in some 
cases even eager—to tell personal stories 
of violence they had suffered, witnessed 
and participated in, describing how they 
overcame fear, depression and anger, 
and went on to help others do the same.
Participants practiced a series of ex-
ercises designed to localize the strong 
emotions (both positive and negative) 
associated with traumatic events. This 
allowed survivors to isolate feelings 
of anger and grief, and instead sum-
mon strength and calmness. This mas-
tery of internal forces is essential to the 
next step in the recovery process—the 
“Survivor Story,” which is the survivor’s 
contemplation and analysis of his or her 
traumatic memories.30
Recalled with horror, sorrow and 
bitterness, the “Survival Story” rep-
resents how survivors understand the 
events and actions forming their trau-
matic experience. Decades of research 
support the theory that survivors who 
tell their story to a sympathetic listen-
er or audience can better comprehend 
what happened.31 Not only is this pro-
cess therapeutic, but survivors’ un-
derstanding can increase with each 
retelling of their story.32 Within the 
workshop, exercises focused on teach-
ing participants to ask questions de-
signed to promote analysis of the 
survivor’s own role in the survival sto-
ry in order to emphasize self-effica-
cy and promote self-identification in a 
positive light. This was crucial for pa-
tients recovering from feelings of hu-
miliation and guilt, which can plague 
survivors for years. Questions includ-
ed, “How did you find the strength to 
go on?” and “What have you learned 
about yourself from this experience?” 
Finally, participants were instructed to 
encourage the survivor to look toward 
the future: “What will you need to do 
to rebuild your life?”33 Storytelling is an 
important part of Burundian oral tra-
dition and proved a valuable part of the 
training.
A major component of the work-
shop was role-play exercises in which a 
“peer-support worker” conversed with 
a “survivor,” giving participants an op-
portunity to practice peer-support skills 
and analyze each other’s performances. 
Role-plays gave participants an oppor-
tunity to present stories about not only 
trauma and recovery but some of the 
fundamental injustices of Burundian 
society toward female ex-combatants. 
The participants were skilled actors, 
depicting distrust, hatred, fear, grief 
and rage with great feeling, yet they also 
convincingly portrayed empathy, con-
cern and understanding.
The Future of Peer Support  
in Burundi
This workshop was unique: It was 
designed to teach counseling skills to 
participants who have had little or no 
formal education. Traditionally, coun-
seling is considered an activity only 
literate individuals may engage in; how-
ever, peer support takes place naturally 
in post-conflict communities, especial-
ly where professional psychotherapy is 
inaccessible. Support for nonliterate 
groups does not negate the importance 
of literacy; instead, it acknowledges 
that an individual need not be literate 
to learn new skills and contribute to 
the rebuilding of a war-affected com-
munity. Providing these women with 
counseling skills is particularly impor-
tant because of the high prevalence of 
psychological trauma among female 
ex-combatants, and the importance of 
their continued recovery as part of re-
integration and reconciliation. 
Participants play the roles of a peer-
support worker counseling a female 
veteran in order to practice counsel-
ing skills.
Participants learn how to help others 
relinquish painful memories by exhal-
ing them into balloons.
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Cameron Macauley, MPH, joined CISR in 
August 2010 as Peer Support and Trauma 
Rehabilitation Specialist. He holds degrees 
in anthropology and psychology, and be-
came a Physician Assistant in 1983. He 
has worked in a refugee camp on the Thai-
Cambodian border, at a district hospital 
in Sumatra, as a Peace Corps volunteer 
in Guinea-Bissau, in Mozambique where 
he taught trauma surgery for landmine in-
juries, in an immunization program in An-
gola and in a malaria-control program in 
Brazil. Between 2005 and 2010, he taught 
mental-health courses for Survivor Corps 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, El 
Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan and Vietnam.
Cameron Macauley, MPH
Peer Support and Trauma Rehabilitation 
   Specialist 
Center for International Stabilization  
   and Recovery 
James Madison University
Email: macaulcx@jmu.edu
Eric Niragira, a former combatant in  
Burundi, founded CEDAC in 2005 to fight 
armed violence and assist ex-combatants. 
CEDAC has received support from CISR, 
United Nations Development Programme 
and the United Nations Development Fund 
for Women (UNIFEM) to undertake its 
peace-building and development initia-
tives, such as campaigns for the voluntary 
handover of firearms and training in peer-
to-peer support. Winner of the Niarchos 
Prize 2010 which honors individuals who 
promote resilience in conflict-affected  
areas, Niragira is involved in several  
projects to promote the rights of women, 





Tel: +257 7991 2027
CEDAC is interested in establish-
ing a nationwide peer-support pro-
gram for trauma survivors of all types 
in Burundi; however, the organization 
currently lacks the funding and per-
sonnel to do this. The current project 
relies heavily on the volunteer efforts of 
CEDAC’s staff and the workshop par-
ticipants. Under the current Niarchos 
grant, CISR will to return to Burundi 
in 2012 to offer peer-support train-
ing for other groups, including women 
with disabilities. 
CEDAC views this workshop as a 
step toward gender equality in Burundi. 
CEDAC’s communes gave female ex-
combatants a safe environment to re-
cover, but these women will need to 
return to society soon. Hopefully, 
building their capacity through work-
shops of this kind will help them be-
come leaders, caregivers and advocates 
for women’s rights in Burundi and 
throughout Africa. 
See endnotes page 82
Monica Onyango, Ph.D., MS, MPH, 
RN, is a Clinical Assistant Professor of 
International Health at Boston Univer-
sity School of Public Health, where she 
teaches courses in managing disasters 
and complex humanitarian emergencies, 
and sexual and reproductive health in di-
saster settings. Onyango served in the 
Kenya Ministry of Health for 10 years as 
a Nursing Officer, worked as a Health 
Team Leader with international NGOs in 
relief and development in Angola, South 
Sudan and in a refugee camp in Kenya. 
She also participated in training South 
Sudanese health workers on emergency 
obstetrics and neonatal care. Onyango’s 
research interests focus on reproductive 
health, maternal and child health, HIV/
AIDS, health care among populations af-
fected by war and natural disasters, and 
the role of nurses and midwives in improv-
ing maternal and child health. She holds 
a doctorate in nursing, a Master of Sci-
ence (nursing), a Master in Public Health, 
a diploma in advanced nursing, and a di-
ploma in general nursing and midwifery.
Monica Onyango, Ph.D.
Clinical Assistant Professor
Boston University School of Public Health
Email: monyango@bu.edu
The program encouraged the women to help each other rather than rely  
on outsiders.
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Firearms Safety in Somaliland: From 
  Mine Action to Community Safety
Multiple border and civil wars have left Somaliland contaminated with explosive remnants of war 
and a surplus of small arms and light weapons. Today, unsecured firearms threaten daily life in ru-
ral villages, resulting in more deaths in Somaliland than from recent landmine incidents. Addressing 
the need for firearm security, Danish Demining Group provides training and awareness through its 
Community Safety program.
by William Vest-Lillesøe [ Danish Demining Group ]
T ogether with the rest of Somalia, the northwest re-gion of Somaliland (previously British Somaliland) has a bloody past with years of civil war. Although 
it is not internationally recognized as a legitimate state, in 
1991, it declared its independence from Somalia and became 
the Republic of Somaliland. Since then, the region has en-
joyed relative peace and stability. With help from the Somali 
diaspora, Somaliland managed to establish a relatively well-
functioning government with democratic elections and good 
(though mostly unofficial) diplomatic ties.1
Mine Action and Community Safety
Following years of war, large areas of Somaliland became 
contaminated with landmines, explosive remnants of war 
and surplus small arms and light weapons. Funded by the 
United Nations Development Programme and the Danish 
International Development Agency, DDG began clearing 
minefields in Somaliland in 1999, alongside other agencies 
such as Rimfire, a British commercial mine-action agency. 
Shortly afterwards, The HALO Trust and Santa Barbara, a 
German nongovernmental organization, joined the effort.2 
By 2006, DDG had cleared more than 11,000 landmines and 
Close-up of a gun clamp developed by DDG. See larger photo on following page.
All photos courtesy of the author.
more than 124,000 ERW. With fewer contaminated areas and 
evidence of a greater rate of incidents caused by SA/LW than 
mines and ERW, DDG decided to shift its focus away from 
traditional mine action toward a broader approach address-
ing safety within local communities. In 2009, the Somaliland 
Mine Action Centre reported 19 incidents and 23 casualties 
from mines and ERW. DDG research from the same year 
estimated more than 7,500 firearm accidents and at least 
11,000 incidents involving shootings or threats with fire-
arms. Consequently, DDG started its Community Safety pro-
gram in Somaliland in 2008 with funding from the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency and the 
Netherlands.3
DDG envisioned that a much bigger impact on human 
safety (regarding physical harm and the psychological feel-
ing of security) could be achieved by using its resources to ad-
dress the SA/LW problem instead of continuing traditional 
mine clearance in Somaliland. The 2006 Geneva Declaration 
on Armed Violence and Development greatly inspired the new 
approach. The declaration highlights the role of armed vio-
lence as an obstacle to sustainable development and aims to-
ward the fulfillment of the Millennium Development Goals, a 
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In collaboration with local communities, DDG has developed safe-storage devices, such as this gun clamp as well as 
boxes for pistols and ammunition. The devices are locked with a padlock and chained to the foundation of the owner’s 
house, and they have proven very succesful in preventing accidents and theft.
In a small plain room in the village of Adan Abokor in rural Somaliland, around 20 locals 
squeezed together on benches along the walls: women on one side and men on the other. 
Latecomers peeked through a window as several curious children stood in the doorway. 
They had gathered to attend a session in firearms safety education, a part of DDG's Com-
munity Safety program in Somaliland. With the help of illustrations to teach risk awareness 
and prevent accidents, the facilitator covered different types of firearms and dangerous 
situations. The participants then contributed personal experiences and stories from their 
communities. In one instance, a boy and his sister were home alone and found a gun. They 
played with it, and the girl put her finger in the barrel while the boy pulled the trigger. The 
girl survived but lost her lower arm. Another man’s father accidentally shot himself while 
trying to set a trap for a wild animal that was eating his goats. Still another young man 
almost killed his sister when he accidentally fired his father’s gun. Fortunately, the bullet 
only grazed her head.
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Inhabitants of Adan Abokor village in Somaliland attend a Firearms Safety Education workshop by DDG. The workshop teaches 
safe handling of firearms and sensitizes communities to the dangers of keeping firearms in the home.
group of eight goals that range from halving poverty and hun-
ger to reducing child mortality and providing universal edu-
cation by 2015.4 More than 100 states signed the declaration 
so far, thereby committing to strengthen efforts to reduce and 
prevent armed violence, nationally and internationally.
As a guideline for policy, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development created a tool, the Armed 
Violence Lens, which addresses firearms (instruments), the 
perpetrators of violence (agents) and the institutions that help 
sustain a culture of armed violence from national to global 
levels.5 DDG also used OECD’s Armed Violence Lens in the 
development of its Community Safety program, a comprehen-
sive approach that not only deals directly with the prevention 
of physical damage but also helps people cope with the psy-
chological aspects of violence, including feelings of stress and 
anxiety regarding perceived accidents and threats. Feelings of 
insecurity can be as devastating as the actual presence of dan-
ger. Finally, mitigation and successful resolution of conflicts is 
achieved through conflict management and cooperation with 
local law enforcement. DDG also deploys the Community 
Safety program in the rest of Somalia, including Puntland, and 
in other countries such as South Sudan, Uganda and Yemen.
Firearms in Somaliland
In Somaliland, many families view firearms as a necessary 
means of defense. A 2009 DDG survey showed that 74 percent 
of Somaliland homes contained at least one firearm.2 Although 
Somalia, including Somaliland, is one of Africa’s most ethni-
cally homogenous countries, it has a long history of fighting 
between different clans and subclans for territory, livestock 
and other resources. Clans are, in essence, extended fami-
lies and can divide into several subclans or even sub-subclans 
and so on. The land is arid with little rainfall, and struggles 
between clans and within communities often revolve around 
control of scarce resources. If a clan or community is wronged, 
retaliation is expected, often drawing out conflicts for extend-
ed periods of time with extensive casualties until an agreement 
of compensation has been reached. These outbreaks of armed 
conflict have long been part of everyday life, especially in the 
rural areas of Somalia and Somaliland. Technological ad-
vancements in weapons manufacturing and years of civil wars 
throughout Somalia have replaced clubs and axes with pistols 
and AK-47s. The added destructive potential of these weapons, 
coupled with limited knowledge of the workings of firearms, 
results in thousands of accidents every year.
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Years of war have resulted in a massive spread of firearms to civilian populations in Somalia, including the self-declared Republic 
of Somaliland. For many families, having a gun in the home is seen as a necessity to protect family and property. DDG address-
es the problems associated with such a high frequency of gun ownership through its Community Safety program.
In the village of Adan Abokor, most homes have had safe-storage devices installed and 
many have received firearms safety and conflict-management training. At the workshop, 
Yousuf Liswar, a teacher and community-safety volunteer, explained how the locals 
used to store their firearms, “In the past, we simply covered our weapons with a piece 
of cloth and hid them inside the houses or in holes or shrubs and we never felt com-
pletely safe doing that.” 
As the session came to a close, a woman stood up and spoke, “Our homes are scat-
tered throughout the bush and are far between. We often need to visit our relatives 
and run errands when doing our domestic chores, and we used to feel very uneasy 
leaving the kids alone. Now we feel much safer and can do our work without fear of 
accidents.” 
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Part of DDG’s community-safe-
ty work is to educate the local popula-
tion on the dangers of keeping firearms 
at home and to teach safe handling and 
storage. For this purpose, DDG dis-
tributes safe-storage devices, includ-
ing gun locks for rifles and metal boxes 
for pistols, both secured by padlock and 
chained to the foundation of the house. 
Their purpose is threefold: 
• Prevent accidents in the home
• Guard against theft
• Create a barrier between the 
weapon and its user that gives 
time for reflection and second 
thoughts, especially when cou-
pled with conflict-management 
techniques
Forcing people to disarm completely 
proves disastrous in many parts of the 
world, since it is often carried out se-
lectively and without credible and ac-
countable governmental security for the 
disarmed population afterward, making 
these populations vulnerable to attack. 
As a result, people see firearms posses-
sion as a necessary means to protect 
families, communities and possessions. 
DDG has had great success reduc-
ing violence by securing firearms with 
safe-storage devices and simultane-
ously providing alternatives to violence 
through education, conflict-manage-
ment training and the establishment of 
safety committees at community and 
district levels.
Conclusion
Privately held firearms are not likely 
to diminish any time soon in 
Somaliland, because weapons are per-
ceived as necessary tools for protection. 
The normalization of violence has re-
sulted in desensitization to the dangers 
they pose. Statistics of firearms-related 
incidents, however, reveal significant 
reasons to address the issue. Mines and 
ERW still pose a threat to security, but 
in most parts of Somaliland, where the 
high-risk minefields have been cleared, 
the physical and psychological impact of 
SA/LW safety remains significantly 
higher. A 2010 survey of DDG’s 
Community Safety program showed a 
47 percent increase in the number of re-
spondents who said that the level of 
armed violence had decreased com-
pared to the previous year, based on 509 
households in 11 communities.3 At the 
same time, only two percent of respon-
dents had a firearms-related accident in 
the first year after the program launched 
compared to 14 percent before the inter-
vention.3 
See endnotes page 82
Continent of Africa with Somalia  
in brown.  
Map courtesy of CISR.
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Priority-setting in Mine Action: 
   Getting More Value for the Investment
This article presents an overview of the main elements and key challenges involved in implementing 
sound national prioritization systems in mine-action programs. Since all mine/explosive remnants 
of war-affected countries are different, the article does not provide a standard blueprint; rather, it 
introduces the basic principles, components and considerations involved in prioritization. This will 
be valuable when implementing and designing priority-setting systems that cater to national and 
local contexts in each mine- /ERW-affected country.
by Albert Souza Mülli and Ted Paterson [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]
Few topics are as hotly debated within the mine-action industry as prioritization. What actions should be done first? Which tasks should receive the 
most resources? Who should set the priorities: mine-action 
experts, government officials, people in affected communities 
or perhaps donors? How should the quality or effectiveness of 
prioritization be assessed?
This debate is warranted. The aim of priority-setting is to 
get the most value-for-money possible. The most important is-
sue determining whether a national mine-action program per-
forms well—whether it delivers good value-for-money—is not 
the quality of its survey and clearance 
technology, how hard its staff works 
or even how well-trained its managers 
are; rather, the most important issue 
is whether the program is doing the 
right tasks. Prioritization is about selecting the right actions 
and dedicating the necessary resources on a timely basis to en-
sure tasks are accomplished as efficiently as possible.
A number of programs have experimented with approach-
es taken from decision theory and risk management, including 
Multi-Criteria Analysis and the PROMETHEE method—the 
most sophisticated technique applied to mine action thus 
far.1,2,3,4,5 Through such experimentation and debate, many 
mine-action centers and operators have developed what appear 
to be good systems for setting priorities, with well-conceived 
criteria and opportunities for input from multiple stakehold-
ers, including people in mine-affected communities. 
However, an examination of how well mine-action prior-
ities match country needs often leads to very disappointing 
outcomes, even in well-established programs in which each 
operator has seemingly sound prioritization procedures. For 
example, in one country, only 4 percent of a recent year’s de-
mining efforts took place in the most-affected communities 
(i.e., those that experienced multiple casualties in the previ-
ous three years). How could this occur in a country with ex-
perienced operators and a consensus that casualty reduction 
should be one of the most important criteria for determining 
demining priorities?
In Cambodia, for example, Mine Action Planning Units 
are provincial government units created in the most mine-
affected provinces to assist in the identification of demining 
priorities and the formulation of pro-
vincial mine-action plans. The main 
task of MAPUs is to work with villag-
es and communities to identify local 
demining preferences, but the actu-
al pattern of clearance has little relationship to community 
preferences. As a result, in 2000, only 56 percent of the area 
planned for clearance was actually demined; the number in-
creased in 2001 and 2002.6,7 
What’s the Problem?
Prioritization is an effort to match resources with people’s 
preferences, aimed at delivering the greatest possible benefits 
with the resources available. A key problem in mine action is 
that those providing the resources generally are not the ones 
who will benefit from mine-action services. Most resourc-
es come from donor countries and are delivered through a 
chain of intermediaries (United Nations agencies, internation-
al firms, nongovernmental organizations, local governments, 
etc.) before reaching affected communities and individuals. 
“Achieving good value-for-money 
is essential for an effective and effi-
cient national mine-action program 
to meet a country’s strategic goals.”
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Even if each donor, U.N. agency, operator, etc., in the chain ef-
fectively sets its priorities, the national program’s results are 
almost certain to be disappointing, unless national authorities 
(or the U.N. where it has been asked to take overall responsibil-
ity) can create and enforce a prioritization system for the over-
all national program.
Put simply, sound priorities for individual projects or pro-
grams will not add up to a sound set of national-program pri-
orities, unless some agency has the authority to assess the 
overall package and convince or require individual donors 
and operators to make adjustments.8 Achieving value-for-
money demands a coordinated program-wide approach.9
Toward National and Regional Prioritization Systems
Most national mine-action programs already have sound 
procedures for making decisions regarding which tasks to 
complete first. Local or regional prioritization deals mainly 
with identifying tasks that will produce the largest expected 
benefits and assigning resources to those specific tasks. While 
this local prioritization is crucial to ensure a national mine-
action program’s tasks are carried out effectively and efficient-
ly, it will not deliver high value-for-money unless a broader 
system is in place to ensure the bulk of resources are allocated 
to the most heavily impacted areas. 
National prioritization is concerned with how resources 
will be allocated among geographic areas, program compo-
nents, operators, etc., whereas local prioritization is the de-
termination of which specific tasks to complete first, once 
the resources are allocated at the national level. If a national 
mine-action program delivers value-for-money, the process-
es and procedures put in place for national and local prior-
itization must be interlinked and coordinated. Therefore, 
prioritization must be viewed as a system of inter-connected 
decisions across different levels. After all, assigning resources 
Train-the-trainer workshop in Cambodia.
Photo courtesy of Elke Hottentot.
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to any one task will invariably make them unavailable for oth-
er tasks, so a broader perspective is required to ensure each 
piece fits together.
A national priority-setting system invariably includes ac-
tors, resources, information, a structure, processes (i.e., where, 
when, by whom and how decisions are made) and policies. A 
good priority-setting system must be informed by the following:
1. Consideration for the interests of relevant actors to 
make the right decisions
2. High-quality, relevant and complete data 
3.  Regular analysis of the data to guide decision-makers 
Strategic, operational and task requirements are the three 
necessary levels of prioritization. Strategic priorities should be 
established at the headquarters of the national mine-action pro-
gram and should take into account the preferences of all stake-
holders; however, allocations must also be in line with national 
development priorities. Mine action is a means to an end, not an 
end in itself. Therefore, strategic priorities should be set accord-
ing to broader political, economic and social priorities in the 
country as a whole. Operational priorities should be deter-
mined by the relevant program manager, who should identify 
priorities using relevant data from analysis of non-technical 
or technical surveys and the expressed perceptions of at-risk 
communities and landmine victims. 
Afghanistan offers an example of successful prioritization. 
In 2009, the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan 
found hundreds of minefields close to communities. These 
minefields were known as “low hanging fruit,” because mine 
removal was considered an easy task—MACCA had the nec-
essary equipment available. However, these areas remained 
for more than two decades without clearance. The minefields’ 
small size deterred teams from clearing the area, since the 
fields would lower their productivity targets. However, after 
realizing this problem, MACCA instructed operators to estab-
lish small teams and created new productivity standards for 
small fields, giving “low hanging fruit” locations a priority. 
Different program components and operators some-
times have diverging priorities, but in order for the national 
mine-action program to operate in a sensible and coordinat-
ed fashion, headquarters is responsible for ensuring that all 
three priority levels add up and fit well together. Ensuring 
these requirements are met usually depends on clear guid-
ance from the national mine-action authority of the national 
government; a clear-cut list of strategic objectives will allow 
decision-makers at all levels to understand essential tasks. A 
national policy, even a simple one, is crucial to determine who 
does what, by which processes and through which structure.
Sustainability and National Ownership
Sustainability is key to ensuring that a priority-setting 
system continues to function beyond the presence of the in-
ternational community. The most important governmental 
processes for prioritization are planning and budgeting, but 
many mine-/ERW-affected countries lack proper planning 
and budgeting systems, particularly in the immediate post-
conflict period. As a result, many mine-action programs are 
Site visit outside Battambang, Cambodia.
Photo courtesy of Pehr Lodhammar.
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set up as “parallel systems” (i.e., separate 
from the host government’s own plan-
ning and budgeting systems), making 
the eventual transfer to national author-
ity long and expensive. For this reason, 
mine-action officials need to understand 
that, even in cases where proper nation-
al planning and budgeting systems are 
not in place, they should align the pri-
ority-setting system with whatever na-
tional structures exist or ensure that 
this alignment occurs in the very early 
stages of transition to national owner-
ship. If not, the essential capabilities of 
the mine-action program will probably 
not be sustained.
Establishing and Adapting a  
Prioritization System
Mine-action officials need to be 
aware that a country’s mine-action pro-
gram will encounter significant chang-
es as it transitions from post-conf lict 
to reconstruction and eventually, de-
velopment. As the political, social and 
economic environment evolves, peo-
ple’s needs change and priorities need 
modification. 
Mine-action organizations should 
always focus on directing the most re-
sources to support the most strategically 
important efforts identified by all rele-
vant stakeholders at any given point in 
time, which may mean that during post-
conflict stabilization, mine-action ser-
vices will center on clearing roads or key 
infrastructure. However, as life returns 
to normal and previous mine-action 
efforts have helped return children to 
school and enabled access to key roads, 
priorities should align with longer-term 
development requirements, including 
shifting resources to demining agricul-
tural land or land for natural-resource 
extraction (e.g., mining). 
International actors will also play a 
smaller role as transition progresses. In 
a conflict’s immediate aftermath, outside 
funding and expertise may be crucial for 
emergency clearance and risk-education 
services, but as a country moves from 
conflict into reconstruction and devel-
opment, national ownership becomes 
increasingly important. Mine-action of-
ficials should expect rising levels of na-
tional ownership and more input from 
different government levels, from the 
national to the provincial, with local 
governments gradually assuming more 
responsibilities. As a result, internation-
al actors must switch from an opera-
tional focus to a capacity-development 
focus and should prepare for the mine-
action program’s full indigenization, 
including by providing operations and 
senior-management training to local 
mine-action and government officials. 
Conclusion
Achieving good value-for-money is 
essential for an effective and efficient 
national mine-action program to meet a 
country’s strategic goals. In an environ-
ment where international donors try to 
get more results for money spent, well-
coordinated program-wide priority-set-
ting systems are critical to a national 
mine-action program’s performance. 
For a more detailed and comprehen-
sive understanding of prioritization, see 
the first four of the Geneva Internation-
al Centre for Humanitarian Demining's 
“Priority-Setting in Mine Action” Issue 
Briefs series, available on the GICHD 
website (http://snipurl.com/23jixsi). The 
objective of the series is to assist mine-
action programs in achieving greater 
value-for-money by designing and im-
plementing sound priority-setting sys-
tems. The Briefs enable mine-action 
officials to design and implement priori-
tization systems suitable to their respec-
tive place and time and adaptive to their 
changing national contexts. 
See Endnotes Page 82
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Canadian Scientist Receives Grant  
   to Continue Developing Innovative, 
   Low-cost Prosthetic
E conomically impoverished survivors of landmines and explosive remnants of war not only face psycho-logical and physiological trauma but also economic 
upheaval as they may not be able to continue previous profes-
sions, especially those involving physically taxing work such 
as farming, manufacturing or construction. Furthermore, a 
survivor of a mine-related accident “typically requires ampu-
tation, multiple operations and prolonged physical rehabilita-
tion,” all of which are extremely time-consuming and costly.1 
The reality is harsh for many landmine and ERW survivors in 
the developing world who lack access to adequate health care 
and safe, effective and affordable prosthetic limbs. Thus, one 
of the most fundamental questions facing victim-assistance 
practitioners is how to produce low-cost and robust prosthet-
ics for underprivileged amputees around the world.
For trans-femoral (above-the-knee) amputees, the out-
look may be brighter. For the past six years, Jan Andrysek, 
an assistant professor at the Institute of Biomaterials and 
Biomedical Engineering and scientist at Holland Bloorview 
Kids Rehabilitation Hospital in Toronto, Canada, has been de-
veloping the Low-Cost Prosthetic Knee Joint, also called the 
LC Knee.2 Through a barrage of computer modeling, testing 
and optimization, Andrysek has developed a prosthetic that 
costs US$50—considerably more affordable when compared 
with other prosthetics, which may cost as much as $3,000.2
Developing an affordable and effective prosthetic is im-
mensely difficult. The prosthetic must be durable so that con-
stant and costly repairs are not needed, but it must also use 
cheap and available resources so that impoverished amputees 
in the developing world can afford to purchase it. The pros-
thetic should also be lightweight so that the amputee’s mobil-
ity is not inhibited, but it should be heavy enough to withstand 
weathering and difficult terrain. The prosthetic must provide 
adequate weight-bearing stability so as not to inhibit the pa-
tient’s natural gait or stride.3
To facilitate low-cost production and higher functional-
ity, Andrysek employed topological optimization, a process 
that tests the durability of objects through various degrees 
of deformation and pressure.4 Through topological analy-
sis of various knee configurations, one design provided su-
perior strength-to-weight ratios, allowing Andrysek and his 
team to use cheaper thermoplastic polymers while maintain-
ing the same level of durability as more expensive prosthet-
ics. To address stability and gait issues, the team employed a 
new “stance-phase control mechanism,” which allows patients 
to stand securely without sacrificing their natural walking 
stride.3 Most prosthetics in the developing world use outdat-
ed manual-lock knees, which only lock by fully extending the 
limb. These traditional prosthetics are cosmetically inferi-
or, as patients must walk with “stiff knees,” and functionally 
inhibiting, as patients’ strides are limited to avoid uninten-
tionally locking the knees with an extended step. Andrysek’s 
model, however, “automatically locks and unlocks itself de-
pending on how the person is putting their weight on the 
limb,” allowing the patient a more natural gait.2 Initial test-
ing also revealed that the LC Knee improves the patients’ mo-
bility, as they can walk faster with less effort and less energy.3
“We can now mold all the pieces for a knee for about $15,” 
says Andrysek.2 Using an optimized design, he and his team 
use inexpensive thermoplastics that can be mass-produced 
with injection-molding techniques. The injection-molding 
technique essentially consists of pouring melted plastic into a 
mold where the plastic sets into its final form.5 This quick and 
efficient process allows for the cheap manufacture of parts; 
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Research scientist, Jan Andrysek, displays the low-cost mechanical prosthetic that 
he created at the Holland Bloorview Kids Rehabilitation Hospital in Toronto, Canada.  
Photo courtesy of Rick Eglinton/Toronto Star.
however, topological optimization of 
the design attempts to counter any sac-
rifice in performance that may associate 
with thermoplastic molding.
Thus, Andrysek and his team are well 
on their way to creating affordable and 
effective prosthetics for landmine vic-
tims and other persons with disabilities 
around the world. Their mission was 
further bolstered in February 2012 when 
the group received one of 15 US$100,000 
grants from Grand Challenges Canada, 
an organization that promotes innova-
tive projects to address health-care 
needs in the developing world. Andrysek 
and his group of researchers plan to use 
this money to continue testing the LC 
Knee in the developing world—
Colombia, Ethiopia and Nicaragua, in 
particular.2 Regardless of socioeconomic 
status, amputees worldwide will again 
inexpensively enjoy the freedom of mo-
bility. 
~ Jeremiah Smith, CISR staff
See endnotes page 83
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In Remembrance: Kaido Keerdo 







As efforts to clear landmines and other explosive remnants of 
war from Libya continue, international deminers risk their lives to 
eliminate the risks to people in the area. On 3 March 2012, a sus-
pected Type 84 anti-tank mine, a Chinese-made cluster munition, 
killed civilian contractor Kaido Keerdo in Dafniya, 180 kilometers 
(112 miles) from the Libyan capital of Tripoli.1 ,2 Although Estonia’s 
Government has not deployed any demining specialists to Libya,3 
Estonian mine-expert Keerdo was working for DanChurchAid as 
a demining technician after having served six years with an explo-
sive-ordnance disposal unit in the Estonian military.
On 1 March 2012, alleged in-fighting among Libyan militias 
caused a rocket-propelled grenade to strike a shipping container 
that housed munitions.1 Hearing of the skirmish while traveling to 
a different clearance task, Keerdo and his team insisted that the site 
be evacuated, as one of the containers was still smoking.1 Returning 
a day later, despite having the day off, Keerdo and his team assessed 
the area, found several Type 84 submunitions and surrounded the 
explosives with sandbags.1 Whereas most anti-tank mines are bur-
ied by hand, the Type 84 AT mine is a scatterable cluster munition 
deployed via airborne rockets. It remains above ground, scatters 
submunitions over a wide area and relies on a magnetic fuze to 
detonate its internal explosive charge.1 On 3 March 2012, Keerdo 
and his team returned to the site to determine how best to dispose 
of the explosives. Members of Keerdo’s team say that he climbed to 
the roof of a nearby building to survey the area when, roughly 100 
meters (328 feet) away, Keerdo’s team heard an explosion and later 
found him dead.1
Experts believe a Type 84 submunition is responsible for 
Keerdo’s death, as his team previously saw submunitions and 
rocket carriers scattered in the vicinity of the exploded shipping 
container. Moreover, pieces of a detonated submunition were 
also found near Keerdo’s body. DCA spokeswoman Helen Rits 
told Agence France-Presse that Keerdo was killed “disposing of a 
charge.”3 Tragically, a few days prior, Keerdo was quoted as saying 
that he intended to leave the demining scene since he thought the 
work was too dangerous.1
Although Keerdo had only worked with DCA for three months, 
he encountered the Type 84 before.1 In January 2012, he found a 
Type 84 outside Dafniya, cordoned off the area and used explosives 
to detonate it. Incidentally, the explosion left the fuze of the mine 
intact.1 Unable to determine whether the rocket carrier that was 
still attached to the mine carried additional submunitions, Keerdo 
and his team buried two large explosive charges in two trenches on 
opposing sides of the carrier and left a “crater” where the Type 84 
mine had been.1
Keerdo’s death signifies the ongoing struggle to remove the land-
mines and ordnance remaining from Moammar Gadhafi’s regime. 
Since the dictator’s death, authorities within the Libyan National 
Transitional Council have requested foreign mine-action experts to 
help with clearance. Keerdo’s death marks DCA’s most serious casu-
alty since two of DCA’s international deminers were injured in 
Misrata in November 2011, also by a Type 84 submunition.1 
~ Blake Williamson, CISR staff
See endnotes page 83
Kaido Keerdo preparing UXO for destruction in Dafniyah, Libya.
Photo courtesy of Marcus Rhinelander.
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Environmental Simulations 
   for EOD Shaped Charges
This article describes the methodology and importance of environmental simulations and testing of shaped 
charges used for the disposal of explosive remnants of war and landmines. The author discusses a single 
sequence of tests conducted on a specific product as an example of the depth to which environmental factors 
should be investigated in order to address them before final production and manufacture. 
by Reto Liechti [ Saab Bofors Dynamics Switzerland, Ltd. ] 
Vibration caused by transportation, temperature changes and the natural 
aging process, as well as other environmental 
factors, can impact the safe operation of a 
product. Assessing environmental effects 
on a product can be time-consuming and 
expensive. However, in the case of explosive 
ordnance-disposal equipment, environmental 
simulations and testing are basic tools for the 
scientific investigation and production of safe 
new products.
The Need for Environ-
mental Simulations
When handling explosives, safety and reli-
ability are key factors for a successful mission. 
In demining operations with in situ dispos-
al, shaped charges are often used, especially 
when inducing deflagration of submunitions 
(cluster bomblets). Thus, using shaped charges 
speeds up operations and minimizes hazard-
ous risks to deminers.
Many shaped charges are available on 
the market. Any of these charges used in the 
field can cause harm if not used properly. The 
shaped charges referred to in this article are 
proven through a program of extensive environmental tests, not only 
in their development phase but also throughout the manufacturing 
stage. These environmental test programs include assessment, clearance 
checks (to ensure operators can handle them) and transport-vibration 
checks (to test for worst-case land, sea and air conditions). Environmen-
tal tests also consider extreme environmental aggression such as rapid 
and extensive changes in temperature, pressure, humidity and adverse 
immersion environments such as sand, dust storms and water. These 
tests guarantee the product can withstand different circumstances and 
provide full performance until the end of its anticipated life cycle.
Development Phase
Environmental simulations are often performed either before a prod-
uct is in its early development phase or when a product is about to enter the 
market and go into service. Development phases are usually detailed pro-
grams with a number of activities and individual phases that some coun-
tries refer to as a series of Design Definitions. The content for each DD 
phase varies from one project to another but generally takes the form as 
illustrated in Figure 1.
Test Program
A test program can be performed with many individual and inde-
pendent experiments that focus on individual test events. These tests 
do not represent real circumstances, and therefore a test program 
combines a variety of tests and possible scenarios either in paral-
lel (each test performed independently) or in a sequence. Combina-
tions are the most common and realistic approach. Figure 2 (right) 
shows six typical test sequences which are performed in parallel for 
the SM-EOD 331 explosive shaped charges. Each sequence can vary in 
the number of tests, and this example shows one or two tests in each 
sequence followed by an X-ray inspection and a static detonation at 
the end of each sequence.
Sequence
In order to discuss a sequence for environmental testing, one se-
quence of the tests will be more closely examined now. Each test is de-
pendent on its predecessor. With this dependence, potential failures can 
be summed; this summation results in better estimates than the prod-






















Figure 1. Diagram of development phases.
All graphics © Saab Bofors Dynamics Switzerland Ltd./CISR.
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Standards and Specifications
All tests should be according to certain test-method type standards 
such as: 
• MIL STD 8102: Department of Defense Test Method Standard for 
Environmental Engineering Considerations and Laboratory Tests
• MIL STD 3313: Department of Defense Test Method Standard for 
Fuze and Fuze Components, Environmental and Performance 
Tests
• STANAG 43704: Environmental Testing (AECTP 3005 & 400)6
• IEC 60068-2-Series7: Environmental Testing
Vibration Test
High-cycle fatigue materials performance8 is commonly character-
ized by an S-N curve (S = stress, N = cycles to failure), also known as a 
Wöhler-curve. A vibration test simulates the effect with vibrations often 
experienced during transportation and operation. The test attempts to 
cover all occurrences the product will encounter during its product life 
cycle. In the case of explosive charges, the more intense the vibration en-
vironment, the faster the aging process occurs and the higher the possi-
bility of discovering cracks and gaps in between the explosive filling and 
the mechanical body.
X-ray inspection will prove if the vibration tests had any influence 
see Figure 3). In this illustrative example, the procedure is undertaken 
according to MIL STD 810E, method 514.4, category one (basic trans-
portation) with the following characteristics:
Vibration test specifications.
Configuration Products in original packaging
Vibrator V 964 Horizontal, transversal and vertical axis 
vibrations
Frequency 10 - 500 Hz/1.04 g
Testing time 1 h per axis (3 axis)
MIL STD MIL STD 810E, Meth. 514.4, Fig. 514.4 -1
Number of test pieces n = 30 – batch no. 2050 – 2079




The rain test simulates a strong rainfall on the field. In this illustrative 
example, a method of a 360-degree rain toward the product with specific 
intensity for a certain time was chosen. The details are as follows: 
Rainfall test specifications.
Test order-No. 4182 09682 and 4185 09690
Used facility Rain plant No. 80
Frequency 10 - 500 Hz/1.04 g
Type of test Rain test unpacked
MIL STD According to 810D, meth. 506.2
Rain quantity 100 mm/h, wind velocity 18 m/s
Duration 30 min.
Rotary table Turning 
The rain test determines the effectiveness of seals and cases in pre-
venting water penetration. The test also shows the product capability to 
satisfy performance during and after exposure to water. 
X-ray Inspection
An X-ray inspection is performed after each individual environmen-
tal test in a sequence. It is a real-time nondestructive subsurface inspec-
tion and shows the product’s internal characteristics. The inspection is a 
dynamic 360-degree live image where the object is rotated in front of the 
X-ray source. During a visual inspection by trained operators, the X-ray 
will indicate any hairline cracks or air gaps.
The advantage of the X-ray inspection is that no harm will reach the 
product, but it will provide full information about the object’s density, 
which is directly linked to quality and performance. Any cracks or gaps 
detected would expectedly have a negative impact on product perfor-
mance and accuracy.
Performance Test
In addition to all previous tests, a final performance test simulates a 
mine or unexploded ordnance-disposal operation where, for instance, 
a mine body or artillery shell requires penetration before deflagration 
or detonation. The setup for such a performance test with a defined tar-
get can utilize multiple rolled homogenous armor plates as shown in the 
Images 4 and 5.9 The penetration will show any performance problems 
such as variation, dispersion or inadequate penetration of the jet’s tip 
that may not be detectable in any of the previous tests. The requirements 
for the performance penetration test are that it must be reproducible and 
permit comparisons to identify penetration performance, which is the 
most important testimony of a high-quality product. In the field, high 
accuracy and reproducibility will permit fast intervention and safe and 
successful operations.
Images 1 and 2. Rain plant setup.
All photos © Saab Bofors Dynamics Switzerland Ltd.
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Figure 2. Example of a test program.
Performance test specifications.
Test order-No. 33, charge 18
Used facility Bunker No. 3
Type of test Rain test unpacked
Test temperature + 7° C (44° F)
Additional Tests
In addition to the tests described above, the SM-EOD 33 products 
are subject to:
• Sand and dust tests
• Heat and cooling tests
• Water dip tests
• Visual structural inspections
• Weight inspections
• Size and density inspection of explosives
Independence
Environmental simulation and testing can have a higher credibility 
if a neutral, independent company performs the testing and analysis. 
An external laboratory without any affiliations to the supplier is com-
mon. However, not all laboratories can undertake tests with explosives, 
which in the case of explosive products, limits the number of test sup-
pliers available.
Conclusion
This article discusses a single sequence of tests conducted on a spe-
cific product as an example of the depth to which environmental factors 
should be investigated in order to address life-cycle problems before fi-
nal production and manufacture. 
In the early development phase of most products, environmental sim-
ulations and testing can uncover potential future risks and reduce the 
eventual time to market. Simulations and testing can improve designs 
and ensure the product is safe and reliable throughout its full life cycle. 
These environmental assessments can be time-consuming and expen-
sive, but assessment prior to product use in the field is more economical 
and ethical than marketing untested products that may result in consid-
erable damages and loss of life. 
See endnotes page 83
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Figure 4. Protocol of vibration test. The test verifies whether the product 
will function and withstand the anticipated vibration exposures through-
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Images 4 and 5. Penetration performance witness.
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Environmental Determinants of     
   Landmine Detection by Dogs: 
   Findings From a Large-scale  
   Study in Afghanistan
This article’s purpose is to examine the strengths and weaknesses of mine-detection dogs in different en-
vironments. The experiments employed a total of 39 dogs in Afghanistan between October 2002 and July 
2003. The results are discussed here.
by Dr. Rebecca J. Sargisson [ University of Waikato ], Dr. Ian G. McLean [ Consultant ], Dr. Jennifer Brown [ University of  
Canterbury ] and Håvard Bach [ Norwegian People's Aid ]
Mine-detection dogs were first used during and after World War II and 
have been used with increasing frequency 
in Afghanistan since the first humanitarian 
mine-clearance operations began there in 
1989.1,2 Employing dogs to detect landmines 
and explosive remnants of war is compara-
ble to the use of dogs to detect cryptic ani-
mal species, such as ground squirrels, which 
occur at low densities and tend to burrow 
underground.3 Dogs may offer advantag-
es over other methods of detection in these 
situations due to their ability to cover large 
land areas more quickly than other detection 
methods, while minimizing damage to frag-
ile ecosystems.4 
Given the long history of mine-detection 
dogs, it is reasonable to assume that the lim-
itations on their use as mine detectors are 
thoroughly understood. Unfortunately, lit-
tle research accompanied the original train-
ing and deployment of dogs as mine detectors. 
Essentially no published research existed on 
the principles underlying a dog’s ability to de-
tect mines before the Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian Demining began its 
work in 2000. Handicap International’s 1998 
review of the use of mine-detection dogs for 
humanitarian purposes appears to be the first 
significant review on the subject, and it con-
centrates primarily on operational issues.5 
In 1999, a meeting to discuss the use of dogs 
as mine detectors convened in Ljubljana, 
Slovenia, and the mine-dog community for-
mally recognized the general absence of in-
formation for the first time. 
Mines are routinely found in difficult and 
variable environmental situations. Therefore, 
the environmental influences on any detec-
tion technology should be understood and 
the constraints defined. Specifically, for any 
mine-clearance technology, it will be valuable 
to define the environmental conditions under 
which detection reliability declines or the lim-
its beyond which the technology should not be 
used. This study was designed to sample the 
full range of conditions under which dogs are 
utilized in hot, dry, semi-desert environments 
in order to determine the ideal conditions in 
which to use dogs. 
Mines were laid in an unused golf course 
near Kabul, Afghanistan. Dogs from the Mine 
Dog Centre were filmed while attempting to 
detect those mines using normal operating 
procedures. Weather conditions were record-
ed in the long-term and at the precise moment 
that a dog crossed a mine. These data enabled 
us to link detection success to context (season, 
vegetation) and weather (wind speed, temper-
ature, humidity) during the search.
Method
Participants/subjects. A request for dogs 
was made through the Monitoring Evaluation 
Training Agency ahead of each proposed ex-
perimental trial, and the research team was 
normally assigned eight dogs and handlers 
and two supervisors for the period of the trial 
(one working week of six days).
A total of 39 dogs (22 male and 17 female) 
were used in the five trials. Of the 39 dogs, 
28 were German Shepherds and 11 were Ma-
linois (Belgian Shepherds). The average op-
Image 1. Dog, handler and supervisor; observer with camera in the background.
All photos courtesy of the authors.
74
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol16/iss2/1
16.2 | summer 2012 | the journal of ERW and mine action | research and development         75
erational experience was 3.4 years (s.d. = 1.7). The average number of 
strips searched by one dog was 3.8 (s.d. = 1.9, range 1-11). “Strips” are 
defined below.
None of the 39 dogs shared a handler. All handlers were male with an 
average operational experience of 5.4 years (s.d. = 3.9).
One dog, Axel, was used in October 2002 and July 2003 (when four 
dogs were employed for the entire trial); this dog searched an unusually 
high number of strips (11). All other dogs were used for one trial only.
During operational search in Afghanistan, a handler and dog work 
closely with a supervisor who observes the search and monitors details 
such as ground missed by the dog (see Image 1). This practice allows the 
handler to concentrate on the details of the dog’s search behavior, while 
the supervisor has a broader view to ensure complete coverage of ground 
and safety.6 The experimental trials employed the same practice.
The researchers supplied two teams, between two and four people 
each. The observer used a video camera to record the dog throughout the 
search and verbalized details of the search into a microphone connected 
to the camera (see Image 1). The datum recorder ensured that weather 
data were noted when the dog crossed a mine (see Image 2).
Thus, at any one time during a trial, two pairs of teams worked: a dog 
team consisting of dog, handler and supervisor; and a research team 
consisting of observer and datum recorder(s) (see Images 1 and 2).
The site. The test field was established in a steep-sided valley at 
Kharga, 15 km north of Kabul just below a reservoir dam (see Image 3). 
The site was originally established as a nine-hole golf course as part of 
a larger recreational and commercial development. In previous history, 
it was a battlefield. When GICHD first visited the site in 2001, a crater 
from a large bomb was in the middle of the site, some artillery pieces 
were stored on site and most of the buildings were destroyed. 
Prior to establishment as a research minefield, the site was searched 
using MDC’s dogs. The dogs found some explosive items; a large num-
ber of indications at which nothing was found suggested that consider-
able explosive contamination occurred on-site. Battlefield clearance was 
conducted in the hills surrounding the site during early 2003.
Up to 30 cm. of topsoil was therefore removed from about two-thirds 
of the site prior to the test mines being laid, with the aim of removing 
most of the contamination left by the partially exploded bomb. After 
topsoil removal, the site was cleared using dogs, and the indication rate 
was considerably reduced. Although not ideal for the trials, the site was 
realistic, because dogs routinely work in highly contaminated situations 
in Afghanistan. The MDC training area in Kabul where the dogs are 
trained is also a highly contaminated site.
Image 2. Datum recorders with portable weather station (the temperature 
gauge is shaded by the box).
Image 3. The Kharga site showing an old pond (center right), a demining 
clearance site (center left) and the old golf-course clubhouse. Kharga dam 
in the background.
Mine Origin Explosive Weight of explosives
Weight of 
mine
P4AP Pakistan Tetryl 30 g 140 g
Type 72 AP China TNT 50 g 140 g
YM1 RDX 50 g 190 g
PMN2 State factories TNT/RDX 100 g 420 g
PMN State factories TNT 240 g 550 g
P3AT Pakistan TNT 5 kg 7 kg
TC-6 Italy, various TNT/RDX 6 kg 8.4 kg
TM57 State factories various 6.3 kg 8.5 kg
Table 1. Mine types, names and sizes used in the Kharga test field.7
Mine type 0 7.5 15 20 25
P4AP 0 1 3 0 2
Type 72 AP 4 4 8 4 4
YM1 0 4 4 0 4
PMN2 4 4 4 0 0
PMN 4 4 4 4 4
P3AT 4 4 4 4 0
TC-6 4 4 4 0 0
TM57 0 4 4 0 4
Table 2: Number of mines of each type laid at each depth in the Kharga test fi eld
Table 2. Number of mines of each type laid at each depth in the Kharga 
test field.
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Site preparation. After soil preparation, the site was laid out into 31 
strips, each 40 m x 8 m. The length of 40 m provided a realistic search 
baseline, and the width of 8 m was the standard line search distance for 
Afghanistan dogs. 
Test mines were laid in March and May 2002. Table 1 (page 75) gives 
details of the mine types. Using eight mine types, a total of 114 mines 
were laid at five different depths (as shown in Table 2 on page 75). The 
number of mines in a strip was randomly assigned using a weighted 
mean (average of four per strip) and restricted range (minimum 2, max-
imum 5). Once a mine was assigned to a strip, location within the strip 
was assigned randomly with the limitations that a mine was a minimum 
of 3 m from any other mine and 0.5 m from any boundary. Having ran-
domly defined 120 locations in 30 strips (one strip was left empty), mine 
x depth combinations were then randomly assigned to each location in 
replicates of 4 (this is a total of 30 mine x depth assignments for 120 lo-
cations).
Mines were laid following strict International Mine Action Stan-
dards protocols, involving washing and sterilizing the mines three 
times over several days.8 All handling and digging tools were steril-
ized in boiling water. Once sterilized, mines were handled with plas-
tic gloves. All soil not returned to a hole was removed completely from 
the site.
After completion of the study, all mines were dug up to ensure that 
they were still in position. All were in place except one, which was dis-
placed 0.5 m from its assigned location. Whether this discrepancy was 
an error in original placement or the mine had shifted after burial is un-
certain. However, the mine was considered close enough to the assigned 
position for data associated with that mine to be used normally. 
Apparatus. Portable weather stations were set up (see Image 2, page 
75) to record weather variables during the dog searches. Equipment was 
used to record temperature in the soil’s surface layer, temperature at 
ground level in exposed sun, temperature in shade at chest height, rela-
tive humidity in shade at chest height, soil-moisture content (based on 
conductance), mean wind speed over 20 sec (m/s) and peak wind speed 
over 20 sec (m/s).
Digital video cameras were placed on tripods and positioned to cap-
ture the dog’s searching behavior. Additionally, microphones clipped 
to the camera operator’s clothing allowed voice recording of observed 
behavior, including notification of the dog crossing a mine. Cross ref-
erencing between observer (on tape) and datum recorder (on paper) 
was achieved using coordinated time records. The observer and the da-
tum recorder also held a mapped layout of each trial strip to ensure that 
weather records, dog behavior and mine position could be linked.
Measuring tapes were used to measure the distance from a dog’s in-
dication to the site of the buried mine. A knotted rope defined a 1-sq. m. 
quadrant around the mine in order to measure vegetation (see Image 4).
Procedure
The research team arrived at a strip before the dog team. The cam-
era was positioned at an angle to the predicted search direction (deter-
Image 4. Method of defining a quadrant for vegetation sampling. A surface-laid mine is in the center of the one square-meter quadrant.
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mined from wind direction). A small portable weather station (a shaded 
stand, Image 2) was placed about 15 m from the strip. When the dog 
team arrived, they established a search direction and went to work. 
Search direction was frequently adjusted as the wind changed. The 
observer and camera were moved as necessary to ensure an appropriate 
camera angle and lighting.
The weather recorder took records every four minutes or immediately 
if the dog crossed a mine at a moment when no data were being recorded. 
About two minutes were required to make a full set of weather records. 
The dog always worked across the wind, and down wind and search di-
rection was adjusted frequently, so wind direction was not recorded.
When the dog gave an indication, the supervisor marked the site 
with a flag or rock, and then the dog continued to search. The indication 
was recorded on a map of the strip with a time and number in order to 
ensure that it could be linked to the weather records and video. A time 
and number were also noted if a mine was missed. 
The distance between the mine and the indication marker was re-
corded, up to 2 m. Distances greater than 2 m to a mine were ignored, 
and the indication was treated as a false alarm (a false alarm is the same 
as a false positive). 
In most cases, the dog searched the entire strip in one sequence. A 
complete search of a strip required between 16 and 77 minutes of search 
time (mean = 42, s.d. = 14). The time required to search a strip in Trial 2 
(April 2003) was significantly longer (mean = 55 min.; F(1, 4) = 16.86, p < 
.001) than in any other trial (mean range 33 to 40 min for the other four 
trials). After completing the search of a strip, the dog team left the trial 
area, returning about 30 minutes later to search the next strip. Once the 
dog team had left, the datum recorders moved into the strip to measure 
the distance from the dog’s indications to the mines and to measure veg-
etation cover around the mines. Total vegetation cover was measured on 
a 4-point scale: 0–25%, 25–50%, 50–75%, 75–100%. Cover was viewed 
as any vegetation that could be a barrier between the dog’s nose and the 
ground, and thus included all dead vegetation. The presence of spiky or 
aromatic plants was measured separately on 4-point scales: 0=absent, 
1=present, 2=common and 3=dominant.
Data Analysis
All mines having an indication within 2 m were treated as found 
mines in the analyses. Detection success was calculated as a logit trans-
form of proportion of mines found. Specifically, detection success is 
shown as logit p, which is calculated as logit p = log10(p / (1 - p), where p 
= proportion found (found mines/(found + missed mines)). Logit p has 
the advantage of being an equal-interval scale and is not bounded by up-
per and lower limits, as is proportion found, enabling the use of para-
metric statistical analyses. In the situation in which proportion found 
was 1.0 (indicating zero misses), misses were recorded as 0.25 in order to 
avoid an infinite logit p. Higher values of logit p reflect higher detection 
success, much in the same way as proportion correct. If 99% of the avail-
able mines were detected, logit p would be two, while a 50% find rate 
would result in a logit p value of zero. A find rate less than 50% produces 
negative logit p values, and the larger the negative number, the poorer 
the detection success.
Image 5. Weather station with dog and research teams working in the background.
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Detection success under different weather conditions. Mean de-
tection success (logit p) differed significantly across the five trials ac-
cording to a one-way analysis of variance using the success scores for 
individual dogs (F(4, 36) = 3.41, p = .018). Detection success was sig-
nificantly higher in October 2002 (mean = 1.23) than for any other tri-
al and was lowest in June 2003 (mean = 0.03), although the other four 
trials did not significantly differ from each other (Fisher’s LSD post-
hoc test) (see Figure 1). Kabul experienced heavy rains in the spring 
of 2003, and the increased humidity and soil moisture appear to have 
hampered the dogs’ ability to detect mines, as rainfall occurred imme-
diately prior to the April and June trials (see Figure 2). The false-alarm 
rate was lowest in October 2002 and rose to higher and similar levels in 
all subsequent trials, supporting the hypothesis that heavy rains ham-
pered detection success.
Informal observations suggested that the heavy spring rains may 
have distributed mine odor around the site, particularly along drainage 
channels running through the strips. Chemical analysis of soil samples 
supported this conclusion.9 
The detection success achieved in October 2002 is most representa-
tive of drought conditions. Given the rarity of rain in Afghanistan before 
spring 2003, the dogs were unfamiliar with wet soils or working con-
ditions, and detection success seemingly decreased as a result of rain-
fall immediately prior to the trials. Therefore, training of mine-detection 
dogs should include the full range of environmental conditions that may 
be encountered (even if that requires simulation of unusual conditions) 
or that mine-detection agencies withdraw dogs for retraining and li-
censing when unusual weather patterns occur. This precautionary ap-
proach may be particularly necessary when dogs move from dry to wet 
conditions (and not the reverse).
Mine type and depth. The proportion of each mine type found for 
each trial was converted to logit p and averaged across all trials (see Fig-
ure 3). Detection success was significantly positively correlated with 
weight of explosive (r = .38, p = .02), showing that detection success im-
proved with the increasing size of mine. Type 72 anti-personnel mine 
(see Table 1) was the most difficult to find, and TM57 the easiest. Al-
though a one-way analysis of variance showed no significant variation in 
detection success for the different mine types (F(7, 32) = 1.47, p = .21), a 
Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test10 showed that P4AP (p = .01) and T72 (p = .02) 
mines were significantly harder to find than TM57 mines. 
Detection success varied significantly with mine depth (one-way 
analysis of variance (F(4, 20) = 2.97, p = .04) and was significantly nega-
tively correlated with mine depth (r = -.39, p = .008). Thus, detection suc-
cess decreased as depth increased, although with exceptions: The small 
T72 mines were poorly detected at all depths; for small YM1 mines, de-
tection was poorest at the shallowest depth (7.5 cm); and the large TM57 
mines were detected more successfully at deeper depths. The over-
all mean in Figure 4 represents the mean of all mine types at all mine 
depths and shows most clearly the decrease in detection success as a 
function of mine depth.
Vegetation. A significant effect of the amount of vegetation cover 
on detection success was found (F(3, 16) = 5.28, p = .01), with detec-
tion success decreasing with increasing vegetation cover near the mine 
Figure 1. Mean detection success (logit p) calculated across dogs for 
each trial.
Figure 2. Rainfall (mm) at the Kargha field site in spring and summer 
of 2003. Arrows mark the first day of the April and June field trials.
Figure 3. Mean detection success (logit p) calculated across trials for each 
mine type. Anti-personnel mines are shown in blue, and anti-tank mines in 
orange. A polynomial curve was fitted to the data, and error bars represent 
the mean’s standard error.
Figure 4. Mean detection success (logit p) for each mine type at each 
depth and for the mean across all mines at all depths. For the overall mean 
figure, an exponential decay function was fitted to the data, and error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean. Note that three possible X-axis 
scales are shown which reflect the fact that different mine types were laid 
at different depths (P3AT, PMN2 and TC6 at 0, 7.5 and 16 cm; P4AP, YM1 
and TM57 at 7.5, 15 and 25 cm; and T72 and PMN at all five depths. (See 
Table 2.) The mean graph shows all data for all mine types for the depths 
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(r = -.65, p = .002; mean logit p = 0.32, 0.23, 
0.11, -0.33 for 0–25%, 25–50%, 50–75% and 
75–100% vegetation cover in the 1-sq m quad-
rant around the mine). The spikiness of plants 
surrounding the mine had no significant ef-
fect on detection success (F(3, 16) = 0.44, p = 
.72), with a correlation revealing a negative 
but nonsignificant, relationship (r = -.13, p = 
.59). The strength of plant aromas surround-
ing the mine also had no effect on detection 
success (F(3, 16) = 0.02, p = .996), with no cor-
relation found between these two variables (r 
= -.009, p = .99).
Weather variables.A principal component 
analysis identified humidity as contributing 
the most explanatory power to the data, in 
that detection success was poorer in high hu-
midity. However, when humidity was includ-
ed in a logistic-regression analysis involving 
month, mine type and depth, humidity did 
not explain significantly more variance than 
was already explained by month. However, 
Figure 10 shows that, for most months, hu-
midity rarely varied. For October 2002, June 
2003 and July 2003, relative humidity rarely 
climbed higher than 30%. The greatest vari-
ability in humidity occurred in April 2003, 
and its implications are discussed below.
Overall, none of the microvariation in en-
vironmental variables measured at the time a 
dog crossed a mine affected the probability of 
that mine’s discovery. We conclude that the 
probability of dogs finding mines was robust 
with respect to the environmental variation 
normally experienced by dogs in Afghanistan. 
Despite the possible effects of humidity dis-
cussed below, in general terms, dogs worked 
with similar effectiveness under all typical 
working conditions. 
Detection success across the working 
day. Some evidence, shown in Figure 5, indi-
cates that detection success was occasionally 
higher in the early morning, dropping across 
the morning and increasing again at midday. 
As shown in Figure 5, this pattern particular-
ly occurred for the trials conducted in April 
2003, June 2003 and July 2003. The mean data 
clearly show that detection success decreased 
simultaneously with humidity until 9 a.m. 
However, after 9 a.m., humidity continued to 
decrease, whereas detection success increased. 
We suspect that, if greater variability in hu-
midity was encountered during more trials 
(and not just for April 2003), the effect of hu-
midity on detection success would have been 
stronger than that reported here. 
We believe that two effects are operating 
here, as described by Phelan and Webb.11 
• First, overnight dew wets the surface 
of the soil and displaces surface odor. 
Little air movement happens overnight, 
thus displaced odor tends to concen-
trate immediately on and above the 
ground. When the sun first hits the 
ground (the time at which the dogs 
begin work),  evaporation of surface 
moisture and overnight accumulation 
of odor together provide an increased 
concentration of mine odor near the 
ground surface for a short period (prob-
ably 20 minutes to 1 hour, depending 
on local conditions). Therefore the dogs 
detected the mines relatively easy in the 
early morning, giving the initially high 
detection rate. 
• Second, as the soil surface warms up 
and convection disperses the overnight 
accumulation of dew, humidity begins 
interacting antagonistically with detec-
tion success. Relatively high humidity 
makes detection difficult, and detection 
improves as relative humidity declines 
through the morning. This effect is pre-
dicted because, when sniffing, the dog 
rapidly alternates exhalation and inha-
lation of moist air over the ground sur-
face. This moist air displaces mine-odor 
molecules attached to surface dust into 
the vapor, allowing inhalation. When 
humidity is high, the process is less 
effective than with low humidity, be-
cause the key factor influencing odor-
molecule release is the high moisture 
content of the dog's exhaled breath. 
The lesson from these results on detec-
tion success through the morning suggests 
that some micromanagement of dog search-
ing could improve overall detection success in 
arid environments. Specifically for the condi-
tions experienced near Kabul, on calm morn-
ings, dogs should take a break during the 
second hour after dawn, which is the period 
when detection success is predicted to be low-
est as a result of humidity effects. 
The reality is that use of dogs in arid en-
vironments is routinely limited by high tem-
peratures later in the day, and mid-morning 
is a desirable time of day to be working dogs. 
It may not be realistic to stand dogs down for 
part of the morning. 
Fortunately, there are other options. For 
example, maintenance training could include 
humidity management (such as spraying of 
water on training fields) in order to mimic 
the relatively difficult high humidity condi-
tions experienced during mid-morning, and/
or maintenance training could be focused on 
that part of the day at which humidity is high-
est in the operational theatre. 
We encourage monitoring of relative hu-
midity through the day in any operational 
theatre in which dogs are being used, but par-
ticularly in arid environments. Further, regu-
lar maintenance training should be conducted 
under the most challenging conditions like-
ly to be experienced by the dogs—in general 
terms, meaning that part of the day when rela-
tive humidity is highest. 
An issue that arose in this study was the 
distribution of odor as a result of heavy rain-
fall in arid environments. Odor of mines was 
clearly transferred downstream in runoff 
channels, resulting in detection of individ-
ual mines by dogs at distances well outside 
the standard clearance perimeter for man-
ual demining. While the mine itself should 
still be found, the consequence is numerous, 
apparently false indications. Recognition of 
this effect may help to improve the efficiency 
of use of demining resources in operational 
situations.   
Summary
The overall aim of this study was to ex-
plore the effects of environmental variables on 
mine detection by dogs working in Afghani-
stan. Data were gathered during five trials car-
ried out in October 2002 and April, June, July 
Figure 5. Relative humidity (%; filled circles) 
and detection success (logit p; open circles) 
plotted for each month against time of day 
(e.g., 7 represents 7 a.m.). The final graph is 
the mean of all five trials, and standard error 
bars represent standard error of the mean of 
the five trials.
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and September 2003. Detection success was 
highest in October. After the October trial, 
Afghanistan experienced heavy rains, which 
appeared to lower detection success. No sig-
nificant variation was apparent in detection 
success of the different mine types, although 
mines with higher explosive content (weight) 
were detected more easily than smaller mines. 
Detection success decreased with increasing 
mine depth. Higher levels of vegetation re-
duced detection success, but the presence of 
spiky or aromatic plants did not affect detec-
tion. While standard weather variables (tem-
perature, relative humidity, wind speed) had 
no overall significant effects on detection suc-
cess, humidity appeared to be the most im-
portant variable. Evidence indicated that high 
humidity results in poorer detection (in arid 
environments), except in the early morning, 
when dew on the ground’s surface appeared to 
facilitate detection.
A key implication arising from this re-
search is that relative humidity should be 
monitored in any operational theatre in which 
dogs are used, particularly in environments 
where humidity varies considerably through 
the day. Variation in humidity appeared to 
influence detection success, and this effect 
could be dealt with by either standing dogs 
down when humidity is high, or by under-
taking maintenance training under the most 
challenging humidity conditions experienced 
in the operational theatre. 
Odor was clearly conducted downstream 
from mines during severe rainfall events in 
the arid environment in which this study was 
undertaken, resulting in numerous apparent-
ly false indications in drainage channels. Un-
derstanding this phenomenon could result in 
more efficient use of clearance resources in 
operational situations.  
See endnotes page 83
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period from 1991 to 2011. HCR. http://bit.ly/K7x41z or http://bit.ly/Aa2M20. 
Accessed 11 May 2012. 
2. Čerina, J. and N. Zgrabljić Rotar. (2009) “Communication in Crises and 
Media: Press Coverage on Landmine Accidents.” Medijska istraživanja, 15 (1) 
143-163.
3. A Guide to Mine Action, Fourth Edition, Geneva International Center for 
Humanitarian Demining, Geneva, 2010, pp. 124-125. GICHD. http://bit.ly/
IYJ2M5. Accessed 11 May 2012. 
4. Wheatley, A. (2002) Procjena potreba edukacije o opasnostima od mina u 
Republici Hrvatskoj. Geneva: Geneva International Center for Humanitarian 
Demining.
5. MISportal. Croatian Mine Action Centre. http://bit.ly/LxwtFC. Accessed 11 
May 2012. 
6. “Pomoć žrtvama mina.” HCR. 15 December 2010. http://bit.ly/xo6Ykt. Ac-
cessed 11 May 2012.  
7. Čerina, J. (2009) “Doprinos medija sigurnosti građana na primjeru minske 
opasnosti.” Medijski dijalozi. 2 (4) 31-41.
8. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. United Nations. http://
bit.ly/6yIrm. Accessed 11 May 2012.
Peer-support Training for Nonliterate and Semiliterate Female Ex-combatants in 
Burundi by Macauley, Onyango and Niragira [ from page 52 ]
1. “Nonliterate” is used here to signify individuals who have not been educated 
to read or write, and feel no need to do so, because literacy is not required for 
survival and social productivity. “Nonliterate” is used in place of the term 
“illiterate” which has pejorative connotations of ignorance and lack of intel-
ligence. “Functionally illiterate,” on the other hand, means someone who can 
read letters and some words but is unable to derive the meaning of a sentence.
2. “Burundi: Forced recruitment of females of Hutu origin by Hutu militia 
groups (September 2002).” Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 25 
September 2002. Refworld. http://bit.ly/urguMV. Accessed 10 November 2011.
3. Human Development Report 2009: Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility 
and Development. UNDP, New York, 2009. http://bit.ly/GyUK8. Accessed 10 
November 2011.  
4. Adult literacy rate is defined as “the percentage of people ages 15 and above 
who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on 
their everyday life.”
5. Africa: Burundi. CIA The World FactBook. http://1.usa.gov/UpoRb. Accessed 
10 November 2011. 
6. “Population, Health, and Human Well-Being—Burundi. EarthTrends. http://
bit.ly/up6jiG. Accessed 10 November 2011. 
7. Burundi. UNICEF. World Bank. http://bit.ly/tWwt1B. Accessed 31 October 
2011.
8. Social Indicators. United Nations Statistics Division. http://bit.ly/drdt2V. Ac-
cessed 10 November 2011. 
9. Literacy rate, youth female (% of females ages 15-24). The World Bank. http://
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it means that the development of Somaliland is in large part due to the 
remittances (money sent back from abroad) and the intellectual support of 
Somalis who have been living abroad, studying and working, thereby gaining 
knowledge and experience that can benefit their kin back home in Somalia/
Somaliland (although it is sometimes also detrimental to the place of origin, 
as those in the Somali diaspora often have their own agenda according to clan 
affiliation). 
2. “Somaliland.” Landmine and Cluster Munitions Monitor. http://tinyurl.
com/7ve4hvu. Accessed 3 May 2012.
3. “DDG Armed Violence Reduction. Impact numbers from 2010/2011.” Danish 
Demining Group. http://tinyurl.com/79qmrjo. Accessed 2 May 2012.
4. “Millennium Development Goals.” United Nations Development Programme. 
http://on.undp.org/zFrI5z. Accessed 8 May 2012. 
5. OECD-DAC. Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development. OECD Pub-
lishing, 2009.
Priority-setting in Mine Action: Getting More Value for the Investment by Mülli 
and Paterson [ from page 62 ]
1. Lisica, Darvin. “Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Problem: Priority Setting.” 
Journal of Mine Action, Issue 7.2 (August 2003: 14-16).
2. Keeley, Robert. “Use of Multi-Criteria Analysis in Allocating EOD Teams in 
Humanitarian Mine Action.” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 7.1 (April 2003: 
52-55). http://bit.ly/JhEYnr. Accessed 10 May 2012.
3. Goršeta, Damir. “Multicriterial Analysis Application in Mine Action.” Journal 
of Mine Action, Issue 7.2 (August 2003). http://tinyurl.com/cmmfc9u. Ac-
cessed 10 May 2012.
4. Mareschal, Bertrand. “PROMETHEE-GAIA.net: Home.” http://bit.ly/FP-
S8ZV. Accessed 10 May 2012.
5. Paterson and Vanna (2004). A Study of Capacity Development in Mine Action: 
Case Study of Cambodia.
6. Mladineo, Nenad and Snjezana Knezic. “Decision Support System for Demin-
ing Waterways.” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 7.3 (December 2003). http://
tinyurl.com/7bbazej. Accessed 25 April 2012.
7. Mladineo, Nenad, Snjezana, Knezic and Damir Goršeta. “Hierarchic Ap-
proach to Mine Action in Croatia.” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 7.2 (August 
2003: 41-45). http://bit.ly/ISK1fO. Accessed 10 May 2012
8. This is one instance of what economists term the ‘theory of the second-best,’ 
which means that if one project is not optimal (e.g., donor X has decided to 
provide mine-action funding only for one part of the country), then trying to 
make other projects optimal will generally lead to worse results than adjusting 
the other projects’ aims to compensate for the ‘sub-optimality’ of donor X’s 
project. “Theory of the Second Best”. Wikipedia. Accessed 19 March 2012. 
http://bit.ly/qzU6wO. 
9. The term “program-wide” comes from aid-effectiveness debates, meaning 
that plans and objectives should be made from the perspective of the national 
program rather than on a piecemeal basis for each project and organization 
within that program. For example, strategies and policies should exist for the 
health sector, the education sector, etc., that guide individual government 
departments, donors, operators, etc., working in these sectors.
Canadian Scientist Receives Grant to Continue Developing Innovative, Low-cost 
Prosthetic [ from page 66 ]
1. “Caring for Landmine Victims.” International Committee of the Red Cross. 
http://tinyurl.com/6s7jb5u. Accessed 12 March 2012.
2. Ogilvie, Megan. “Toronto scientist develops artificial leg that costs just $50.” 
The Toronto Star. 9 February 2012. http://tinyurl.com/75eea8g. Accessed 12 
March 2012.
3. Andrysek, Jan. “Artificial limbs for a global need: the LC Knee™ project.” The 
Sixth Annual Bloomview Research Institute Symposium. 22 November 2011. 
http://tinyurl.com/brbjgz4. Accessed 19 March 2012.
4. Bendsoe, Martin Philip and Ole Sigmund. Topological Optimization: Theory, 
Methods and Applications (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2003).
5. “Methods of Processing Plastic.” Plasticsindustry.com. 2012. http://tinyurl.
com/br52aa9. Accessed 30 March 2012.
Estonian Demining Expert Killed in Libya [ from page 68 ]
1. Rhinelander, Marcus. “Deadly cluster bomb thought to have killed Estonian 
mine expert.” Libya Herald. 11 March 2012. http://bit.ly/wagKrl. Accessed 27 
March 2012. 
2. “Estonian deminer dies in Libya blast.” The Daily Star. 5 March 2012. http://
bit.ly/GI8nnk. Accessed 27 March 2012. 
3. “Estonian Killed in Libya Was Civilian.” Estonian Public Broadcasting. 6 
March 2012. http://bit.ly/GDJ1eo. Accessed 27 March 2012. 
Environmental Simulations for EOD Shaped Charges by Liechti [ from page 70 ]
1. “SM-EOD 33 Contact Free Demining Equipment.” SAAB Bofors Dynamics 
Switzerland Ltd. http://saabgroup.com/sm-eod. Accessed 6 June 2012. 
2. “Department of Defense Test Method Standard MIL STD 810F: Environ-
mental Engineering Considerations and Laboratory Tests.” Department of 
Defense. 1 January 2000. MIL STD 810F emphasizes tailoring the equipment's 
environmental design and test limits to the conditions that it will experience 
throughout its service life, and establishing test methods that replicate the 
effects of environments on the equipment rather than imitating the environ-
ments themselves. 
3. “Department of Defense Test Method Standard MIL STD 331C: Fuze and Fuze 
Components, Environmental and Performance Tests.” Department of Defense. 
5 January 2005. MIL STD 331C reflects standardization among the services 
and improvements in fuze design, test technology, and safety. 
4. “Standardization Agreement for Environmental Testing Edition 2.” North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization Standardization Agency. 19 April 2005. STANAG 
4370 gives guidelines on the management of environmental testing of defense 
material, characterizes environments, and standardizes environmental testing 
processes.
5. “Allied Environmental Conditions and Test Publications 300: Climactic 
Environmental Tests Edition 3.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization Stan-
dardization Agency. 18 May 2006. AECTP 300 is one of 5 documents included 
in STANAG 4370. AECTP 300 test methods address climatic elements which 
may occur either individually or in combination with other climatic elements 
or mechanical environments. 
6. “Allied Environmental Conditions and Test Publications 400: Mechanical 
Environmental Tests Edition 3.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standard-
ization Agency. 18 May 2006. AECTP 400 Test Methods address mechanical 
environments, both individually and when combined with other environ-
ments, such as climatic environments included in AECTP 300. The applica-
tion of combined environments is relevant and often necessary where failures 
could be expected from potential synergistic effects.
7. “International Electrotechnical Commission 60068-2: Environmental Test-
ing.” International Electrotechnical Commission. October 1988. IEC 60068-2 
enumerates a series of environmental tests and appropriate severities, and 
prescribes various atmospheric conditions for measurements for the ability of 
specimens to perform under normal conditions of transportation, storage and 
operational use.
8. The likelihood that a material will break down (fatigue) over multiple uses 
(cycles).
9. Rolled Homogenous Armor is a type of steel used to armor vehicles from 
velocity metal projectiles. It is made by processing cast steel billets and then 
rolling them into plates. Hot rolling homogenizes the structure of the steel 
elongates the grain structure, thus strengthening the steel and allowing stress 
to be loaded throughout the metal instead of concentrating on one area.
Environmental Determinants of Landmine Detection by Dogs: Findings From a 
Large-scale Study in Afghanistan by Sargisson, McLean, Brown and Bach [ from 
page 74 ]
1. Lemish, Michael G. War Dogs: A History of Loyalty and Heroism. Potomac 
Books Inc., 1999.
2. Hayter, Dan. “Training Dogs to Detect Tripwires.” Mine Detection Dogs: 
Training Operations and Odour Detection, June 2003. Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian Demining.  http://bit.ly/M21pPN. Accessed 14 June 
2012.
3. Duggan, Jennifer M., Heske, Edward J., Schooley, Robert L., Hurt, Aimee and 
Alice Whitelaw. “Comparing Detection Dog and Livetrapping Surveys for a 
Cryptic Rodent.” The Journal of Wildlife Management, 75 (2011), 1209-1217. 
http://bit.ly/M8pUa9. Accessed 14 June 2012.
4. McLean, Ian. “Environmental applications in demining.” Journal of Mine Ac-
tion, 9.2 (2006), 59-60. http://bit.ly/LHNhuu. Accessed 14 June 2012.
5. Horwood, Chris. “The Use of Dogs for Operations Related to Humanitarian 
Mine Clearance.” Lyon: Handicap International, 1997. 
6. Mine Detection Dogs: Operations, Case Studies of Operational Systems, 
September 2005. Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining.  
http://bit.ly/NlPlMF. Accessed 14 June 2012.
7. Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance. IHS Jane’s: Defense & Security Intelligence 
and Analysis. http://bit.ly/L822YO. Accessed 14 June 2012.
8. IMAS 09.42: Operational Testing of Mine Detection Dogs and Handlers, Second 
Edition, United Nations Mine Action Service (1 March 2008). http://bit.ly/
NlUzb6. Accessed 14 June 2012.
9.  “Detection of Landmines by Dogs: Environmental and Behavioural Deter-
minants.” November 2005. Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining.  http://bit.ly/IIPAMM. Accessed 14 June 2012.
10. Fisher’s Least Significant Difference test is a statistical test that compares the 
mean of one group with the mean of another.
11. Phelan, James M. and Stephen W. Webb. “Chemical Sensing for Buried 
Landmines: Fundamental Processes Influencing Trace Chemical Detection.” 
Mine Detection Dogs: Operations, Case Studies of Operational Systems, June 
2003. Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. http://bit.ly/
KwAC0y. Accessed 14 June 2012.
For a glossary of terms and  
additional online articles, visit  
http://cisr.jmu.edu/journal/index.html.
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FOCUS: Clearance Operations Trends and Technologies 
Issue 17.1 will look at trends and innovations in mine action. What new procedures and equip-
ment have been developed to increase the speed that land can be returned to a conflict-affected 
community? What tried-and-true methods are best for clearance? How do governments decide 
what is an acceptable level of residual risk? Case studies showing effectiveness of clearance methods 
and technologies will be considered. What is the mine-action community seeing regarding donor 
funding, government support, clearance methods, land release, and new techniques developed? 
FEATURE: Post-conflict Recovery: Gender and Age Issues 
The Feature section will address gender and age issues in post-conflict situation. How does gender 
affect the ability of men, women, girls and boys to seek and obtain assistance following an injury 
from an explosive remnant of war or traumatic war injury? Is one gender or age group better able to 
recover from ERW injuries than another? If so, why? Is there a difference in how gender and age af-
fects survivors or how survivors are served? How are survivors of different genders and ages included 
in mine action? What inconsistencies affect employment and how? What is being done (or can be 
done) to address these inequities? Are these discrepancies long lasting? Or do the differences ease 
as time passes? What programs have proven effective in addressing post-conflict age and/or gender 
issues? How does age and/or gender affect the employability of healthy people in post-conflict situ-
ations? How have solutions to these concerns matured since the onset of humanitarian mine action?
Photo top: New techology demonstration at the U.S. Department of Defense, Humanitarian Demin-
ing Workshop, 2012. Photo courtesy of Lois Carter Fay/CISR.
Photo left: A young Afghan boy recovering from limb-loss. Photo courtesy of Jed Puretecinc.
Peer-reviewed Research, Technology and Development Section 
All articles on current trends and developments in R&D will be considered for this section. Topics 
will include but not be limited to Detection and Neutralization, Manual or Mechanical Equipment, 
Data Fusion, Biosensors (including dogs, rats and bees), GIS, Mapping and Terrain Analysis, Personal 
Protective Equipment, Demining Tools, Metal Detectors, Needs of Users, Lessons Learned, Test and 
Evaluation, Information Technology, Mine-detection Test Facilities, Landmines, ERW and Ordnance.
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